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Does Employment Protection Inhibit Labor Market Flexibility?: Lessons from Germany, France and Belgium

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**DOES EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION INHIBIT LABOR MARKET FLEXIBILITY?
LESSONS FROM GERMANY, FRANCE AND BELGIUM**

Upjohn Institute Staff Working Paper 93-16

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DOES EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION INHIBIT LABOR MARKET FLEXIBILITY? LESSONS FROM GERMANY, FRANCE AND BELGIUM

ABSTRACT

Laws in most West European countries give workers strong job rights, including the right to advance notice of layoff and the right to severance pay or other compensation if laid off. Many of these same countries also encourage hours adjustment in lieu of layoffs by providing prorated unemployment compensation to workers on reduced hours.

This paper compares the adjustment of manufacturing employment and hours in West Germany, France and Belgium, three countries with strong job security regulations and well-established short-time compensation systems, with that in the United States. Although the adjustment of employment to changes in output is much slower in the German, French and Belgian manufacturing sectors than in U.S. manufacturing, the adjustment of total hours worked is much more similar. The short-time system makes a significant contribution to observed adjustment in all three European countries. In addition, we find little evidence that the weakening of job security regulations that occurred in Germany, France and Belgium during the 1980s affected employers' adjustment to changes in output.

These findings suggest that, given appropriate supporting institutions, strong job security need not inhibit employer adjustment to changing conditions.

DOES EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION INHIBIT LABOR MARKET FLEXIBILITY? LESSONS FROM GERMANY, FRANCE AND BELGIUM

I. Introduction

In most West European countries, workers historically have enjoyed strong job rights, including the right to advance notice of layoff and the right to severance pay or to negotiations over compensation for layoff. During the 1970s, on the eve of the first oil price shock, many of these countries significantly strengthened the notice and severance pay requirements imposed on employers who carried out collective dismissals. Particularly following the rapid growth in European unemployment during the late 1970s and early 1980s, these laws came under attack, and many were weakened over the course of the 1980s.

The question of whether and to what extent job security regulations adversely affect labor market flexibility remains a matter of continuing controversy. Critics have claimed that strong job rights prevent employers from adjusting to economic fluctuations and secular changes in demand. It has also been alleged that, by inhibiting layoffs during downturns, strong job security provisions reduce employers' willingness to hire during upturns and thereby contribute to unemployment.¹

In fact, the effects of job security regulations on labor market adjustment are poorly understood. Although job security regulations would be expected to slow the adjustment of employment to an unexpected shock, the magnitude of this effect is debatable. Moreover, strong job security regulations typically have been accompanied by measures intended to facilitate alternatives to layoff such as work sharing. Whether and to what extent variation in working hours offers employers a viable substitute to adjustment through layoffs remains an open question.

In this paper we provide new evidence on these issues. We compare the adjustment of employment to changing levels of demand in West Germany, France, and Belgium, all countries with strong job security regulations, with that in the United States. Insofar as is possible with existing data, we also examine the responsiveness of hours worked to changes in the level of output in each of these countries. Finally, we ask whether changes in the strength of German, French and Belgian job security regulations during the 1970s and 1980s were associated with corresponding changes in the speed of employment or hours adjustment.

We begin in Section II with a discussion of selected features of the German, French and Belgian industrial relations systems, focusing on job security regulations and on measures intended to encourage work sharing. For purposes of comparison, relevant U.S. institutions are also described. Our modeling strategy and data are briefly outlined in Section III. Section IV documents the responsiveness of employment and, where possible, the responsiveness of hours, to changes in output in the countries studied. Section V contains our tests of the effects of

changes in job security law on observed adjustment, and Section VI offers a few concluding observations.

II. Institutional Background

Many features of a country's industrial relations system may affect employers' adjustment decisions. Among the most noteworthy are regulations that impose notice and severance pay requirements on employers who dismiss workers and measures that encourage hours adjustment in lieu of layoffs. Like most other West European countries, Germany, France and Belgium all impose significant notice and severance pay requirements on employers who lay off workers. The most important features of these countries' job security regulations are summarized in Table 1. In addition, as outlined in Table 2, all three countries have unemployment insurance systems that allow for prorated replacement of lost income for workers whose hours have been reduced as part of an approved short-time plan.

Like other West European countries, Germany, France and Belgium tightened their job security regulations during the 1970s, then weakened them in one or more important ways during the 1980s. All three countries experienced substantial increases in unemployment during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Thus, tighter job security regulations were associated with subsequent increases in unemployment. In each country, the relaxation of job security regulations during the 1980s reflected pressure from employer groups that argued that existing regulations were unduly restrictive and that weakening those regulations would increase employment.

Below, we briefly review the laws governing collective dismissals in Germany, France, and Belgium and relevant aspects of each country's unemployment insurance system. These countries' policies are then contrasted with those in the United States.

West Germany

The first law requiring German employers to give advance notice of dismissal to individual workers was passed during the 1920s. Today, required periods of notice to individual workers in Germany vary from two weeks to six months, depending upon whether the worker holds a blue-collar or a white-collar job and upon his or her seniority and age.²

In addition to stipulating advance notice for individual workers, German law gives the works council, a legally-mandated body of elected worker representatives, important powers in the event of a collective dismissal. Under current law, employers must keep both the works council and the local employment office advised of any developments that might lead to a collective dismissal over the next twelve months, and must consult the works council "as soon as possible" when contemplating such a layoff. The most important provision of the current law was introduced by the Works Constitution Act of 1972. That law requires, in cases of collective dismissal at an establishment normally employing more than twenty employees, that management

and the works council must negotiate a social plan that stipulates compensation for workers who lose their jobs. In the event that the two parties cannot agree on a social plan, the law provides for binding arbitration.

Settlements in social plans vary considerably from case to case, and depend upon the worker's tenure and wage, as well as the company's financial condition. A recent study by Hemmer (1988) provides the best available data on the amounts of compensation paid out. In a sample of 145 social plans negotiated between 1980 and 1985, the median settlement was between 10,000 and 15,000 DM per recipient, or about 15 to 25 weeks pay for a person with average blue-collar industrial earnings.

Between 1972 and 1985, the negotiation of a social plan was required if an employer laid off more than about 10 percent of the work force or more than 30 workers. The Employment Promotion Act of 1985 raised these thresholds to about 20 percent of the work force or more than 60 workers and gave new firms a four-year exemption from the social plan requirement. In addition, the new law made it easier for employers to hire workers on fixed-term contracts. German law regulates the use of fixed-term contracts so that employers cannot evade job security regulations by hiring temporary workers who do not fall under the law's strictures. Prior to 1985, fixed-term contracts could last for no more than six months except under special circumstances. The 1985 law lengthened the allowable duration of fixed-term contracts to eighteen months and to twenty-four months for new small businesses.

German workers who are laid off are eligible to collect unemployment insurance benefits. The payroll tax that finances these benefits is not experience rated, so that German employers incur no increase in unemployment insurance tax liability when they lay off workers. Because of the advance notice and other requirements associated with collective dismissals, temporary layoffs are virtually unknown in Germany, but the German unemployment insurance system does provide for short-time benefits. With the approval of the works council and the Employment Service, firms can reduce employees' hours of work and those employees can collect prorated unemployment insurance benefits, which are financed in the same way as benefits to laid-off workers. Firms applying for short-time benefits must show that other measures for accommodating the fall in demand, such as reductions in overtime and rebuilding inventories, have already been taken. Since 1969, short-time benefits have been payable for six months under ordinary circumstances and for up to twelve months to employees of establishments in depressed regions or industries. In 1975, the allowable duration of benefit payment was extended to twenty-four months during periods of general recession.³

France

As in Germany, the requirement that workers be given advance notice of layoff has a long history in France. Under current law, the required period of notice is one month for workers with at least six months' service, two months for workers with at least two years' service and three months for persons in middle management positions. French law also provides for

severance payments to workers with at least two years' service who have not been fired for poor performance or other serious cause. The amount of severance pay guaranteed by law is one-tenth of one month's salary or twenty hours' pay for each year of service, though these amounts may be increased by the terms of applicable collective bargaining agreements.

French employers are required to meet additional legal requirements before carrying out collective dismissals involving as few as two workers over a thirty-day period. Before carrying out any such layoff, the employer is obliged to consult with the works council and advise the Labor Inspectorate of its plans. If ten or more workers are to be laid off, the law provides for minimum periods of consultation with the works council and notice to the Labor Inspectorate.

The most important changes to French labor law in recent years relate to these requirements. From 1975 through 1986, employers who wished to carry out any collective dismissal were required to obtain authorization from the Labor Inspectorate, which investigated both the reasons for the dismissal and the measures taken to avoid it. New rules effective as of 1987, however, have eliminated this requirement. The same reform also eliminated all administrative oversight of layoffs involving fewer than ten employees and substantially reduced required periods of notice for larger layoffs.⁴

Like Germany, France also has a well-established structure for paying benefits to individuals whose hours of work have been temporarily reduced. The French system includes two types of payment, one from the state and the second from the employer under the terms of a 1968 national inter-industry agreement. The former payment may be received except when workers are idled by an industrial dispute at their own establishment; the latter is not payable to workers idled by any industrial dispute. The public payment is a fixed hourly amount equal to 65 percent of the minimum wage for reductions in hours below 39 per week. The complementary employer payment raises the short-time benefit to 50 percent of the worker's gross wage for reductions in hours below 36 per week, subject to a ceiling. Benefits currently may be paid for up to 500 hours per year.

To encourage the use of short time, employers may be reimbursed for between 50 and 80 percent of their share of workers' short-time benefits. In practice, reimbursement rates of 70 to 80 percent are common. Agreements between an employer and the state concerning reimbursement of the employer's share of short-time benefit costs may last three months when the reimbursement rate is 70 percent or more, or six months when the reimbursement rate is 50 percent, with the possibility in both cases of one extension for a like term.⁵

Belgium

Like German and French employers, Belgian employers are required to give advance notice of dismissal to affected workers. For blue-collar workers past their probationary period, the notice period is 28 days for workers with less than twenty years of service and 56 days for workers with more than twenty years of service. Since 1978, much longer notice periods have

been required for white-collar workers, starting with a minimum of three months for those with less than five years of service and rising by three months for each successive five-year anniversary attained. In addition, highly paid white-collar workers were given the right to an amount of notice to be determined by the labor court. Subsequent court rulings effectively guaranteed these workers substantially longer notice periods.

Belgian law specifies no mandatory compensation to workers who are individually dismissed beyond the amount they are paid while serving out their period of notice. Belgian workers involved in a collective dismissal are entitled to special compensation from their employer in the amount of 50 percent of the difference between their previous net pay and their unemployment benefit or current net earnings. Workers who received less than three months' notice are entitled to receive this special payment for up to four months; the period of entitlement is reduced by one month for each extra month of notice received. Belgian law also contains special provisions for compensation to workers who lose their jobs because their plant closes.

In contrast to both German and French law, Belgian law does not require employers to justify dismissals. A law passed in 1972, however, requires that worker representatives be consulted before an employer carries out a collective dismissal. In addition, under the terms of a 1975 Royal Decree, which took effect in 1976, companies are required to provide detailed information to the state in the event of a planned layoff and to wait for at least 30 days after submitting this information before notifying affected workers of their dismissal. The introduction of this requirement was an important milestone in the development of Belgian labor law.⁶

Although the requirements imposed on employers who lay off blue-collar workers are less stringent in Belgium than in Germany and France, the growth of unemployment in the 1980s led to pressure for measures to increase employment flexibility. In addition to reducing periods of notice for white-collar workers, the reform package introduced in 1985 eased regulations concerning the use of fixed-term contracts and made a number of other smaller but collectively significant changes (EIRR, 1984).

Among the three European countries we have studied, Belgium has the most liberal rules governing payment of short-time benefits to production workers. Production workers' short-time benefits are paid out of the regular unemployment insurance fund, which is financed by a payroll tax of a uniform percentage amount. Legislation that would have experience rated the contributions that pay for short-time compensation was introduced in 1991, but did not pass (Vroman, 1992, p. 22). Short-time compensation replaces 55 to 60 percent of a worker's net wages, depending upon his or her family situation. The rules governing payment of short time are complex, but allow a blue-collar worker to collect short time indefinitely so long as he or she works a minimum of 3 days per week or every other week if on a system of rotating layoffs and if the government does not disapprove the payment. Belgian white-collar workers are guaranteed full pay during slack periods and are generally not eligible for short-time benefits.⁷

The United States

The requirements governing layoffs and the provision for short-time benefits described above offer a significant contrast to the general absence of similar arrangements in the United States. Prior to 1988, advance notice of layoffs and plant closings was required in only three states: Maine, Wisconsin, and Hawaii. In the absence of any national law requiring advance notice, workers often received little or no warning prior to being let go. In addition, workers who are permanently laid off often receive no severance pay.⁸

Although U.S. employers are not required to make severance payments to laid-off workers, the fact that the U.S. unemployment insurance system is experience rated means that layoffs may lead to an increase in unemployment insurance tax liability. For a U.S. employer, the effective unemployment insurance cost of laying off a worker depends upon three things: his or her weekly benefit amount; the duration of benefit receipt; and the share of benefits for which the employer ultimately pays through higher unemployment insurance taxes. Weekly benefit amounts average roughly 35 percent of weekly wages; the average duration of benefit receipt varies somewhat over the business cycle, but has averaged about 14 weeks; and, at the margin, a typical employer bears about 60 percent of the cost of benefits paid to laid-off workers (though many employers are already paying the maximum unemployment insurance tax rate and thus incur no increase in costs if they lay off additional workers).⁹ Thus, a rough estimate of the unemployment insurance cost to a typical employer of laying off another worker is about three weeks' wages in the form of increased unemployment insurance tax liability.

Paying unemployment insurance benefits to workers whose hours have been reduced is a recent innovation in the United States. At present, only seventeen states have laws allowing prorated payment of unemployment insurance benefits to workers whose hours are reduced under approved worksharing plans, and most of these laws were passed quite recently.

Implications for Labor Adjustment

Because of the institutional features of the German, French and Belgian labor markets, we would expect that employers in these countries would respond quite differently to changes in production than would their American counterparts. The advance notice and severance pay requirements that exist in all three countries can be expected to slow the adjustment of employment to changes in output. Given that mass layoffs are relatively costly in all of the European countries included in our study, we would expect greater reliance on attrition to achieve desired work force reductions there than in the United States.

While we would expect the adjustment of employment to be slower in these European countries than in the United States, we would not necessarily expect slower adjustment of total labor input. High employment adjustment costs should increase employers' reliance on hours adjustments. In addition, the availability of short-time compensation makes it less costly to adjust average hours per worker.¹⁰ A priori, it is unclear whether German, French and Belgian

employers are, in fact, less able than U.S. employers to adjust labor input to changes in demand. Our empirical analysis looks at this question.

A final issue of interest is whether changes during the 1970s and 1980s to the job security regulations in each of the three European countries studied affected the speed with which labor input adjusted to changes in output.

III. Model and Data

We have used a standard Koyck model of the dynamic demand for labor to study labor adjustment in Germany, France, Belgium and the United States. The model assumes that employers seek to maximize the expected present value of current and future profits; that the costs of adjusting labor input are a quadratic function of the size of the adjustment made; and that determinants of the demand for labor other than output change sufficiently smoothly that they can be captured by time trends. Under these conditions and given certain assumptions about how employers form their expectations of future demand, the adjustment of labor to changes in the level of output can be represented by the following equation:

$$(1) \quad \ln L_t = \alpha + (1-\lambda)\phi \ln P_t + \lambda \ln L_{t-1} + \delta_1 t + \delta_2 t^2 + \epsilon_t,$$

where L represents employment (E), production employment (PE) or production hours (PH), P represents output, t is a time trend and ϵ is the equation error. In this model, the parameter λ lies between zero and one, and captures the speed of adjustment to changes in output. Larger values of λ are associated with slower adjustment speeds. A value of zero for λ implies that adjustment occurs instantaneously.

In interpreting cross-country differences in the estimated value of λ , it should be noted that a given difference in λ implies a larger difference in the speed of adjustment to a shock at high than at low values of λ . In the model specified, the proportion of the adjustment of labor input to a one-time change in output that occurs with a lag of t periods declines geometrically with t and equals $(1-\lambda)\lambda^t$. The median lag in adjustment is the time required for 50 percent of the adjustment to be complete. In an equation using quarterly data, a drop in the estimated value of λ from 0.9 to 0.8 would imply a sizable drop in the median adjustment lag, from 6 to 3 quarters. For values of λ of 0.5 or less, half or more of the adjustment to an output shock occurs concurrently, so that the median adjustment lag is zero quarters. Thus, a reduction in λ from, say, 0.4 to 0.3 would have no effect on the median adjustment lag. The mean lag in adjustment, which is the weighted average of the lag lengths $t=0,1,2,\dots,\infty$ with the weight for each t equal to the share of adjustment occurring at that lag, can be calculated as $\lambda/(1-\lambda)$ (Maddala, 1977, p. 360). A drop in the estimated value of λ from 0.9 to 0.8 would imply a drop in the mean adjustment lag from 9.0 to 4.0 quarters, whereas a decline in λ from 0.4 to 0.3 would imply a much smaller decline in the mean adjustment lag, from 0.7 to 0.4 quarters. When we report estimated values of λ for the

purpose of making cross-country comparisons, we also report the values of the implied median lag and mean lag in adjustment.

Our specification treats output as exogenous. Although this assumption might be questioned, as a practical matter there is no real alternative. Our model also assumes that the costs of adjusting labor input are a quadratic function of its change. Although the true structure of adjustment costs has been widely debated in the economics profession, whatever their structure, we would expect larger adjustment costs to produce less complete adjustment.¹¹ Moreover, although the model we have estimated was originally developed to explain the behavior of individual employers, all else the same, larger adjustment costs should produce larger values of λ in models estimated using aggregate data.

Finally, our specification assumes that information on current output is sufficient to generate employers' expectations concerning future output. In earlier work (Abraham and Houseman, 1992), we found that making more complex assumptions about output expectations had little effect on the relative estimated speeds of adjustment across countries. We also have estimated finite distributed lag models of the labor adjustment process and reached qualitative conclusions generally similar to those based on the models reported here. In short, although there are certainly questions that could be raised concerning our model specification, we believe both that our choice is defensible and that our qualitative conclusions would not have been much different had we made a different choice.

We use equation (1) or a variant of it to assess the contribution of short-time work to observed labor adjustment and to assess the effect of changes in labor market regulation on the speed with which labor inputs are adjusted.¹² In all models where Durbin-h tests indicated that there was first-order serial correlation in the error term, we made the appropriate correction.

Seasonally adjusted quarterly series for the German, French and Belgian manufacturing sectors and for selected manufacturing industries in those countries are used to estimate the models just described. Comparable estimates for the United States are also reported for purposes of comparison. Usable data on production employment and production hours are not available for France. Our principal measure of output for all four countries is an index of industrial production. We also make use of data on short-time hours for Germany, France and Belgium. Further details concerning data sources and construction are provided in the data appendix.

IV. Patterns of Labor Adjustment

The first part of our empirical analysis looks at the adjustment of employment and hours to changes in output over the 1973-1990 period taken as a whole. In addition, we examine the contribution of the short-time system to labor adjustment in Germany, France and Belgium.

Employment and Hours Adjustment

Before turning to the estimation of formal adjustment models, we begin by examining plots of production, production worker employment and production worker hours indices for Germany, Belgium and the United States.¹³ Figure 1 displays these plots for the manufacturing sector as a whole and for the textiles; apparel; stone, clay and glass; primary metals; automobiles; paper; printing; and chemicals industries. These industries were selected for inclusion both here and in the estimation reported below because there was a close correlation between the European and U.S. industry definition and because at least some usable time series data were available for at least two European countries. There are no plots of French data in Figure 1 because suitable production employment and production hours series for France do not exist.

Consistent with our expectations, production employment in Germany and Belgium moves smoothly and is unresponsive to short-run changes in output, whereas in the United States, movements in production employment closely follow those in output. In contrast, in both Germany and Belgium, production hours—and by implication average hours per production worker—generally appear quite responsive to output changes, and German and Belgian hours adjustment appears to be much more similar to U.S. hours adjustment than German and Belgian employment adjustment is to U.S. employment adjustment.

Tables 3A, 3B and 3C report the estimated adjustment coefficients from Koyck models of employment, production employment and production hours adjustment fit for Germany, France, Belgium and the United States, as permitted by available data. In the employment adjustment models reported in Table 3A, the differences between the estimated European adjustment coefficients and those for the United States are uniformly large and statistically significant. The larger European coefficients imply that employment adjustment there is substantially slower than in the United States. In manufacturing as a whole, for example, the implied median lag is 3 quarters in Germany, 10 quarters in France, and 3 quarters in Belgium, whereas over half (62%) of the adjustment in the United States occurs in the current quarter. Similarly, the mean adjustment lag is 5.1 quarters in Germany, 14.4 quarters in France, and 4.6 quarters in Belgium, but only 0.6 quarters in the United States. Consistent with plots in Figure 1, the production employment models reported in Table 3B imply a similar contrast between the adjustment of production employment in both Germany and Belgium and that in the United States.

Our estimates of the speed of hours adjustment for Germany, Belgium and the United States are reported in Table 3C. Comparison of the German and U.S. coefficients shows that, for manufacturing as a whole and for five of seven disaggregated industries, German hours adjustment is significantly slower than U.S. hours adjustment. In all of these cases, however, the implied difference in the speed of German and U.S. hours adjustment is much smaller than the implied differences in the speeds of employment and production employment adjustment. For example, although they differ statistically, the German and U.S. hours adjustment coefficients for the manufacturing sector as a whole both imply a median adjustment lag of zero quarters and a mean adjustment lag of less than one quarter.

The hours adjustment results for Germany reported here are somewhat different than those we reported in an earlier paper (Abraham and Houseman, 1992). In our earlier work, we estimated adjustment equations for the 1974-1984 period for each of eleven manufacturing industries using shipments deflated by a price index as our output measure. The estimated German coefficients in these models were more similar to those for the United States; for none of the eleven industries did we find evidence that German hours adjustment was significantly slower than U.S. hours adjustment.

Although no single factor accounts for all of the differences, the use of production rather than shipments as the measure of output for the United States seems to be the most important. For purposes of comparison, we also report the results of U.S. production hours adjustment models that use deflated shipments as the measure of output. For all of manufacturing and for several disaggregated industries—apparel, stone, clay and glass, automobiles, and chemicals—the use of production rather than shipments as the measure of output for the United States substantially reduces the estimated speed of adjustment parameter, implying faster adjustment in the United States. Given that finished goods inventories may be used to buffer against demand changes, we might expect faster adjustment when production rather than shipments is used as the measure of output. For aggregate manufacturing and automobiles the drop in the estimated coefficient for the United States also may be related to the way the production index was constructed; for these two industries production hours account for 20 percent and 36 percent, respectively, of the production index. The use of production hours in the construction of the production index in these two cases would be expected to lower the estimated speed of adjustment coefficient. For aggregate manufacturing and the auto industry estimates of hours adjustment in Germany are quite similar to those in the United States when deflated shipments are used as the measure of output for the United States.

The results for Belgium in Table 3C are even more similar to those for the United States. For three of the six disaggregated industries for which comparisons can be made, hours adjustment in Belgium is insignificantly different than that in the United States. In those industries where Belgian hours adjustment is slower than U.S. hours adjustment, the implied mean lag in Belgian adjustment is never more than one quarter longer than that in the United States.¹⁴ Our findings for Belgium are generally consistent with those reported by Van Audenrode (1991), who, using a somewhat different model and a different output measure, concluded that hours adjustment in Belgian manufacturing was as rapid as that in U.S. manufacturing.

The Use of Short Time

It is of interest to ask how short-time work contributes to labor adjustment in the European countries we study. The data available allow us to address this question in somewhat different ways for Germany, France and Belgium.

For Germany, our general strategy is to ask how hours adjustment would have differed had no workers been placed on short time, assuming that employers' adjustment behavior otherwise remained unchanged. Using data on the number of manufacturing sector workers on short time and on the percent reduction in hours experienced by those workers, we constructed estimates of the total number of production worker hours for which short-time compensation was paid. The data on short time apply to all workers, not just production workers. The estimates reported assume that only production workers work short time, though the results are not much different if we assume that short-time hours are distributed between production and nonproduction workers in proportion to their share of total employment.¹⁵

Using this series, it is possible to show the contribution of fluctuations in short-time hours to the adjustment of production labor input. The results of this exercise are reported in the top panel of Table 4. The "with short time" adjustment parameter is the same number as was reported in Table 3C; the "without short time" numbers were derived by first constructing a total production hours series equal to hours actually worked plus short-time hours, then estimating our standard hours adjustment equation using this series. The results clearly indicate that the short-time system plays an important role in German employers' adjustment of labor input to changes in output.¹⁶

Because there is no usable French hours series, we have carried out a somewhat different exercise for France, asking how much larger measured employment adjustment would have been had employers made layoffs to achieve the hours reductions accomplished through short time. The French report quarterly data on the full-time equivalent number of days of authorized short time. We divided these numbers by 65 to yield a full-time employment equivalent usage measure, and constructed a labor input series by subtracting this number of employees from the actual employment series. We then fit labor adjustment models using both actual employment and this adjusted employment series to construct our dependent variable. Like the results for Germany, the French results, reported in the second panel of Table 4, indicate that the use of short time makes an important contribution to the adjustment of labor input. In particular, the results imply that the median and the mean adjustment lags for employment would fall by over half if layoffs were used in lieu of short-time work. By implication, in the short run, short-time work is a more important mechanism for adjusting labor input than is the adjustment of employment levels.

For Belgium, we were able to obtain monthly data on the number of full-time equivalent persons on short-time for the aggregate economy. Although we did not have monthly short-time data disaggregated by sector, we did have data on the proportion of short-time work accounted for by manufacturing for two years. To construct a quarterly short-time hours series for Belgian manufacturing, we multiplied the short-time hours series for the aggregate economy by 0.475, the average of the proportion of short-time hours accounted for by manufacturing in 1985 and 1990, and aggregated the monthly data to yield quarterly figures. As was done for Germany, we then added the short-time hours to production hours and estimated our standard hours adjustment equation with this series.

The results of this exercise, reported in the bottom panel of Table 4, are quite similar to those for Germany and show that short-time hours make an important contribution to total hours adjustment in Belgium. Because the manufacturing sector is somewhat more cyclical than the aggregate economy, our estimates, if anything, understate the importance of short time in Belgian manufacturing hours adjustment.

V. Have Dismissal Laws Inhibited Labor Market Flexibility?

As already noted, we are particularly interested in whether the changes to job security regulations in Germany, France and Belgium during the 1970s and 1980s affected the speed with which labor input adjusts to changes in output. By making it easier to reduce work force levels during periods of slack demand, proponents of weaker regulation argued that it also would make employers more willing to hire during periods of rising demand. There is, however, little empirical evidence on this issue.

To support their claims, proponents of weaker job security regulation often appealed to employer surveys of the sort summarized in Table 5. The employer responses reported there are based on a survey conducted by the Commission of the European Communities in 1985. Over half of manufacturing employers in each of the three European countries we are studying cited "insufficient flexibility in hiring and shedding of labor" as a "very important" or "important" obstacle to increased employment. This percentage is particularly large (81 percent) in France, where, at that point in time, employers who wanted to dismiss workers were required to obtain the authorization of the Labor Inspectorate. Many manufacturing employers, particularly in Germany and Belgium, believed that shorter notice periods, enhanced possibilities for using temporary workers, and lower severance payments would have a "significant positive" effect on their hiring plans. Comparable figures for the United Kingdom, where job security regulations are much less stringent, are also reported to provide a point of reference. Not surprisingly, U.K. employers who responded to the survey were much less likely to cite hiring and firing rigidities as a barrier to employment.¹⁷

Our approach to assessing the effects of legal changes is to look for changes in the pace of labor adjustment that might have accompanied the introduction of more or less stringent regulations. For Germany, we ask whether the speed of adjustment changed following passage of the Employment Promotion Act in 1985.¹⁸ That law raised the thresholds concerning the number of employees who could be laid off without an employer being required to negotiate a social plan with the works council. It also liberalized the use of fixed-term contracts. The nature of these changes suggests that the responsiveness of employment to changes in output might have risen following the law's passage. To the extent that employers had not fully compensated for the slower adjustment of employment with the faster adjustment of average hours per worker, we also might expect that the weakening of employment protection laws would be accompanied by more rapid adjustment of total labor input.

Modified versions of equation (1) can be used to assess the effect of changes in labor market regulation on the speed with which labor inputs are adjusted. For example, to test whether the 1985 Employment Promotion Act raised the speed of labor adjustment in Germany we estimate:

$$(2) \quad \ln L_t = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 D85:2 + (1 - \lambda_0 + \lambda_1 D85:2) \ln L_{t-1} + \delta_1 t + \delta_2 t^2 + \epsilon_t$$

where D85:2 is a dummy variable that takes a value of one in all quarters from 1985:2 onwards and a value of zero prior to that date. The results of this test are reported in the top panels of Table 6A (total employment), Table 6B (production employment), and Table 6C (production hours). Had employment become more responsive, we would have expected a negative value for λ_1 . The estimated values for λ_1 vary in sign, though with one exception the coefficients are insignificant. Our finding that passage of the 1985 Employment Promotion Act did not raise the speed of employment adjustment is consistent with that of Kraft (1990), who reaches the same conclusion using a somewhat different specification.¹⁹

In France, the major change in dismissal regulation that we are able to study is the elimination in 1987 of the requirement that the Labor Inspectorate authorize all dismissals of two or more workers.²⁰ Particularly given the large proportion of French employers who reported in 1985 that insufficient flexibility in the hiring and shedding of labor was a major obstacle to employment, it is plausible that this legal change would have had an important effect on the pace of employment adjustment. Again, however, our findings offer no strong support for this position.

If weaker job security regulations encourage more rapid employment adjustment, we would have expected a negative value of λ in the employment adjustment models reported in the middle panel of Table 6A. Although the estimated value of λ_1 is negative and significant for three of seven disaggregated industries, this result obtains neither for manufacturing as a whole nor for the remaining four disaggregated industries. We interpret these results as providing no more than weak support for the view that the weakening of French dismissal regulations has increased the speed of employment adjustment.

Although changes to dismissal law were less dramatic in Belgium than in the other two countries, significant reforms were introduced in 1976 and 1985. A Royal Decree in 1975, effective at the start of 1976, imposed the requirement that employers who make collective dismissals must notify the government 30 to 60 days in advance of carrying them out. In 1985 a package of reforms loosened employment regulations in a variety of ways. We would expect, therefore, that adjustment speeds would have fallen following the imposition of the 1975 Royal Decree (λ_1 positive in the models reported in the bottom panels of Tables 6A, 6B, and 6C) and risen following the 1985 reforms (λ_2 negative in those same models). In certain of the Belgian equations, particularly those with the logarithm of total employment as the dependent variable, we obtain small estimates of λ_0 and large estimates of λ_1 . This pattern probably is attributable

to the fact that we have only twelve quarterly observations prior to the introduction of the 1976 reforms. Leaving these cases aside, our results offer no consistent support for the view that legislative changes have produced important changes in adjustment speeds. Our findings concerning the lack of any effect of the 1975 Decree are consistent with those of Van Audenrode (1991), who fit separate adjustment equations using 1965-1975 data and 1976-1986 data and found no evidence of a change in the estimated model parameters between the two time periods.

Taken as a whole, then, our results provide no strong evidence that changes in the strength of job security regulations since the early 1970s have affected the speed of labor adjustment in Germany, France or Belgium. Various interpretations of this finding are possible. One could argue that the regulatory changes we have identified did not fundamentally change the relevant legal framework, or that the constraints imposed by collective bargaining agreements are more important than those imposed by the laws we have considered, so that legal changes had only limited effects. In the French context, these arguments do not seem plausible. There is widespread agreement that the elimination of the requirement for government approval of layoffs in France was an important change. Although the post-1972 changes in German and Belgian dismissal regulation were less major, observers in both countries have viewed the changes as significant.

In addition, although there is no clear theoretical reason for the Koyck adjustment coefficients we have estimated to be affected by differences in demand conditions, it is possible that our findings are contaminated by the different aggregate economic conditions of the 1970s and 1980s. Cleaner tests of the effects of different regulatory regimes may become possible if the European countries experience a deep downturn of the sort produced by the first oil price shock in the mid-1970s. In some cases, we also have relatively few observations either before or following a major change in legislation, thus raising the standard errors and lowering the significance of the coefficients capturing the effects of the change. In the future, with a longer time series it may be possible to construct a stronger test of the effects of the more recent legal changes.

Perhaps the most intriguing interpretation of our findings is that the changes to job security regulations in Germany, France and Belgium during the 1970s and 1980s had little effect because employers had adapted to a strong job security regime by using alternate adjustment mechanisms that have generally proved to be satisfactory and which they feel no compelling need to change. This interpretation is consistent with our earlier findings that the speed of hours adjustment, at least in Germany and Belgium, is more similar to that in the United States than is the speed of employment adjustment and that the availability of short-time compensation facilitates hours adjustment in these countries.

VI. Conclusion

Our results suggest that, at least under certain circumstances, strong job security is compatible with labor market flexibility. Although the adjustment of employment to changes in output is much slower in the German, French and Belgian manufacturing sectors than in the U.S. manufacturing sector, the adjustment of hours worked appears to be much more similar. Further support for the view that job security regulations have not been burdensome for employers in the three countries we have studied comes from the fact that seemingly important changes in these regulations have not led to measurably different adjustment. A plausible interpretation of this finding is that, in spite of the important constraints imposed upon their behavior by existing job security regulations, employers in these countries have developed alternate strategies that have given them adequate flexibility to adjust their labor input to changes in output.

Compared to the United States, then, labor market institutions in the European countries we have studied seem to have encouraged relatively greater reliance on hours adjustment and correspondingly reduced reliance on hiring and firing to alter the level of employment. This finding raises the question of how the competing systems we have examined should be evaluated.

Although the use of short time and the use of temporary layoffs during a cyclical downturn may be reasonably close substitutes from the employer's point of view, they are quite different from the employee's perspective. Workers on temporary layoff are likely to face considerable uncertainty about whether they will ever be recalled. Those who are never recalled experience longer than average unemployment spells, in part because they tend not to look for new work while awaiting recall. These lengthy spells of unemployment represent a loss of income for the individual workers and a loss of resources to society. Extensive reliance on layoffs is also less equitable than work sharing, for it concentrates the costs of adjustment on a relatively small number of workers who suffer large losses of income and other job-related benefits. Short-time work arrangements spread the costs of adjustment more evenly across members of the work force. These are important arguments in favor of short-time work to accommodate cyclical fluctuations in demand.

Short-time work may be used to accommodate structural as well as cyclical downturns. By extending the time over which these work force reductions occur, employers can make greater use of attrition and other alternatives to layoff. The use of short-time work in instances of structural adjustment is more controversial. Economists typically take the position that in the event of a permanent decline in demand, workers should be reallocated to other sectors as quickly as possible. To achieve this, large-scale layoffs, where necessary, have been advocated, on the assumption that dislocated workers will then be forced to find new employment. A number of recent studies of displaced workers in the United States show, however, that workers permanently laid off from their jobs often experience long periods of unemployment (see, for example, Podgursky and Swaim, 1987 or Seitchik and Zornitsky, 1989). By using short-time work as an interim adjustment measure and relying on attrition to reduce work force levels, firms can significantly reduce or even avoid layoffs. In this way, job reductions occur among those who

have the most attractive outside opportunities or who are best able to relocate, and those who have poor outside opportunities or who are unable to relocate are not thrown out of work.

Currently seventeen states in the United States have short-time compensation programs, but data show that in these states short-time compensation is used relatively little compared to regular unemployment insurance. The reasons for this low take-up rate are not entirely clear. One factor is no doubt that U.S. law makes it relatively easy for employers to lay off workers. Because there are no significant legal obstacles to continued reliance on layoffs, U.S. employers arguably have no compelling incentive to rethink their established adjustment strategies. Certain aspects of the way in which existing U.S. short-time programs have been administered also may have discouraged the use of short-time benefits.²¹ For example, in contrast to Europe where short-time payments are financed either through a non-experience-rated payroll tax or through general tax revenues, in the United States, short-time benefits are financed through an experience-rated payroll tax, which may discourage their use. In addition, the maintenance of health care benefits for employed workers may be more of a disincentive to the use of short time in the United States than in Europe.²² Whether and how U.S. employers should be encouraged to make greater use of short time remain important unanswered questions.

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Data Appendix

Figure 1 and the estimates reported in Tables 3, 4, and 6 make use of seasonally adjusted quarterly data on output, employment, production employment and production hours, as available for each of the four countries included in the study.

For all four countries, the principal output measure is an index of industrial production (IPI). The German IPI is based on employer reports concerning the output of some 10,000 product groups. For France, 45 percent of the underlying series are based on production measured in physical units, 13 percent on input quantities, 18 percent on deflated turnover, 18 percent on hours worked, 5 percent on raw materials consumed, and 1 percent on orders converted into production. The Belgian IPI is based primarily on physical production data, but in metal working, which receives a weight of about 30 percent in the construction of the total manufacturing index, movements in deflated turnover and in hours worked serve as equal proxies for movements in output. Where available, information on physical output serves as the basis for the IPI for the United States. Information on energy usage is generally the preferred proxy for the level of production activity where output data are unavailable, but in some cases person-hours serve as a production activity proxy. The IPI's for the three European countries were obtained on tape from Eurostat and the U.S. IPI data are published by the Federal Reserve Board. We also make limited use of deflated shipments series for the United States. The U.S. shipments data were obtained from the Bureau of the Census's Manufacturer's Shipments, Inventories and Orders data set and were deflated using the manufacturing, the durable goods or the nondurable goods producer price index, as appropriate.

Monthly data on German employment, production employment and production hours were obtained directly from the Statistisches Bundesamt. Because employment is measured at the end of the month in Germany, rather than at mid-month as in the United States, we transformed the German employment numbers defining:

$$(A1) \quad E'_t = (E_t + E_{t-1}) / 2$$

These transformed numbers were used in all analyses, though making this adjustment had little effect on any of our estimates. The German hours numbers measure actual hours worked during the course of the month. For France, we used quarterly employment indices supplied by Eurostat. French production employment data are not available; although French hours data are published, they are not comparable over time. Eurostat supplied us with indices of employment, production employment and production hours for Belgium. The Eurostat figures for Belgium are quarterly for the pre-1980 period and monthly from 1980 onwards; to ensure comparability over time, the later figures were converted to quarterly numbers before seasonally adjusting. Belgian labor data for the manufacturing sector as a whole were reported by Eurostat only from 1980 onwards; complete quarterly series on manufacturing employment, production employment and production hours were obtained from Dr. Jean Lemaitre of Louvain University. The Belgian employment numbers refer to employment as of the pay period including the 15th of the month; the Belgian hours numbers measure hours worked during the month. The U.S. employment and hours data are monthly numbers published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The U.S.

employment figures refer to payroll employment as of the payroll period including the 12th of the month; the U.S. hours numbers measure hours paid during the same period.

None of the four countries' employment or hours series are adjusted for the effects of strikes. In cases where we knew that large strikes had occurred (for example, in the German automobile industry in 1984), we included dummy variables for the affected periods in our estimating equations.

In addition to the data just described, the estimates reported in Table 4 require data on hours of short-time compensation. For Germany, the underlying data are monthly figures on the number of workers in the manufacturing sector collecting short-time payments and annual data on the distribution of workers collecting short-time payments according to the percentage reduction in their hours of work. These numbers were taken from *Amtliche Nachrichten der Bundesanstalt für Arbeit - Jahreszahlen* (various issues), published by the Bundesanstalt für Arbeit. For France, monthly data by industry on the number of full-time equivalent days of authorized short-time compensation are reported in *Statistiques du Travail: Bulletin Mensuel*, published by the Ministère des Affaires Sociales et de l'Emploi. We received unpublished data on short-time payments in Belgium, expressed in terms of the full time equivalent number of workers supported, from Dirk de Bie of the Office National de l'Emploi.

Table 1
Summary of Selected Provisions in German, French and Belgian Dismissal Law

	<u>Germany</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>Belgium</u>
<u>Individual Dismissal Law</u>			
Social or economic justification of dismissal required	Yes	Yes	No
Period of notice to affected individuals	Blue collar: < 5 years: 2 weeks > 5 years: 1 month > 20 years: 3 months White collar: < 5 years: 6 weeks > 5 years: 3 months > 12 years: 6 months	> 6 months: 1 month > 2 years: 2 months middle management: 3 months	Blue collar: < 20 years: 28 days > 20 years: 56 days White collar: Since 1978, 3 months per new period of 5 years seniority and longer for highly paid employees
Compensation to affected individuals	None.	1/10th of month's pay per year of service plus 1/15 of month's pay for each year over 10 years of service.	None.
<u>Collective Dismissal Law</u>			
Definition of Collective Dismissal	Approximately 20% of work force over 30-day period, depending on establishment size. Thresholds raised in 1985.	2 or more employees over 30-day period. More stringent regulations apply if 10 or more dismissed.	Approximately 10% of work force over a 60-day period, depending on establishment size.

Table 1
(Continued)

	<u>Germany</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>Belgium</u>
Additional notice and consultation requirements	Obligation to inform and consult with worker representatives. Local employment office must be informed of dismissal. May delay dismissal for up to 2 months	Obligation to inform and consult with worker representatives. Labor inspector must be informed of dismissal of 10 or more workers and dismissal may take place only after specified waiting period.	Obligation to inform and consult with worker representatives. Government must be informed of dismissal. Waiting period of 30 days following notification to government. Waiting period may be extended to 60 days.
Additional compensation to affected individuals	Social plan must be negotiated between works council and management. Provision for binding arbitration if agreement cannot be reached.	None.	Workers entitled to receive 50 percent of difference between previous pay and unemployment benefit for up to four months, depending on length of notice. Special payments in the event of a plant closing.
Other requirements	None.	Administrative authorization of all economic dismissals of 2 or more persons required from 1975-1986.	None.

Table 2
Selected Features of German, French, and Belgian
Short-Time Compensation Systems

	<u>Germany</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>Belgium</u>
Benefit amount	63-68% of net pay for hours not worked	<p>1) Public payment of 65% of minimum wage for reductions below 39 hours per week.</p> <p>2) Employer payment to raise short-time benefit to 50% of gross wages for reduction below 36 hours per week, subject to a ceiling. State may reimburse employers for 50-80% of this payment.</p>	55-60% of net pay for hours not worked.
Noteworthy limitations	Works council and local employment office must approve plan.	No benefits paid to strikers. Employer benefit not paid to any worker idled by an industrial dispute. Labor inspector must approve plan.	Usually available only for blue-collar workers. White-collar workers guaranteed full pay during slack periods.

Table 2
(Continued)

	<u>Germany</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>Belgium</u>
Allowable period of benefit receipt	6-24 months, depending on industry, regional or national economic conditions. Allowable periods extended by 1969 and 1975 laws. Special provisions for steel.	Up to a maximum of 500 hours per year (600 hours per year July 1981-December 1985, 400 hours per year before July 1981). State will partially reimburse employers for their portion of payments for 3-6 month period, with one extension possible.	Indefinite, provided individual works certain minimum amount and government doesn't disapprove payment.
Funding	Non-experience-rated payroll tax.	General revenues.	Non-experience-rated payroll tax.

Table 3A
 Estimated Speed of Employment Adjustment in Manufacturing
 in the United States, Germany, France and Belgium,
 1973-1990^a

	<u>Germany</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>Belgium</u>	<u>United States</u>
Manufacturing	.837 (.016) [3, 5.1]	.935 (.026) [10, 14.4]	.823 (.032) [3, 4.6]	.383 (.039) [0, 0.6]
Textiles	.918 (.024) [7, 11.2]	.905 (.073) [6, 9.5]	.950 (.044) [13, 19.0]	.530 (.046) [1, 1.1]
Apparel	.859 (.066) [4, 6.1]	(NA)	.710 (.062) [1, 2.4]	.397 (.091) [0, 0.7]
Stone, Clay, & Glass	.853 (.025) [4, 5.8]	.924 (.026) [8, 12.2]	.809 (.039) [3, 4.2]	.568 (.032) [1, 1.3]
Primary Metals	.897 (.078) [6, 8.7]	.937 (.048) [10, 14.9]	.726 (.089) [2, 2.6]	.504 (.039) [1, 1.0]
Autos	.897 (.076) [6, 8.7]	.934 (.037) [10, 14.2]	.828 (.052) [3, 4.8]	.331 (.049) [0, 0.5]
Paper	.906 (.046) [6, 9.6]	.910 (.036) [7, 10.1]	(NA)	.557 (.048) [1, 1.3]
Printing	.864 (.027) [4, 6.4]	.927 (.031) [9, 12.7]	(NA)	.858 (.059) [4, 6.0]
Chemicals	(NA)	.925 (.036) [8, 12.3]	.877 (.040) [5, 7.1]	.698 (.055) [1, 2.3]

^a The speed of adjustment parameter is the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable from the following Koyck model: $\ln E_t = \alpha + (1-\lambda)\phi \ln P_t + \lambda \ln E_{t-1} + \delta_1 t + \delta_2 t^2 + \epsilon_t$. The standard error of the estimated adjustment parameter is reported in parentheses and the implied median, mean adjustment lag in brackets.

Table 3B
 Estimated Speed of Production Employment Adjustment in Manufacturing
 in the United States, Germany, and Belgium,
 1973-1990^a

	<u>Germany</u>	<u>Belgium</u>	<u>United States</u>
Manufacturing	.800 (.017) [3, 4.0]	.792 (.038) [2, 3.8]	.325 (.041) [0, 0.5]
Textiles	.912 (.027) [7, 10.4]	.924 (.048) [8, 12.2]	.507 (.044) [1, 1.0]
Apparel	.858 (.090) [4, 6.0]	.607 (.087) [1, 1.5]	.380 (.094) [0, 0.6]
Stone, Clay, & Glass	.822 (.024) [3, 4.6]	.547 (.109) [1, 1.2]	.508 (.027) [1, 1.0]
Primary Metals	.885 (.090) [5, 7.7]	.955 (.056) [14, 21.2]	.458 (.038) [0, 0.8]
Autos	.883 (.073) [5, 7.5]	.902 (.038) [6, 9.2]	.276 (.051) [0, 0.4]
Paper	.886 (.051) [5, 7.8]	(NA)	.540 (.044) [1, 1.2]
Printing	.873 (.050) [5, 6.9]	(NA)	.873 (.053) [5, 6.9]
Chemicals	(NA)	.866 (.045) [4, 6.5]	.551 (.064) [1, 1.2]

^a The speed of adjustment parameter is the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable from the following Koyck model: $\ln PE_t = \alpha + (1-\lambda)\phi \ln P_t + \lambda \ln PE_{t-1} + \delta_1 t + \delta_2 t^2 + \epsilon_t$. The standard error of the estimated adjustment parameter is reported in parentheses and the implied median, mean adjustment lag in brackets.

Table 3C
 Estimated Speed of Production Hours Adjustment in Manufacturing
 in the United States, Germany, and Belgium,
 1973-1990^a

	<u>Germany</u> ^b	<u>Belgium</u> ^b	<u>United States</u> ^b	<u>United States</u> ^c
Manufacturing	.433 (.066) [0, 0.8]	.441 (.066) [0, 0.8]	.132 (.051) [0, 0.2]	.362 (.051) [0, 0.6]
Textiles	.714 (.058) [2, 2.5]	.542 (.101) [1, 1.2]	.295 (.059) [0, 0.4]	.257 (.153) [0, 0.3]
Apparel	.652 (.062) [1, 1.9]	.063 (.105) [0, 0.1]	.076 (.105) [0, 0.1]	.547 (.189) [1, 1.2]
Stone, Clay, & Glass	.512 (.052) [1, 1.0]	.181 (.082) [0, 0.2]	.340 (.036) [0, 0.5]	.549 (.070) [1, 1.2]
Primary Metals	.621 (.064) [1, 1.6]	.104 (.107) [0, 0.1]	.314 (.038) [0, 0.5]	.253 (.059) [0, 0.3]
Autos	.363 (.072) [0, 0.6]	.407 (.063) [0, 0.7]	.119 (.041) [0, 0.1]	.240 (.044) [0, 0.3]
Paper	.381 (.098) [0, 0.6]	(NA)	.374 (.057) [0, 0.6]	.475 (.174) [0, 0.9]
Printing	.504 (.071) [0, 1.0]	(NA)	.830 (.065) [3, 4.9]	.813 (.052) [3, 4.3]
Chemicals	(NA)	.621 (.088) [1, 1.6]	.366 (.065) [0, 0.6]	.596 (.106) [1, 1.5]

^a The speed of adjustment parameter is the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable from the following Koyck model: $\ln PH_t = \alpha + (1-\lambda)\phi \ln P_t + \lambda \ln PH_{t-1} + \delta_1 t + \delta_2 t^2 + \epsilon_t$. The standard error of the estimated adjustment parameter is reported in parentheses and the implied mean adjustment lag in brackets.

^b Estimates use production indices as the measure of output.

^c Estimates use deflated shipments as the measure of output.

Table 4
 Estimated Effects of Short Time on Adjustment
 in German, French, and Belgian Manufacturing, 1973-1990

	Germany ^a	
	Hours Adjustment Without Short Time	Hours Adjustment With Short Time
Speed of adjustment (standard error) [median, mean adjustment lag]	.655 (.082) [1, 1.9]	.433 (.066) [0, 0.8]
	France ^b	
	Employment Adjustment With Short Time	Employment Adjustment Assuming Layoffs Used In Lieu of Short Time
Speed of adjustment (standard error) [median, mean adjustment lag]	.930 (.030) [9, 13.3]	.847 (.044) [4, 5.5]
	Belgium ^a	
	Hours Adjustment Without Short Time	Hours Adjustment With Short Time
Speed of adjustment (standard error) [median, mean adjustment lag]	.658 (.070) [1, 1.9]	.441 (.066) [0, 0.8]

^aThe German and Belgian with-short-time coefficients are the estimated λ 's from the Koyck models with the logarithm of production hours as the dependent variable reported in Table 3C. The without-short-time coefficients are the estimated λ 's from similar models using the logarithm of production hours plus short-time hours as the dependent variable.

^bThe French without-short-time coefficient is slightly different from the estimated λ from the Koyck model with the logarithm of employment as the dependent variable reported in Table 3A because the French short-time series begins in 1973:4. The with-short-time coefficient is the estimated λ from a similar model using the logarithm of employment minus short-time days during the quarter divided by 65 as the dependent variable.

Table 5
Selected Results from a 1985 European Community Survey
of Manufacturing Employers^a

(1) Insufficient flexibility in hiring and shedding labor as an obstacle to more employment

Percent responding:	<u>Germany</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>Belgium</u>	<u>U.K.</u>
- very important	23	48	38	7
- important	33	33	37	19
- not important	39	15	25	58
- no answer	5	4	0	16

(2) Expected effects on employment plans over next 12 months of shorter periods of notice in case of redundancies, dismissals and simpler legal procedures

Percent responding:	<u>Germany</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>Belgium</u>	<u>U.K.</u>
- significant positive	31	18	33	6
- little positive	32	30	41	22
- no change	34	34	25	66
- negative	1	13	1	3
- no answer	2	5	0	3

(3) Expected effects on employment plans over next 12 months of more frequent use of temporary contracts

Percent responding:	<u>Germany</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>Belgium</u>	<u>U.K.</u>
- significant positive	23	13	30	4
- little positive	51	41	33	23
- no change	22	40	31	66
- negative	2	1	6	4
- no answer	2	5	0	3

(4) Expected effects on employment plans over next 12 months of reduction in redundancy payments that might have to be paid

Percent responding:	<u>Germany</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>Belgium</u>	<u>U.K.</u>
- significant positive	21	7	26	6
- little positive	25	15	37	17
- no change	50	67	36	71
- negative	2	6	1	4
- no answer	2	5	0	2

^a Survey methodology and results summarized in Commission of the European Communities, *European Economy*, March 1986, No. 27.

Table 6A
 Estimated Effects of Changes in Employment Law
 on Adjustment of Employment

	All Manufac- turing	Textiles	Apparel	Stone, Clay, and Glass	Primary Metals	Autos	Paper	Printing	Chemicals
<u>Germany^a</u>									
λ_0 (speed of adjustment)	.829 (.017)	.920 (.025)	.879 (.058)	.850 (.025)	.875 (.075)	.874 (.023)	.911 (.048)	.864 (.028)	(NA)
λ_1 (Dummy 1985:2+)	.035 (.025)	-.056 (.082)	.407 (.239)	.051 (.067)	-.389 (.350)	-.265 (.602)	-.077 (.468)	-.164 (.434)	
<u>France^b</u>									
λ_0 (speed of adjustment)	.897 (.032)	.757 (.176)	(NA)	.905 (.029)	.853 (.090)	.917 (.059)	.871 (.051)	.819 (.052)	.875 (.046)
λ_1 (dummy 1987:1+)	-.007 (.034)	.090 (.090)		-.194 (.083)	-.008 (.065)	-1.058 (.276)	-.125 (.117)	.037 (.081)	-.305 (.122)

Table 6A
(Continued)

	All Manufac- turing	Textiles	Apparel	Stone, Clay, and Glass	Primary Metals	Autos	Paper	Printing	Chemicals
<u>Belgium^c</u>									
λ_0 (speed of adjustment)	.775 (.087)	.049 (.040)	.137 (.041)	.042 (.032)	.139 (.061)	.817 (.112)	(NA)	(NA)	.129 (.029)
λ_1 (dummy 1976:1+)	.056 (.089)	.517 (.082)	.215 (.068)	.733 (.075)	.442 (.153)	.035 (.084)			.877 (.120)
λ_2 (dummy 1985:1+)	.036 (.037)	1.115 (.232)	.377 (.125)	-.055 (.060)	.207 (.129)	.139 (.085)			-.293 (.201)

^a Reported coefficients (standard errors) are from the following model using quarterly data over the 1972-1990 period:

$$\ln E_t = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 D85:2 + (1 - \lambda_0 - \lambda_1 D85:2) \phi \ln P_t + (\lambda_0 + \lambda_1 D85:2) \ln E_{t-1} + \delta_1 t + \delta_2 t^2 + \epsilon_t.$$

^b Reported coefficients (standard errors) are from the following model using quarterly data over the 1975:2-1991:1 period:

$$\ln E_t = \alpha_0 + \alpha_2 D87:1 + (1 - \lambda_0 - \lambda_1 D87:1) \phi \ln P_t + (\lambda_0 + \lambda_1 D87:1) \ln E_{t-1} + \delta_1 t + \delta_2 t^2 + \epsilon_t.$$

^c Reported coefficients are from the following model using quarterly data over the 1973-1990 period:

$$\ln E_t = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 D76:1 + \alpha_2 D85:1 + (1 - \lambda_0 - \lambda_1 D76:1 - \lambda_2 D85:1) \phi \ln P_t + (\lambda_0 + \lambda_1 D76:1 + \lambda_2 D85:1) \ln E_{t-1} + \delta_1 t + \delta_2 t^2 + \epsilon_t.$$

Table 6B
 Estimated Effects of Changes in Employment Law
 on Adjustment of Production Employment

	All Manufac- turing	Textiles	Apparel	Stone, Clay, and Glass	Primary Metals	Autos	Paper	Printing	Chemicals
<u>Germany</u> ^a									
λ_0 (speed of adjustment)	.793 (.018)	.906 (.092)	.875 (.079)	.820 (.024)	.871 (.076)	.892 (.055)	.888 (.054)	.869 (.058)	(NA)
λ_1 (dummy 1985:2+)	.020 (.026)	.092 (.035)	.411 (.296)	.048 (.061)	-.458 (.270)	-.281 (.422)	-.158 (.401)	-.296 (.528)	
<u>Belgium</u> ^b									
λ_0 (speed of adjustment)	.658 (1.291)	.919 (.068)	.620 (.191)	.490 (.562)	.949 (.050)	.649 (.157)	(NA)	(NA)	.976 (.074)
λ_1 (dummy 1976:1+)	.351 (1.291)	-.043 (.080)	-.041 (.125)	-.030 (.563)	-.002 (.036)	.174 (.154)			-.158 (.115)
λ_2 (dummy 1985:1+)	-.044 (.025)	.205 (.156)	.110 (.203)	.166 (.192)	-.017 (.041)	.101 (.223)			-.148 (.109)

^a Reported coefficients (standard errors) are from the following model using quarterly data over the 1972-1990 period:

$$\ln PE_t = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 D85:2 + (1 - \lambda_0 - \lambda_1 D85:2) \phi \ln P_t + (\lambda_0 + \lambda_1 D85:2) \ln PE_{t-1} + \delta_1 t + \delta_2 t^2 + \epsilon_t$$

^b Reported coefficients (standard errors) are from the following model using quarterly data over the 1973-1990 period:

$$\ln PE_t = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 D76:1 + \alpha_2 D85:1 + (1 - \lambda_0 - \lambda_1 D76:1 - \lambda_2 D85:1) \phi \ln P_t + (\lambda_0 + \lambda_1 D76:1 + \lambda_2 D85:1) \ln PE_{t-1} + \delta_1 t + \delta_2 t^2 + \epsilon_t$$

Table 6C
 Estimated Effects of Changes in Employment Law
 on Adjustment of Production Hours

	All Manufac- turing	Textiles	Apparel	Stone, Clay, and Glass	Primary Metals	Autos	Paper	Printing	Chemicals
<u>Germany^a</u>									
λ_0 (speed of adjustment)	.424 (.066)	.716 (.057)	.653 (.063)	.515 (.067)	.609 (.061)	.372 (.074)	.379 (.100)	.486 (.070)	(NA)
λ_1 (dummy 1985:2+)	.203 (.684)	.591 (.586)	.408 (.550)	.078 (.114)	-.045 (.097)	-.156 (.118)	.040 (.888)	.271 (.546)	
<u>Belgium^b</u>									
λ_0 (speed of adjustment)	.226 (.119)	.394 (.131)	.757 (.157)	.200 (.265)	-.393 (.183)	.079 (.185)	(NA)	(NA)	.178 (.209)
λ_1 (dummy 1976:1+)	.124 (.103)	-.028 (.147)	-.188 (.097)	-.075 (.242)	.457 (.214)	.243 (.182)			.517 (.228)
λ_2 (dummy 1985:1+)	.226 (.078)	.521 (.257)	.230 (.150)	.061 (.150)	.509 (.168)	-.192 (.220)			-.155 (.148)

^a Reported coefficients (standard errors) are from the following model using quarterly data over the 1972-1990 period:

$$\ln PH_t = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 D85:2 + (1 - \lambda_0 - \lambda_1 D85:2) \phi \ln P_t + (\lambda_0 + \lambda_1 D85:2) \ln PH_{t-1} + \delta_1 t + \delta_2 t^2 + \epsilon_t.$$

^b Reported coefficients (standard errors) are from the following model using quarterly data over the 1973-1990 period:

$$\ln PH_t = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 D76:1 + \alpha_2 D85:1 + (1 - \lambda_0 - \lambda_1 D76:1 - \lambda_2 D85:1) \phi \ln P_t + (\lambda_0 + \lambda_1 D76:1 + \lambda_2 D85:1) \ln PH_{t-1} + \delta_1 t + \delta_2 t^2 + \epsilon_t.$$

Figure 1

SEASONALLY ADJUSTED PRODUCTION, EMPLOYMENT AND HOURS, 1973-90




Figure 1
(continued)

SEASONALLY ADJUSTED PRODUCTION, EMPLOYMENT AND HOURS, 1973-90




Figure 1
(continued)

SEASONALLY ADJUSTED PRODUCTION, EMPLOYMENT AND HOURS, 1973-90








Figure 1
(continued)

SEASONALLY ADJUSTED PRODUCTION, EMPLOYMENT AND HOURS, 1973-90



Data for
Belgian Paper
not available









Figure 1
(continued)

SEASONALLY ADJUSTED PRODUCTION, EMPLOYMENT AND HOURS, 1973-90



Data for
Belgian Printing
not available

Data for
German Chemicals
not available



Endnotes

1. For an elaboration of these arguments, see OECD (1986) and Soltwedel (1988).
2. A 1990 decision of the Federal Constitutional Court, the highest German court, declared the disparate treatment of blue-collar and white-collar workers under these statutes to be unconstitutional. This decision instructed the parliament to pass new legislation providing for equal notice periods for the two groups prior to June 30, 1993 (Brandes, Meyer and Schudlich 1992, pp. 22-23).
3. For a more detailed discussion of German institutions, see Abraham and Houseman (1993).
4. For discussions of French dismissal law and its evolution over time, see Rojot (1980, 1986) and EIRR (1985b, 1986).
5. For additional information on the French short-time system, see Grais (1983) and EIRR (1983). We have also benefitted from conversations about the system with David Gray of the University of Ottawa.
6. Further details concerning Belgian dismissal law can be found in EIRR (1985a), Vranken (1986), and Blanpain (1989).
7. See Grais (1983), EIRR (1983) and Vroman (1992) for further discussion of the Belgian short-time system.
8. See General Accounting Office (1986) for survey results on the incidence of advance notice and severance pay.
9. *Unemployment Insurance Financial Data*, published by the U.S. Department of Labor, contains data on weekly benefit amounts, weekly wages in covered employment, and the duration of benefit receipt. Vroman (1989) discusses alternative estimates of the degree of experience rating.
10. Formal models of the effects of employment adjustment costs on both employment and hours are surveyed by Nickell (1986) and Hamermesh (1993). Burdett and Wright (1989) model the effect of access to short-time compensation through the unemployment insurance system. In their model, the short-time compensation subsidy associated with imperfect experience rating increases employers' reliance on hours adjustments and raises the volatility of average hours relative to the volatility of employment. Even in a perfectly experience-rated unemployment insurance system, giving liquidity-constrained employers access to short-time benefits for their workers may produce the same result.
11. For example, if adjustment costs are linear and there are periods during which firms choose not to hire or fire, then λ should be approximately equal to the fraction of periods during which no hiring or firing occurs and that fraction should be larger when adjustment costs are higher (Card, 1992). Similarly, the existence of fixed costs of adjustment should

reduce the probability that a firm will adjust its labor input when output changes and raise the estimated value of λ (Hamermesh, 1989).

12. We also tested for differences in the speed of labor adjustment in response to negative versus positive output shocks. The differences, however, were always very small and generally statistically insignificant, and we do not report the results of this exercise.

13. Total employment behaves similarly to production employment, but is omitted from the plots.

14. As in the United States, hours data are used in the construction of the Belgian production indices for aggregate manufacturing and the auto industry, comprising about 15 percent of the weight in each index.

15. Additional details concerning our procedures for constructing time series on German production workers' short-time hours are reported in Abraham and Houseman (1993).

16. Results estimated using data for more disaggregated manufacturing industries confirm the importance of the role played by short time in German hours adjustment.

17. The responses to a similar survey of European employers in the retail trade sector show much the same pattern.

18. The German data series that we use in the present paper begin in 1970 and thus in principle would permit us to test the effects of the social plan requirement introduced by the Works Constitution Act of 1972. However, the results of any test based on data containing only eight pre-1972 observations would be highly suspect.

19. The Works Constitution Act of 1972 changed German job security regulations more fundamentally than did the Employment Promotion Act of 1985. The 1972 act's requirement that employers who carry out a collective dismissal must negotiate a social plan with the works council might have been expected to slow employers' adjustment to changing economic conditions. In earlier work using a somewhat different approach, however, we found no evidence that this occurred (Abraham and Houseman, 1993).

20. Given that French data are available from the last quarter of 1972 onwards, we could have reported tests of the effects of the 1975 introduction of the requirement that employers receive authorization for all dismissals. The results of this test, however, were implausible, presumably because of the small number of observations prior to the requirement's introduction.

21. See Abraham and Houseman (1993) for a more detailed discussion.

22. At least in Germany, however, special provisions concerning the maintenance of social insurance contributions as well as collective bargaining agreement provisions concerning vacation time and other special payments to workers imply that the fixed costs of keeping a worker on the payroll are substantial (Flechsengar, 1978 and Abraham and Houseman, 1993). These costs have not prevented German employers from making substantial use of the short-time

system.