Publication Date

1-1-1995

DOI

10.17848/9780585282985

Abstract

By applying econometric analyses to case data from two states, Falaris, Link and Staten identify the economic incentives influencing the probability of litigation in workers' compensation cases, and the probability that a contested case is pursued to verdict.

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Contents

  1. Workers' Compensation and Market Efficiency
  2. The Delaware Data and Characteristics of the Workers' Compensation System
  3. An Economic Model of Workers' Compensation Litigation and an Empirical Methodology
  4. The Determinants of Litigation and Payments for Workers' Compensation in Delaware
  5. Determinants of Litigation: Michigan Closed Case Study
  6. Conclusions and Implications

Sponsorship

Financial support provided by the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research

ISBN

9780880991612 (pbk.) ; 9780585282985 (ebook)

Subject Areas

UNEMPLOYMENT, DISABILITY, and INCOME SUPPORT PROGRAMS; Workers compensation and disability; Benefits and financing; Disability

Causes of Litigation in Workers' Compensation Programs

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Citation

Falaris, Evangelos M., Charles R. Link, and Michael E. Staten. 1995. Causes of Litigation in Workers' Compensation Programs. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. https://doi.org/10.17848/9780585282985

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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-Share Alike 4.0 International License.