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# Banking Deserts and the Paycheck Protection Program

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Banking Deserts and the Paycheck Protection Program

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# Banking Deserts and the Paycheck Protection Program

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May 6, 2022

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## Motivation

- Banking Deserts and the Paychec Protection Program
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- The pandemic has exposed many underlying inequalities throughout the United states
- Access to banking services is one such inequality that has been further exposed by the pandemic and the response to it.
  - Many American live in a banking desert or banking hinterland.
  - This may make it harder on small businesses since they will not have as much access to "relational lending."
- The pandemic caused many businesses to layoff their workers.
- The Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), was created in March 2020 to help struggling small business owners retain their employees.
  - Loans were originally distributed through existing SBA 7(a) lenders.

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- We examine how the preexisting geographic distribution of banks affected the disbursement of PPP loans.
- We have three main hypotheses:
  - Relative banking deserts and hinterlands received fewer PPP loans.
  - Loans went to relatively advantaged labor markets.
  - The smallest businesses (those with less than 50 and less than 10 employees) were not the major beneficiaries of the program.

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## Data & Methodology

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- PPP loan data come from the Small Business Administration (November 2020).
  - Number of loans, loan amount, number of jobs reported, and business address.
- Banking data come from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the National Credit Union Administration.
  - Number, type, and location of banks.
- These data are combined with other county-level measures and then aggregated up to the commuting zone level.

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 $\begin{aligned} Y_{i} &= \beta_{0} + \beta_{1} Bank \ Concentration_{i} + \beta_{2} (Bank \ Concentration)_{i}^{2} + \beta_{3} Bank \ HQs_{i} \\ &+ \beta_{4} (BankHQs)_{i}^{2} + \beta_{5} COVID19_{i} + \beta_{6} NonWhite \ Share_{i} \\ &+ \beta_{7} Smallest \ Business \ Share_{i} + \beta_{8} \frac{Emp.}{Pop.}_{i} + \beta_{9} \frac{H.H.Med.Inc.}{H.H.MeanInc.i} \\ &+ \beta_{10} GDP \ per \ Capita_{i} + \beta_{11} BA + \ Share_{i} + \epsilon_{i} \end{aligned}$ 

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### Results

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## All PPP Loans: Hypothesis 1

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	Loans per Sm. Bus.	Amount per Sm. Bus.	Jobs per Sm. Bus.
Banks + C.U.s per 10k	1.002***	$-0.234^{*}$	-0.183
	(6.89)	(-1.78)	(-1.37)
$(Banks + C.U.s \; per \; 10k)^2$	$-0.527^{***}$	0.049	0.012
	(-5.76)	(0.57)	(0.15)
Bank HQs per 10k	0.333**	0.102	0.215
	(2.46)	(0.73)	(1.61)
(Bank HQs per 10k) <sup>2</sup>	-0.115	-0.079	-0.096
	(-1.24)	(-0.47)	(-0.60)

Highlighted standardized results presented. All specifications include the full slate of controls and robust standard errors were calculated. T-statistics included in parenthesis.

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## All PPP Loans: Hypotheses 2 & 3

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	Loans per Sm. Bus.	Amount per Sm. Bus.	Jobs per Sm. Bus.
Employment Population	0.203***	0.206***	0.219***
	(4.08)	(3.20)	(2.67)
Share of Bus. $< 10$ Emp.	$-0.148^{***}$		
	(-3.39)		
Share of Bus. $<$ 50 Emp.	$-0.151^{***}$		
	(-3.58)		

Highlighted standardized results presented. All specifications include the full slate of controls and robust standard errors were calculated. T-statistics included in parenthesis.

## First Round PPP Loans: Hypothesis 1

	Loans per Sm. Bus.	Amount per Sm. Bus.	Jobs per Sm. Bus.
Banks + C.U.s per 10k	0.968***	0.001	0.057
	(7.05)	(0.01)	(0.47)
$({\sf Banks}+{\sf C.U.s} \; {\sf per}\; 10{\sf k})^2$	$-0.564^{***}$	-0.097	$-0.142^{*}$
	(-6.69)	(-1.38)	(-1.86)
Bank HQs per 10k	0.397***	$0.211^{*}$	0.364***
	(2.96)	(1.68)	(2.92)
(Bank HQs per 10k) <sup>2</sup>	$-0.272^{***}$	$-0.256^{*}$	$-0.338^{**}$
	(-3.39)	(-1.74)	(-2.16)

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Highlighted standardized results presented. All specifications include the full slate of controls and robust standard errors were calculated. T-statistics included in parenthesis.

## First Round PPP Loans: Hypotheses 2 & 3

	Loans per Sm. Bus.	Amount per Sm. Bus.	Jobs per Sm. Bus.
Employment Population	0.229***	0.320***	0.261***
	(5.45)	(4.37)	(3.73)
Share of Bus. $< 10$ Emp.	$-0.155^{***}$		
	(-432)		
Share of Bus. $<$ 50 Emp.	$-0.122^{***}$		
	(-3.33)		

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Highlighted standardized results presented. All specifications include the full slate of controls and robust standard errors were calculated. T-statistics included in parenthesis.

## Round 2 Loan Sample

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- The Paycheck Protection Program evolved as time went on.
  - Some of the restrictions on lenders were loosened to make the disbursement of loans easier.
- To capture the changing nature of the program we also use the sample of loans from when the regulations were changed after the first round.

## Round 2 Results

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- Hypothesis 1:
  - Commuting zones with a higher concentration of banks still received more PPP loans (0.700\*\*\*).
  - Diminishing returns to the number of banks are also present for the 2nd round of loans (-0.317\*\*).
  - Bank Headquarters were not a significant factor in the second round.
- Hypothesis 2:
  - Commuting Zones with stronger labor markets received more loans, but the result is not as strong as the previous results (0.103\*).
- Hypothesis 3:
  - The CZs with the a greater share of the smallest businesses still received fewer loans in the second round of funding (Less than 10: -0.096\*; Less than 50: -0.133\*\*\*).

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- Part of the regulation change after the first round of funding was allowing fintech companies to make PPP loans.
  - Fintech companies rely more on automation to make lending decisions.
- Fintech companies are able to make loans remotely, so borrowers are not geographically constrained.
  - This may reduce the inequality of access that originally existed in the PPP.

### Fintech Results

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- Hypothesis 1:
  - CZs with fewer banks received more of the fintech loans (0.634\*\*\*).
  - These CZs also received a greater total amount per small business (0.724\*\*\*).
  - More jobs per small business were retained with the fintech sample in high banking CZs (0.701<sup>\*\*\*</sup>).
- Hypothesis 2:
  - Places with a relatively stronger labor market did not get more of the fintech loans.
- Hypothesis 3:
  - CZs with a higher share of small businesses with less than 10 employees were not disadvantaged for the fintech loans, but CZs with a greater share of small businesses with less than 50 employees did receive significantly fewer fintech PPP loans (-0.173\*\*\*).

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- An existing relationship with a bank is beneficial for businesses.
  - Banks can utilize "soft" information and "relational lending" when making lending decisions.
- We find evidence that access to banks mattered for receiving PPP loans.
  - Places with a higher concentration of banks received a higher number of PPP loans.
  - This held when we examined the program in total, first round loans, and second round loans.
  - Fintech loans improved access and went to places with fewer banks per person.

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- Access to banks should be taken into account for future similar programs.
- Fintech can be a solution to the issue of access and should be part of future policy.
- More policies are needed to support community banks and increase access to community banks.
- Targeting the loans toward regions that faced particularly stark economic shocks would have help equalize the distribution.

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# Questions?

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## Number of PPP Loans by Bank Type

(1)	(2)	(3)
1.002*** (0.0102)		
-0.527*** (0.000280)		
	1.030*** (0.0112)	
	-0.552*** (0.000293)	
	-0.019 (0.0288)	-0.049 (0.0282)
	0.044 (0.0126)	0.049 (0.0120)
		1.171*** (0.00888)
		-0.581*** (0.000236)
		0.367*** (0.0151)
		-0.247*** (0.00225)
0.333** (0.0284)	0.305** (0.0302)	0.183 (0.0292)
-0.115 (0.00336)	-0.109 (0.00350)	-0.026 (0.00352)
	(1) 1.002*** (0.0102) -0.527*** (0.000280) 0.000280) -0.115 (0.00336)	(1) (2) 1.002*** (0.0102) -0.527*** (0.000280) 1.030*** (0.0112) -0.552*** (0.000293) -0.019 (0.0288) 0.044 (0.0126) 0.044 (0.0126) 0.044 (0.0126)

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### Number of PPP Loans: Rural/Micro

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	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Loans	Loan Amount	Jobs Retained
Banks + C.U.s per 10k people	0.260***	-0.086	-0.053
	(3.30)	(-1.31)	(-0.81)
Bank HQs per 10k people	0.071	-0.018	-0.021
	(0.78)	(-0.35)	(-0.31)
(Banks + C.U.s per 10k people) <sup>2</sup>	-0.106	-0.051	-0.060
	(-1.34)	(-1.05)	(-1.18)
(Bank HQs per 10k people) <sup>2</sup>	0.059	0.049	0.082
· · · · · ·	(0.43)	(0.71)	(0.84)
Micro	-0.024*	-0.002	0.031
	(-1.92)	(-0.07)	(1.47)
Rural	-0.001	-0.032	0.005
	(-0.03)	(-0.86)	(0.14)



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## Secondary Questions

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	All Loans	First Round	Fintech
COVID-19 Cases per 10k	0.060**	-0.035*	0.177***
	(2.32)	(-1.80)	(3.84)
Non-white Share	1.59***	0.050	0.221***
	(3.40)	(1.37)	(4.61)

