10-1-1995

Employment Research, Vol. 2, No. 2, Fall 1995

Follow this and additional works at: https://research.upjohn.org/empl_research

Citation

W.E. Upjohn Institute. 1995. Employment Research 2(2). [https://doi.org/10.17848/1075-8445.2\(2\)](https://doi.org/10.17848/1075-8445.2(2))

This title is brought to you by the Upjohn Institute. For more information, please contact repository@upjohn.org.

UPJOHN INSTITUTE

Employment Research

FALL 1995

**Institute Celebrates
50th Anniversary**

Welfare to Work
Local Observations on a National Issue

◆
**Performance Management
of Active Labor Programs
in Eastern Europe**

◆
**Institute Announces
Dissertation Award Winners**

◆
New Books

Vol. 2, No. 2

Employment Research is a publication of the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, a nonprofit research organization devoted to finding and promoting solutions to employment-related problems at the national, state, and local level. The Institute is an activity of the W. E. Upjohn Unemployment Trustee Corporation, which was established in 1932 to administer a fund set aside by the late Dr. W. E. Upjohn, founder of the Upjohn Company, to seek ways to counteract the loss of employment income during economic downturns.

W. E. Upjohn Institute
300 S. Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, MI 49007-4686
(616) 343-5541

Randall W. Eberts
Executive Director

Randall W. Eberts

Welfare to Work

Local Observations on a National Issue

Central to the current welfare reform debate is how best to get people off welfare and into jobs. The current choice is between long-term training and education and short-term job search assistance and employability skills. Previous attempts at revamping the welfare system, such as the JOBS program under Family Support Act of 1988 and the Work Incentive (WIN) program in the early 1980s, emphasized longer-term training and education. While these programs have proven to have significant but modest impacts for participants, they are relatively more expensive and time consuming than rapid employment programs. Current thinking in Washington and among many states is moving in the direction of short-term job search assistance as the preferred way off welfare.

Several states have not waited for Congress to come to any conclusion. Michigan started a program, called Work First, in October 1994 that focuses on providing AFDC recipients with short-term job search assistance and employability skills. The Upjohn Institute administers the Work First program, along with six JTPA training programs for the local area. One of the JTPA programs, Title II-A adult training program, is targeted to the economically

disadvantaged, many of whom are welfare recipients.

Work First and the JTPA training programs apply different philosophies to pursuing the common goal of getting people into jobs. The first stresses rapid job placement; the latter emphasizes long-term job retention and career mobility. No rigorous analysis of Work First has been

Comparing the performance of Work First and the JTPA II-A training programs offers some insight into whether short-term employability skills alone are as effective as longer-term skills training in getting welfare recipients back to work.

conducted. However, the fact that the two programs are administered simultaneously by the Institute and that they serve clients with similar characteristics in the same local labor market presents an opportunity to make a few preliminary comparisons. This article compares performance measures of the two programs to offer a few

(continued on p. 3)

From the Executive Director

This year, to help celebrate its 50th Anniversary, the Upjohn Institute inaugurated a dissertation award for the best Ph.D. thesis on employment-related issues. The response was tremendous. We received many excellent dissertations from students who wrote on a variety of topics. To reflect the Institute's mission of pursuing policy-relevant research, committee used the following criteria to evaluate the dissertations: policy relevance, technical quality of the research, potential impact on real-world employment problems, and presentation.

An important consideration in the selection was balance among the four criteria. Some dissertations were clearly superior with respect to technical competence but were not as relevant to employment policy; others stood out in addressing burning policy issues but were not as central to employment issues.

I am pleased to announce that the first-prize winner of the 1995 Dissertation Award is **David Jaeger** of the University of Michigan. The two honorable mention recipients are **Anne Morrison Piehl** of Princeton University and **Matthew Slaughter** of MIT.

David Jaeger, now at the Bureau of Labor Statistics, wrote three essays that examine the role of educational and skill attainment in the labor market. One of his essays, "Skill Differences and the Effect of Immigrants on the Wages of Natives," addresses whether the influx of immigrant labor during the 1980s has had a significant effect on the wage structure of natives. The increase in immigration is one of several explanations put forth for the decline in real wages among low-skilled workers and for the increase in the wage gap between workers of different education levels during the last two decades. However, previous studies have yielded mixed conclusions. Mr. Jaeger approaches this issue in two steps. He first finds that immigrants and natives within

narrow skill levels are nearly perfect substitutes in production. Based on this finding, he then estimates a production function to examine the effects of changes in the supply of immigrants on the wage structure of natives. He finds that immigration accounts for nearly half the decline in real wages among high school dropouts, but contributes little to the growing wage gap between high school and college educated natives. These impacts differ markedly across cities, with immigration into Miami, Los Angeles, and San Francisco having the largest effect on wages.

Institute Celebrates 50th Anniversary by Announcing Winners of its Dissertation Award

Mr. Jaeger's second essay, "Degrees Matter: New Evidence on the Sheepskin Effects in the Returns to Education," addresses a problem that has plagued labor economists when estimating the advantage of education on earnings. Most data sets record only years of education, but the number of years of schooling does not necessarily indicate when and if a degree has been obtained. Using a unique data set that has actual records of degrees obtained along with years of education, Mr. Jaeger finds that the estimated diploma effect is significant. For example, a bachelor's degree earns 33 percent more than simply four years of "some college."

Anne Piehl, who is now at Harvard University's Kennedy School, confronts the mounting problem of what can be done to curb the increase in criminal behavior, particularly among the lower-educated. As she states in her dissertation entitled *Economic Issues in Crime Policy*, expanding prison populations and the

lingering skepticism about the effectiveness of rehabilitation have led to the development of less-expensive modes of supervision. Professor Piehl's dissertation provides strong evidence that education does reduce criminal behavior. She shows that inmates who have completed an adult basic or high school education program while in prison are significantly less likely to be reincarcerated four years after release. Also, recidivism is lower for those inmates with higher levels of education before entering prison. She also finds that youths with more schooling are less likely to commit crimes and be convicted. In addition, her results suggest that public perception that immigration is associated with higher crime rates is unfounded.

Matthew Slaughter, a professor at Dartmouth University, investigates whether international trade has contributed to sluggish real wage growth and increasing wage inequality during the last two decades. The title of his first chapter, "International Trade and American Wages in the 1980s: Giant Sucking Sound or Small Hiccup?" reflects the rhetoric and perceptions expressed during the last presidential election. Professor Slaughter finds no support for these concerns. Rather, slow wage growth and rising wage inequality result from sluggish labor-productivity growth in the service sector and skill-biased technological change, domestic factors not foreign ones. His second chapter, "International Trade, Multinational Corporations, and American Wage Divergence in the 1980s," finds that outsourcing by multinationals has little to do with America's wage divergence.

The selection committee would like to commend the three winners and also thank everyone who submitted thesis summaries for consideration. We appreciate all the applicants' dedication in pursuing high quality research that offers valuable insights into current employment issues. We look forward to next year's competition.

Randall W. Eberts

Welfare to Work*(continued from p. 1)*

observations about the relative effectiveness of short-term employability skills versus longer-term skills training in getting welfare recipients into jobs. We then compare these measures with more rigorous evaluations of other similar programs.

Work First

Since October 1994, AFDC applicants or current AFDC recipients who meet certain criteria are required to be referred to their local job training agency. For welfare recipients in Kalamazoo and St. Joseph Counties, the local training agency is the Upjohn Institute. The Institute in

Michigan's current welfare system offers welfare recipients incentives to search for and accept jobs. . . . Participation in Work First is mandatory for eligible welfare recipients. Those who refuse to participate may find their welfare checks and food stamps cut by 25 percent.

turn subcontracts with various organizations to provide the actual services.

The purpose of the Work First activities and services is to provide participants the skills, support and encouragement, and opportunities to obtain employment in the shortest possible time. Under Work First, each person develops a resume and receives instruction on proper techniques for completing applicants and interviewing for jobs. After clients complete the core services, they are expected to search intensively for work and accept offers that provide at least 20 hours of work per week at or above minimum wage. More extensive assessment and skill training is available through the local JTPA

programs, but these services are reserved for those who have extreme difficulty finding a job.

Michigan's current welfare system offers welfare recipients incentives to search for and accept jobs. They are allowed to keep the first \$200 they earn each month and 20 percent over that without reducing their welfare payments. Clients are provided with transportation until they receive their first paycheck, and they receive health care, child care and other benefits for the first year after securing employment. Participation in Work First is mandatory for eligible welfare recipients. Those who refuse to participate may find their welfare checks and food stamps cut by 25 percent.

The II-A programs also serve welfare recipients, but emphasize longer-term training. As shown in table 1, the primary difference between the core activities of Work First and II-A is the longer-term training: occupational skills training and on-the-job training. Work First participants spend an average 3.5 weeks in the program, while II-A participants spend around 45 weeks. Another difference is that II-A offers more intensive job development services than Work First. Not all Work First subcontractors have offered job development services and some that do offer such service do not have separate staff designated for that purpose. This coming year the state is requiring subcontractors to provide job development services. Therefore, comparing the performance of Work First

and the JTPA II-A training programs offers some insight into whether short-term employability skills alone are as effective as longer-term skills training in getting welfare recipients back to work.

Comparing Program Performance

Experience in our two-county area last year shows that welfare recipients who participated in the II-A program had a slightly better chance of finding a job than Work First participants. However, the margin was not very large. Sixty-five percent of Work First participants were employed at the end of training versus 71 percent of II-A participants (table 1). II-A participants had a greater edge in wages and hours worked. II-A participants found jobs paying \$6.69 an hour and worked an average of 35.3 hours per week, while Work First clients who found jobs were paid \$5.42 an hour and worked 30 hours a week. Consequently, the weekly earnings of Work First participants were only 70 percent of those of II-A participants.

Welfare recipients from both programs were equally likely to hold a job during the first few months after placement. Ninety days after job entry, 60 percent of clients from each program were still employed. However, during the three-month period, Work First participants experienced slightly higher wage growth and a greater increase in weekly hours than II-A participants. Yet, these marginal gains did very little to close the gap between the two groups. After 90 days, II-A participants earned considerably more

Table 1. Core Activities of Work First and JTPA II-A Programs

Activities	Work First	II-A
Employability skills	X	X
Job search training	X	X
Job club	X	X
Placement services	X	X
Job development	Some	X
Occupational skills training		X
On-the-job training		X

than Work First participants (\$250 per week versus \$176 per week).

Evaluations of Other Programs

These results are consistent with those obtained from evaluations of welfare-to-work programs that use randomized experiments. In their review of these

of the Riverside County, California GAIN program to job development activities. Evaluations of the program reveal 40 percent gains in earnings and significant increases in employment rates for eligible AFDC recipients compared to those in the control group. The GAIN programs offered by other California counties that

question for all of these programs is whether rapid entry into the labor market offers future self-sufficiency. In most cases, the answer is no. Even the Riverside Program, considered to be the most successful welfare-to-work program evaluated to date, does not promise lasting results. Three years after entering the program, only 23 percent of the participants were still employed and off AFDC. Furthermore, the earnings do little to lift welfare recipients out of poverty. In California overall, only 20 percent of the participants had annual incomes above the poverty rate after three years. For the Kalamazoo Work First program, the earnings are not sufficient to reduce the poverty rate to any significant degree. The average weekly earnings at placement, assuming clients work all year, would place a family of two at about 85 percent of the poverty income threshold and a family of four at 56 percent. Getting people off welfare and into jobs is a first and important step, however. Once work experience is established, additional education and training, either on the job or in the classroom, will help to increase earnings and job stability and lead to self-sufficiency.

Table 2. Performance Measures of Work First and JTPA II-A Programs

Performance measures	Work First	II-A (welfare recipients)
Employment rate	65%	71%
Employment rate 90 days after placement	60%	60%
Hourly wage at initial placement	\$5.42	\$6.69
Hourly wage 90 days after placement	\$5.61	\$6.95
Hours worked per week at initial placement	30.0	35.3
Hours worked per week 90 days after placement	31.4	36.0
Weekly earnings at initial placement	\$162.90	\$232.14
Weekly earnings 90 days after placement	\$176.10	\$250.13

evaluations, Gueron and Pauly (1991) conclude that "selective-voluntary programs that provided higher-cost or more intensive services appeared to get people into jobs with somewhat higher pay, but did not make a consistent difference in the proportion of people employed" (p. 27).

However, the difference in outcomes between Work First and II-A may result from factors other than the difference in length and type of training. One difference could be the more extensive job development services offered to II-A clients. Professional job developers are likely to have better results in placing a client, since they typically have established rapport with employers, act as the client's advocate, and through experience can offer a better match of client to job.

Evaluation of California's welfare-to-work program, GAIN, suggests that job development makes a difference. Many experts attribute the phenomenal success

did not stress job development had more modest gains.

In addition, because II-A is a voluntary program, the skills and motivation of participants in II-A and Work First may differ. Without a rigorous experimental evaluation, it is impossible to tell how much differences in client mix in the two programs may influence the differences in average client outcomes. The impressions of Institute caseworkers, however, indicate that welfare recipients participating in the II-A program are on average more motivated than the typical Work First participant.

Conclusion

Observations of local welfare-to-work programs administered by the Upjohn Institute are consistent with evaluations of other programs. Rapid employment programs do about as well getting welfare recipients into jobs as programs with more extensive training, although earnings and hours worked are lower. The

Suggested Readings

Judith M. Gueron and Edward Pauly, *From Welfare to Work*, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1991.

Daniel Friedlander and Gary Burtless, *Five Years Later: The Long Term Effects of Welfare-to-Work Programs*, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1995.

What's Working (and what's not): A Summary of Research on the Economic Impacts of Employment and Training Programs. U.S. Department of Labor, Office of the Chief Economist, January 1995.

Timothy J. Bartik, "Using Performance Indicators to Improve the Effectiveness of Welfare-to-Work Programs," Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, Working Paper, June 1995.

Christopher J. O'Leary

Performance Management of Active Labor Programs in Eastern Europe

Unemployment in Hungary and Poland has risen dramatically since late 1989 when privatization and economic reform began to accelerate. The overnight disappearance of the Soviet market and elimination of state subsidies and price controls transformed these shortage economies into labor surplus economies. Registered unemployment in Hungary rose from 23,000 in 1990 to 705,000 in 1993 in a labor force of close to 5 million. Since then the Hungarian unemployment rate has fallen somewhat, but remains in double-digits, with total employment having fallen by 25 percent since 1990. Officially measured unemployment in Poland jumped from zero in 1989 to 16.4 percent in 1994. During this period, Polish civilian employment declined by more than 2 million. Figure 1 summarizes these unemployment trends.

To ease the hardship associated with worker dislocation and to maintain social stability, the governments of Hungary and Poland acted quickly to create

unemployment compensation systems, along with a variety of active labor programs. Policy measures adopted in the two countries include nearly the full menu of active labor programs found in nations with developed market economies: placement service, retraining, self-employment assistance, wage subsidy, public service employment, job creation investments, work sharing, and early retirement subsidy. These are summarized in Figure 2.

Since 1990, the Upjohn Institute has worked with the Ministry of Labor in Hungary to develop evaluation and planning procedures for labor market support programs. In 1993, the Institute initiated a similar project in Poland. The projects have been coordinated by the World Bank and the U.S. Department of Labor.

Given the disappointing historical experience Hungary and Poland had with central planning, both countries have sought ways to manage employment

policy in a decentralized way. In each country, the legal framework of program options is established by national legislation. Funding for employment measures is allocated to the provincial governments, which then implement specific program activities to address regional needs. To support decentralized decision making, while at the same time requiring accountability and efficiency from provincial governments, both Poland and Hungary are establishing performance-based management systems for evaluation and planning of their active labor programs.

The management systems include performance indicators specified to measure the success of each active labor program in the different provinces and local areas. The guiding principle in developing performance indicators was to emphasize *outcomes* rather than *processes*. This emphasis was particularly important in government agencies where, until recently, hoarding of resources and organization building had been primary goals.

The performance indicators focus on desired outcomes such as employment in private unsubsidized jobs. They are timely measures that can be readily implemented and should become a natural tool for managers. They are intentionally simple, so as to minimize the data collection burden on provincial governments. The plan is to adjust performance targets for the local economic conditions and client mix. Such adjustment will make comparisons across provinces and programs more fair. In addition, the adjustments for client mix should discourage provincial governments from attempting to boost reported performance through the practice of *creaming*—inflating a program's success rate by limiting services to only the most qualified applicants. By adjustment weights, performance standards will be relaxed for provinces providing services to low skilled, low-educated, long-term unemployed or other specified hard to reemploy groups. Such targeting of services will raise the social dividend of employment policy.

Figure 1. Registered Unemployment Rate, Hungary and Poland, 1989-94

In November, the Upjohn Institute will conduct training in performance management of active labor programs for all 49 provincial labor offices in Poland. In 1993, similar training was completed in Hungary for all 20 county labor centers.

the effective use and control of the decentralized Employment Fund.

One year after follow-up surveys began, a national conference on the experience with performance indicators was held at the National Labor Center in Budapest. Wide-ranging comments about

guidelines for county annual plans based in part on program performance will be prepared. The Ministry is considering an algorithm which weights program performance 10 percent in budget allocation decisions. Guidelines for performance-based contracts to service providers are also under consideration. The Ministry is pursuing a positive approach to performance management by emphasizing high performance, with the likely response to poor performance being management assistance to counties.

In the past, the transfer of knowledge about employment policy has been from the mature market economies to the less-developed countries. Even the performance management systems developed in Hungary and Poland are adapted from methods used in nations with developed market economies. But because programs in Hungary and Poland are operated in a coordinated way, the systems provide a simultaneous view of the effectiveness of all programs, thereby clearly revealing policy trade-offs. These management systems are models for other nations in Central and Eastern Europe, and they may also provide insights for nations with much longer histories of employment policy.

Christopher J. O'Leary is a senior economist at the Upjohn Institute.

Figure 2. Active Labor Programs in Hungary and Poland

Active labor program	Hungary	Poland
Placement service	Yes	Yes
Retraining	Yes	Yes
Self-employment assistance	Yes	Yes
Wage subsidy for hiring	Long term unemployed	Recent graduates
Public service employment ¹	Yes	Yes
Job creation investments	Yes	Yes
Work sharing	Yes	No
Early retirement subsidy	Yes	No

1. Poland also has Intervention Works projects operated by private sector employers.

The experience of Hungary illustrates the process of system development. Following months of debate, providing users of the system a strong sense of ownership and control, consensus on the list of performance indicators was reached in October 1992. Deliberations involved representatives from the Ministry, National Labor Center, Labor Research Institute, Budapest University of Economics, three county labor centers, and the Upjohn Institute. To illustrate, performance indicators for retraining programs were specified to be:

Average cost per trainee employed at follow-up

Proportion of trainees employed at follow-up

Average cost per training program entrant

Proportion of entrants who successfully complete training

Average monthly earnings of trainees employed at follow-up

Proportion of employed trainees working in occupation of training at follow-up

The performance indicators system was then pilot tested in three Hungarian counties. Despite some reluctance at senior management levels, nationwide implementation of performance management began in 1994. The impetus to set the system in motion came from a 1993 Auditor General report questioning

the system were offered from the 20 counties and from federal representatives. Due to the impact on survey response rates and the minimal dispersion in occupational wage distribution, the reemployment wage indicator of reemployment job quality was eliminated.

While the federal partners at the meeting assured counties that the performance indicator results would be regarded as preliminary and used for developing an adjustment methodology for inter-county comparison, the counties themselves cited a variety of immediate uses of the information. The counties reported the information to be particularly valuable in assessing contract service providers. It was also noted that the impending reduction of active labor programs to four—retraining, public service employment, wage subsidies for long term unemployed, and self employment assistance—will likely simplify the system and speed implementation of the computerized system to support performance management.

The Ministry of Labor in Hungary is currently revising the annual planning and budget allocation process for active labor programs. Master plans for the counties and Ministry will be set in place and

Suggested Readings

O'Leary, Christopher J. (1993), *Innovation in Planning Hungarian Labor Market Programs*, Labor Market Analysis and Employment Policies Working Paper No. 61, Geneva: International Labor Office.

O'Leary, Christopher J. (1994), *A System for Evaluating Labor Market Programs in Hungary*, Technical Report No. 94-005, Kalamazoo: W. E. Upjohn Institute.

O'Leary, Christopher J. (1995), *An Impact Analysis of Labor Market Programs in Hungary*, Staff Working Paper 95-30, Kalamazoo: W. E. Upjohn Institute.

O'Leary, Christopher J. and Andrew S. Targowski (1993), *MIS Guidelines for Employment Law Programs in Poland*, Kalamazoo: W. E. Upjohn Institute.

New Books from the Upjohn Institute

Program Applicants as a Comparison Group in Evaluating Training Programs Theory and a Test

Stephen H. Bell
John D. Blomquist
Larry L. Orr
Abt Associates Inc.
Glen G. Cain
University of Wisconsin-Madison

Program evaluation is a vital phase in the policy-making process. Without

the ability to accurately measure the effects of past policies, new, more effective policies cannot be designed and implemented. Experimental evaluations with

random assignments to comparison groups provide reliable estimates of program impact. But this technique cannot be used in all situations.

Recognizing the need for practical alternatives to experimental evaluations, as well as the drawbacks to the various nonexperimental evaluation techniques, the authors reintroduce the use of applicant-based, *internal* comparison groups. They update this methodology, which was first used in the 1960s, then test it against the random experimental findings derived from a controlled experiment.

This book is essential for anyone interested in evaluation methodology.

1995. 183 pp. \$14 paper ISBN 0-88099-157-7
\$24 cloth ISBN 0-88099-158-5

Causes of Litigation in Workers' Compensation

Evangelos M. Falaris
Charles R. Link
University of Delaware
Michael E. Staten
Purdue University

Rising litigation rates in state workers' compensation systems are often blamed for the rising costs of workers' compensation insurance. Yet, until now there has been little empirical research on the characteristics of injured workers and their employers that affect litigation decisions.

By applying econometric analysis to case data from two states, Falaris,

Link, and Staten are able to identify the economic incentives that influence the probability of litigation in workers' compensation cases, and the

probability that a contested case is pursued to verdict. Factors identified that influence these litigation decisions include:

- state regulation of workers' compensation insurance pricing
- type of industry
- part of body injured and type of injury
- age of injured worker

An overview of the evolution of state workers' compensation systems is presented, along with the reforms implemented to try to stem the rising incidence of litigation.

1995. 137 pp. \$14 paper ISBN 0-88099-161-5
\$24 cloth ISBN 0-88099-162-3

Pathways to Change Case Studies of Strategic Negotiations

Joel E. Cutcher-Gershenfeld
Michigan State University
Robert B. McKersie
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Richard E. Walton
Harvard University

The authors present and analyze a dozen detailed case studies that point

out the various strategic pathways used in today's labor-management relations. These cases clearly display the two main change strategies—

forcing (a highly contentious strategy) and fostering (a highly cooperative strategy)—that together account for two-thirds of all collective bargaining efforts.

Three cases document the use of forcing, the hard bargaining change strategy generally instigated by management and then matched by labor. Three more cases document fostering, an attempt to advance common or complimentary interests through attitude change, persuasion, and problem solving. Three cases show the use of sequenced forcing-fostering strategies, and three cases focus on the use of combined forcing-fostering strategies, the most complex negotiating pathway.

Finally, the authors examine the atmosphere in which negotiated change occurs by focusing on important environmental factors.

This book is from the preeminent authorities on industrial relations.

1995. 265 pp. \$17 paper ISBN 0-88099-155-0
\$27 cloth ISBN 0-88099-156-9

ORDER FORM

Book/Author	Qty Paper	Qty Cloth	Total Price
Program Applicants as a Comparison Group			
in Evaluating Training Programs			
Bell/Orr/Blomquist/Cain	_____ @ \$14	_____ @ \$24	_____
Causes of Litigation in Workers' Compensation			
Falaris/Link/Staten	_____ @ \$14	_____ @ \$24	_____
Pathways to Change			
Cutcher-Gershenfeld/McKersie/Walton	_____ @ \$17	_____ @ \$27	_____
Quantity Discount			
5-9=10% 10-24=20% 25-99=30% 100 & up=35%			
	Less Discount		_____
Shipping/Handling			
U.S. and Canada \$3 first book, .50 cents each additional book.			
Foreign \$3 first book, \$1.50 each additional book.			
	Shipping		_____
	TOTAL \$		=====

SHIP TO:

Name	Name				
Organization	Organization				
Address	Address				
City	State	Zip	City	State	Zip

BILL TO: (must attach purchase order)

Name	Name				
Organization	Organization				
Address	Address				
City	State	Zip	City	State	Zip

If an associate of yours would like to be on the mailing list for *Employment Research*, please check here ☐ and complete the "SHIP TO" information above.

To order a publication or request a catalog, mail, phone, or fax:
W. E. UPJOHN INSTITUTE
 300 S. Westnedge Avenue
 Kalamazoo, MI 49007-4686
 Phone 616/343-4330
 FAX 616/343-7310

PAYMENT: All orders must include payment by check, credit card information, or purchase order. Checks must be payable to the W. E. Upjohn Institute in U.S. funds drawn on a U.S. bank. All prices are subject to change without notice.

_____ check enclosed
 _____ VISA
 _____ MasterCard
 _____ P.O. # _____

signature _____

credit card # _____

expiration date _____

phone _____

W. E. UPJOHN INSTITUTE
 for Employment Research
 300 S. Westnedge Avenue
 Kalamazoo, MI 49007-4686

Nonprofit Org.
 U.S. POSTAGE
 PAID
 Kalamazoo MI
 Permit No. 756