Pension Incentives and Job Mobility
Using models developed for this study which incorporate an array of behaviors generally omitted from conventional models relating backloading to turnover, Gustman and Steinmeier find that backloading plays only a slight role in explaining mobility differences associated with pension coverage. They propose that higher wages often paid at pension-covered jobs play a greater role in reducing mobility than do pensions.
Download 1. Introduction and Overview (815 KB)
Relevant reports submitted to the Department of Labor are entitled 'Job Mobility, Older Workers and the Role of Pensions,' September 1987; 'Evaluating Pension Policies in a Model with Endogenous Contributions,' June 1988; and 'Pension Portability and Labor Mobility,' October 1990
Research supported by three grants from the U.S. Department of Labor and by a Martin Segal Fellowship through the Rockefeller Fund in Economics at Dartmouth College
9780880991513 (pbk.) ; 9780585183466 (ebook)
LABOR MARKET ISSUES; Retirement and pensions; Wages, health insurance and other benefits
Gustman, Alan L., and Thomas L. Steinmeier. 1995. Pension Incentives and Job Mobility. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. https://doi.org/10.17848/9780585183466