Underclass and Overclass: Race, Class, and Economic Inequality in the Managerial Age

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Managers tend to identify the welfare of mankind as a whole with their own interests and the salvation of mankind with their assuming control of society.

James Burnham
The Managerial Revolution, 1941, p. 193.

The New Overclass

Contentious disputes over the underclass concept and the underclass "problem" in the United States have overlooked the necessity of examination of the nature of the overclass. After all, there cannot be one without the other. The purpose of this discussion is to illuminate the comparatively uncharted geography of the elite who dominate society from above as a complement to the conventional inquiry into the lifestyles of those who live at the bottom of modern America. The full range of forces impinging on the lives of the underclass cannot be understood, anyway, without a careful look at the motives and methods of the overclass.

It may seem odd but imagine, as the entry point to the investigation of America's overclass, that we are in twelfth-century England. Follow David Lebedoff's description of the marital selection process among the serf population on a feudal demesne:

It was time for Thomas to get married. He was almost eighteen, his father had died, and the patch of land was now his. He needed a wife
to help with the work, to cook and sew and bear children. He needed a wife as much as he needed the sun and the rain and the protection of his feudal lord. He wanted companionship, too, and sex. These needs were urgent and could not be postponed.

The problem was finding a bride. In Thomas' limited world there were three single women of marriageable age. One was sickly, one was strong, and one was beautiful. He married the one who was strong. There was really no other choice. The sickly woman could not work his poor land, and the beautiful one did not want to. She had other alternatives.

Thomas' bride was named Katherine. The couple got on very well; neither Thomas nor Katherine ever wondered who was smarter. Intelligence was not a factor in marital selection. There was no such thing as an IQ test. No one even suspected that intelligence could be measured. There would have been no point to such measurement. There was no social mobility. A person was born to a certain role and stayed there. The great majority of people spent their lives on the land in harsh drudgery.

As it happened, Katherine was much the brighter of the two. By today's measurement, Thomas had an IQ of 105, and Katherine, 147. Which means that Thomas' intelligence was very near average (100) and Katherine's close to genius. Neither suspected this disparity. Both were illiterate. Almost everyone was. The conditions of their lives did not recognize, let alone reward, Katherine's special gifts.

Thomas and Katherine lived in England in the twelfth century, but the circumstances of their union would have been much the same in Italy or Russia or China, in the Middle Ages or the Renaissance. From the dawn of time until the eighteenth century, the process of marital selection was very much the same. Spouses were chosen from the very small pool of those who happened to live nearby. They were chosen without regard to, and without any way of knowing, what their general intelligence might be.¹

The consequence, according to Lebedoff, was the random distribution of measured intelligence across the population. Measured intelligence and social status were two separate matters in the Middle Ages:

By and large intelligence had nothing to do with one's station in life. A genius comparable to Einstein could die illiterate after a lifetime of serfdom in the fields. No one knew of his ability, and no one would have cared.²
Lebedoff contends that three factors have altered the world of Katherine and Thomas, a world where measured or “general” intelligence was a matter of peripheral importance, to our current condition where measured intelligence has become a matter of central importance. First, there is greater geographic and social mobility, exposing people to a much wider range of possible marital partners. Second, virtually universal education in the Western world (and in Japan) has had the following perverse effect: “If everyone can read and write, everyone can be graded and tested. Children can be told precisely how smart they are supposed to be; and that information, accepted by both the child and society, helps determine the choice of spouse.” Third, and “most important,” is the fact “that, today, intellectual ability is rewarded.” 3 Says Lebedoff: Now, by and large, people can rise to the level that their talent permits. Those with high grades go on to college and to higher-status jobs. Those with lower scores leave school earlier and take other kinds of jobs. The son of a cobbler is no longer destined always to be a cobbler himself. People still marry within their social and economic class, but membership in such classes has come to depend more on measurable intelligence and less on the circumstances of birth. People of high I.Q. marry other people of high I.Q. no matter how disparate their parentage may be. Equality of opportunity has led to people being socially and economically stratified by virtue of their measured intelligence. 4

An extreme vision of a society stratified on the basis of measured intelligence has been advanced by Harvard social psychologist Richard Hernnstein, who argued in the early 1970s for a hereditarian foundation to an emerging IQ meritocracy:

... if ... one grants the possibility that mental abilities do vary at all genetically, then a powerful and surprising conclusion follows—namely, that society may segregate people into social groupings or classes based at least partly on biology. For if mental capacity is to any degree inherited, and if social standing reflects mental capacity, then social standing must be a mirror, albeit an imperfect one, of inherited ability. Moreover, as society equalizes the opportunities for advancement, which is to say as society becomes “fairer,” by the ordinary standards of fairness, it will tend more and more to base its social distinctions on genetic grounds. In other words, if parents no longer can pass social and economic
advantages on to their children—let us say, because of taxes and welfare and public housing and uniformly excellent public schools—they will instead contribute to their children's success and failure only by their genetic legacy.\(^5\)

Both Lebedoff and Hernnstein are wrong in their acceptance of the "equal opportunity" myth. There is substantial evidence that academically high-achieving youths tend to be children of academically high-achieving parents. This is indicative of diminishing interclass mobility, rather than increasing equalization of opportunities, because high-achieving parents are far more able to guarantee quality education for their own children than parents who have been defeated by the educational system.\(^6\)

Nevertheless, Lebedoff and Hernnstein have glimpsed an idealized vision of our unfolding future—Lebedoff as a brutal critic and Hernnstein as an unabashed enthusiast—in which putative mental capacity dictates social class position. Both of them have grasped the great transition that is international in character—the rise to dominance of intellectuals, the intelligentsia, and the technocrats.

Recent events in Eastern Europe, suggestive of the collapse of socialism and the victory of the Western way, obscure the continued preeminence there, as well, of the intellectuals, intelligentsia, and the technocrats. For the movement toward democraticization and the dismantling of a totalitarian apparatus means a switch from the control of one group of social managers predisposed toward political and economic bureaucratic authoritarianism, to another group, predisposed toward electoral politics and the rejuvenation of private enterprise.\(^7\)

What Lebedoff and Hernnstein sense is the international convergence toward a class structure where the dominant class—the modern overclass—possesses vast ideological fluidity. The class structure has at its apex the managerial class, comprised of those with putative mental capacity and putative ability to manage, i.e., design and execute social control strategies and tactics. The managerial class analyzes, constructs, and administers social policy. The cultural manifestation of their influence over contemporary America is evident in the lifestyles of the "Yuppies."\(^8\)
Class analytical explorations of social stratification patterns have been ambiguous with respect to the position of those persons holding professional positions. In Marxist class-theoretic studies, professional workers typically either fold into the working class or are treated as agents of capital.\(^9\)

It is, however, more fruitful to view the professionals as forming an independent social class situated apart from labor proper and capital. Not only do they form a separate social class, but they form a social class driven toward its own destiny. Only by recognizing the distinctiveness of the managerial class can we see the rich outlines of the emergency of the new social order. The importance of mental capacity and the ability to manage has overtaken the authority of wealth and finance.\(^10\) Capitalism winds down and the managerial estate winds up.

**The Genesis of the Managerial Class**

In the United States, the origins of the managerial class can be traced to the Progressive Era at the turn of the century. Development of a cadre of workers ("social" workers in the broadest sense) to minister to the perceived needs of the working class was the incubator for the development of the professions. The process was sponsored by corporate America.\(^11\) The managerial class in its infancy was the progeny of American capital.

Consequently, this new class was dependent on corporate capital and, necessarily, subservient. Largely coterminous with the middle classes that also harbored an older group of small businessmen—the petty bourgeoisie—the members of the managerial class, even those who were social workers for the working class, espoused a certain attachment to the precepts of rugged individualism.

But the decisive event that changed all this was the Great Depression. An ideological shift took place among the middle classes from individualism to New Dealism—a cry for "relief."\(^12\) The managerial class endorsed an apparent "reform" of capitalism that was in fact a revolution. Of course, it was not a revolution on behalf of the working class, but on behalf of the middle classes themselves.
Here is the starting point of James Burnham's "managerial revolution"—in the crucible of maximal capitalist crisis. Here are the beginnings of the self-conscious commitment to macroeconomic stabilization policy, activist fiscal and monetary policy, and macroeconomic management, bolstered by the gathering of data and the development of national income accounts. Here is where the foundation of the welfare state was established, where the federal government de facto took an open hand in the development of a national family policy.

The principle of an unlimited, rather than the formerly limited, terrain for the state became accepted. The extension of the state meant that the welfare state cushioned both the members of the middle and working classes from the exigencies of the capitalist business cycle. But, in addition, the extension of the state meant expanded employment opportunities for the middle class, giving them a dual benefit.

Thus, the managerial class discovered a route for loosening the umbilical cord, which had bound it to corporate capital, through the growth of the public sector. World War II and, thereafter, the Great Society and civil rights movement constituted further bases for still more dramatic expansion. The social programs of the 1960s coupled with civil rights legislation can be construed as a response to race revolt, and the new positions in public sector welfare agencies were obtained disproportionately by black professionals. This was the essential source of growth in the black middle class trumpeted by scholars and journalists in the 1970s.

The combination of the Great Society and civil rights movement took the scope of government beyond the breakthrough achieved by the New Deal. The judiciary, in particular, took on direct involvement in public policymaking, including management of school systems and prison systems. The inherent limitlessness to the managerial state was manifest.

Curing Poverty and Racial Inequality?

Simultaneously, the ideological illusion was fostered that poverty could be abolished by constructive public action. This illusion was consistent with the belief system of the rising managerial class. Their social manage-
ment mentality led to a presumption that they could solve any problem with research and sound thinking—a certain characteristic “arrogance of the new elite.”

Under the passing regime of men of business—the classic capitalist social order—poverty and the social system were blatantly interconnected. Mercantilist thinkers, the heralds of capitalism, were cruelly straightforward in advancing the doctrine of the utility of poverty—the notion that poverty was necessary to extract adequate effort from the laboring classes. Classical political economy, particularly in Ricardo’s hands, elaborated a variety of schemes to repress wages in order to keep down costs of production and delay the inevitable approach to the stationary state.

Neoclassical economics’ story of wage generation is encapsulated in the labor-leisure choice and human capital theory. Labor-leisure choice means some people with preferences for leisure, in effect, will select lower incomes. In the neoclassicals’ preferred world of minimum government interference in market processes, some persons will be “idlers” and, hence, in poverty. But, regardless, if more persons choose to acquire higher levels of human capital and pursue more work, they drive down the returns for everyone potentially, for some categories of jobs, to poverty-level wages.

In Marxist analysis, wage repression was an important avenue to counteract the law of the tendency for the rate of profit to fall. Capitalist society possessed an inherent tendency to produce unemployment, to create a reserve of labor, a tendency driven by the functionality of the reserve. The reserve was necessary to hold back the wage demands of those with work and to make readily available a pool of workers to throw into new lines of activity without disrupting older sectors.

Of course, in principle, one could always engineer a redistribution of income or wealth in such a way that everyone is comfortably above the poverty line. But the mercantilists’ blunt logic holds sway. Such a policy would produce a large incentive problem for employers hiring for occupations at the low end of the wage scale. Therefore, poverty could not be eliminated under capitalism.

Although poverty could not be eliminated altogether, poverty could be reallocated by race or by gender. Proponents of racial equality—
rather than general equality—presumably seek a racial reallocation of poverty so that the proportion of blacks who are poor falls and/or the proportion of whites who are poor rises until the same ratio prevails among both races, e.g., 20 percent of families of each race being in poverty.

But would it always be the same families? William Wilson's big concern in his research on the underclass is the intergenerational transmission of poverty status. He focuses on an underclass that is disproportionately black and that replicates poverty status from generation to generation. Therefore, racial equality for Wilson also must be understood in intergenerational terms.\textsuperscript{17}

Suppose we have a population of twelve families; three families are enumerated as black and nine families are enumerated as white. In Year 1, two black families are poor or 67 percent of all black families, while three white families are poor or 33 percent of all white families. A racially equal society with respect to poverty status would be one where in Year 2, one out of the three black families (33 percent) would be poor, and it would be the family that was nonpoor in Year 1. And now six out of the nine white families (67 percent) would be poor—again the families that previously were nonpoor. This rotation could continue indefinitely. While this would be a community characterized by perpetual general inequality, it certainly would be a community without racial inequality.

Since poverty could not be eliminated under capitalism, then the previous hypothetical situation reveals one feature of the best an egalitarian might hope for: to distribute exposure to poverty evenly across the population by generations. Of course, one might also hope to reduce poverty's scope to the level necessary for continuation of the system, given that one is willing to leave the social system itself intact or is unwilling to mount an attack upon it.

Both of these egalitarian steps—we might call them steps toward Wilsonian equality where one seeks to mute the effects of poverty while failing to challenge the social system—have been pursued with great timidity, if at all. Identification of the minimum incidence of poverty necessary to capitalism has proved to be a virtually intractable proposition. And those groups with the power to resist exposure to the deprivations of poverty will exercise their power to avoid taking their turn.
A hierarchical society typically will have a hierarchical occupational structure. It is hierarchy that lays the material foundation for discrimination. Occupations with better pay, superior status, great stability, and, within the evolving cultural norms, which give greater weight to mental rather than manual work will be preferred. If they are captured by a specific ethnic or racial group, the group will defend their turf from invasion.

This is far from Lebedoff’s and Hernnstein’s pure IQ meritocracy rooted in a genetic allocation of social status. This is stratification based upon naked group power. Control over training, credentials, experience, and information networks dictates access to preferred positions—not mythical equal opportunity. Indeed, to the extent that measured intelligence can be nurtured (to the extent that Hernnstein has overemphasized the hereditarian component), that can affect the racial distribution of slots. Ethnic or racial groups with power can actively transform potential rivals into noncompetitors by distorting the nurturing mechanisms. For example, they can not only insure that their own children go to quality schools, but they can channel children from potential rival ethnic or racial groups into schools where they will be subject to programmed retardation. Then those who are poor appear ex post facto to be social failures because of their own deficiencies, when, in fact, the genesis of those apparent deficiencies can be found in the execution of raw aggression by more powerful ethnic or racial groups seeking to preserve their own comparatively aristocratic status.

The foregoing should suggest that the transition from capitalism to managerial society holds no greater promise for elimination of poverty. Nonetheless, the managerial elite, in all likelihood, will invest much time and rhetoric in holding out just such a possibility through “discovery” of the proper array of policies. Because managerial society is hierarchical as well, the motivation still will exist to produce noncompeting groups among potential rivals. The groups reduced to the most extreme noncompetitive status will constitute the underclass and will display the central feature of a caste group—the intergenerational repetition of low social status. Indeed, society as a whole will take on the character of caste civilization, for the sons and daughters of the
managerial class also will follow in their parents’ upscale footsteps. Thus the overclass will constitute the upper caste, *de facto* the permanent Brahmins.

Dominant ethnic or racial groups will find it especially useful to degrade the mental capacity of potential rival groups, often to the point where members of the disinherited come to doubt their own capacity to perform intellectually. Consider, for example, the case of the black athlete and the NCAA’s Proposition 48 requiring a minimum 700 SAT score and 2.0 high school GPA for an athlete to be eligible to play as a college freshman at a Division 1 school. Proposition 48 has met the opposition from many black coaches and presidents of historically black colleges and universities, suggesting that even they do not believe that large numbers of young black athletes are capable of meeting such standards.

The further twist, however, is that tests like the SAT are broadly accepted markers for access to the university. In managerial society, such testing and refinement of tests become the norms for entry to specialized or advanced training, separating the overclass from those beneath them. In American society, standardized tests tend to establish racial separation as well. Proportionately fewer blacks cross the mental capacity hurdles; of course, proportionately fewer are given the preparation to do so.

Managerial society aspires to pure meritocracy. Instead, it delivers a modern “slavocracy” based upon race and measured (or credential-ed) mental capacity that admits blacks in far smaller proportions than whites into the new elite. And even the occasional admits still are viewed with a skepticism not faced by their white peers. Invariably, black intellectuals are stigmatized as necessarily being less capable. Two direct conclusions can be drawn. Poverty will not vanish in managerial society; neither will racial discrimination in all its dimensions.

**Eugenics Once Again?**

The Great Society-cum-civil rights movement was an accommodation to the aspirations of the black middle class to cope with black urban
revolt. It was a problematic accommodation. Housing desegregation led to black middle class out-migration from black urban ghettos contributing to destruction of the class diversity of black communities. School desegregation went hand in hand with deterioration of the quality of schooling for large numbers of black youths. Affirmative action’s original mission was to serve as a mechanism to put those blacks into positions for which they were well qualified but had been excluded on strictly racial grounds. Later it became viewed as a means for engineering an end to the historically produced numerical racial imbalances across American society, leading to stigmatization of blacks as recipients of a special boost, like handicap golfers, into the positions they have attained.

Concomitantly, there has been a pattern of increased polarization between the black middle class and the black underclass. This is paradoxical, given the black middle class’s overrepresentation as service providers in social welfare agencies and the black underclass’s overrepresentation as service recipients. Spatially separate and economically distinct, both segments of black America share mutual vulnerability to cutbacks in social programs. Moreover, since the last years of the Carter administration and throughout the Reagan administration, the accommodation plainly has been undergoing progressive reversal.

Managerial society has and will have its race and poverty problems—glaring blots on the ostensible social perfectibility the managers’ promise. Highly educated professionals long have possessed a certain fascination with eugenics—social perfectibility via managed procreation. There is evidence to suggest that eugenics, which fell into disfavor with National Socialism’s enthusiasm for its premises in the 1930s and 1940s, is riding a covert upsurge. For if the poor—and the black poor in particular—are not to be transformed from “undesirables” into “desirables,” they may be removed literally by population control measures.

Even while eugenics was in eclipse, the managerial class generally maintained an ideological anti-natalism. The last eight administrations prior to Reagan’s, dating from Roosevelt through Carter, endorsed population control as a significant part of an antipoverty package both domestically and internationally. The Reagan administration was the
first to demur. The Roosevelt administration marked the rise to dominance of the managerial elite with New Dealism. Population control has been targeted at the black poor—both through active policy and through neglect. Family planning programs have been located disproportionately in black communities with the self-conscious intent of reducing black fertility. At 1970 hearings before the House Subcommittee on Public Health and Welfare, Atlanta physician John McCain recommended continuation of the policy of funneling one-quarter of Georgia’s family planning program into Atlanta. He pointed out that the cost of a “satisfactory” program would be $20 million in Georgia, $5 million of which should go to Atlanta. The cost of a “minimum” program would be $10 million, $2.5 million of which should go to Atlanta. But the City of Atlanta, with a population of about 497,000 people at the time, contained about 10 percent of the state’s population. Why, then, should it receive one-quarter of the state’s family planning budget, particularly when it costs more per patient to deliver family planning services in rural than in urban areas? It was probably more than mere coincidence that Atlanta contained one-quarter of the state’s black population.

Birth control services were first funded at the state level in the South in the early 1960s. Southern state legislatures have never been recognized for their desire to protect women’s fertility rights. Lincoln Pashute concluded an empirical study on the determinants of the introduction of birth control services at the state level in the U.S. with the observation that “Southern society and its policies [were] motivated, at least in part, by the desire to reduce the fertility of blacks whether for racial reasons or because they believe blacks make welfare demands upon the state in excess of their contribution, or both together.”

The invidious and often race-specific thrust of population control measures apparently has affected the size of families receiving cash transfer assistance. In the Washington, D.C. area—an area with a 75-80 percent black population—the regional welfare caseload fell 9.5 percent between 1975 and 1978 according to a study prepared by Janice Outtz for the Greater Washington Research Center. Outtz said one reason was the decline in the size of the average welfare family from four persons in 1970 to three in 1977. A *Washington Post* staff writer
speculated the decline was due to “the availability of publicly financed abortions under the Medicaid program that serves welfare recipients.” Indeed, by 1979 there were 13,611 induced abortions performed on residents of the District of Columbia, considerably larger than the 9,404 recorded live births.

Increased access to abortions for the poor in the 1970s coincided with a real decline in public assistance that continues nationally to the present. Again in the Washington, D.C. area, the cost of living rose 68 percent between 1970 and 1978, while payments rose only 13 percent in nominal terms. Nationally, the combined money value of food stamps and AFDC payments for a family of four rose less than the cost of living. Between 1974 and 1979, the real purchasing power of monthly AFDC plus food stamps fell from $520 to $478 or 8 percent. The State of Texas held AFDC payments constant at $140 per month for a family of four for over a decade.

What would be more subtly genocidal than simultaneously to provide more resources for people to limit their family size while depriving them of resources to support their children who are living? The contradictions have been quite plain. Of the 5 million or so women in the national population whom the government identified as being “in need” of family planning services in the early 1970s, 70 percent were white. Yet “. . . little if anything [was] being done to reach these 3,500,000 white women.” As public health physician W.A. Mason observed at the time, “It is no secret that in many communities, contraceptive services are concentrated in black communities, serving primarily blacks with little or no attention to the white poor, the middle class or the affluent.”

Since Joseph Califano’s tenure as Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, public funds no longer can be used to fund abortions. Journalist Ken Auletta has been quoted as expressing displeasure with this policy because of “the incalculable costs’ of making abortion harder to obtain. Among those costs: More future city criminals will be incubated, unwanted kids, entering the world without nurturing and self-esteem.” Better to land a preemptory strike before birth, in Auletta’s estimation.
Indeed, involuntary sterilization of black women, especially welfare mothers, and the involuntary use of blacks in medical experiments have occurred on an extensive basis in the U.S. The absence of public health and public policy measures to contain AIDS, illegal drug use, cardiovascular diseases, cancers, and other illnesses in the black population is glaring. Imprisonment and military service siphons off the black male population.

Capitalist society possesses a certain ambivalence about population. A growing population might dilute per capita income, but on the other hand it could provide both an extended market and slow wage growth. Certainly, one of Marx’s key theoretical claims was the proposition that capitalism needed a surplus population, albeit a reasonably disciplined surplus was preferable.

An Unfinished Counterrevolution

Managerial society, in contrast, possesses undiluted anti-natalist impulses. All things are to be managed and controlled, including population, on both quantity and quality dimensions. The reversal of population policy under Reagan’s presidency is revealing of his administration’s exceptionalism.

The Reagan presidency represented capital’s counterrevolution against the managerial estate—the attempt to restore a social and economic order that predated the New Deal. Thus, steps were taken to roll back the welfare state, to reduce the scope and scale of government, and to deregulate the financial sector. At base, what was called “meanness mania” by some observers (or pure racism by others) was not primarily an assault on the U.S. working class, nor was it primarily an assault on black America. It was first and foremost class warfare conducted by the business interests against the managerial class with the intention of reducing that class to the sycophant function it possessed in the 1920s.

But this has been an incomplete counterrevolution. A capitalist restoration now depends upon an ideological struggle requiring reliance on expert knowledge. The business interests can go out and get their
own experts as hired guns or mercenaries. But the language, the arguments, the very terms of social policy debates are established by members of their rival class. Ultimately, then, the managerial class will determine how broad or narrow the scope will be for the private sector. The right-leaning faction favors an extensive role for private enterprise; the left-leaning faction favors industrial policy, worker management, and state planning of investment. This is the core ideological rupture within the managerial class, aggravated by the fact that members of the managerial class can flexibly alter their allegiances and can even move back and forth between public and private sector positions.32

Furthermore, to conduct its struggle against the managerial class, capital must enlist the support of the working class, particularly when electoral politics matter. The alliance of the 1930s was between the working class and the managerial class. This was the making of the New Deal coalition that only fractured some 40 years later. The alliance of the 1930s was built over shared benefits associated with construction and expansion of the welfare state. The goal was the restoration of economic well-being.

The alliance of the 1970s was between the working class and capital. This alliance was built over the issues of family, schooling, and lifestyle. The goals were restoration of morality, family ties, and personal worth. Both alliances are inherently fragile. The managerial class is uncomfortable with the anti-intellectualism of the working class. The working class dislikes the arrogant paternalism of the managerial class. These are culturally incompatible social classes.

Capital is uncomfortable with prospects of any renewal of working class demands for higher wages, improved working conditions, and especially reductions in the length of the working day. The working class recognizes that capital is their natural enemy. These are economically incompatible social classes.

Consider again the aforementioned fluidity of the managerial class. The chameleon-like quality permits the class to shift broadly, as times dictate, to advocacy of more free market-oriented or more state planning-oriented policies. This is both a class strength and weakness. It is a strength in dealing with capital, since the class can adapt rapidly to
changed conditions favorable or unfavorable to its hegemony. It is a weakness insofar as an ideologically fractioned class can split into internal welfare.

NOTES

2. Lebedoff, “Dangerous Arrogance,” p 20
4. Lebedoff, “Dangerous Arrogance, p 21
7. The artistic/artisanal wing of the Eastern European intellectual community is especially prominent among the new leadership. Vytautus Landsbergis, the Lithuanian president, is a pianist, musicologist, and biographer of Lithuanian composer Mikalojus Ciurlionis. Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia is a playwright and short story writer. Poland’s Takusz Mazowiecki was a journalist who worked for Solidarity’s newspaper. East Germany’s Lothar de Maziere, likely to be the next prime minister, worked as a lawyer but also had played in a philharmonic orchestra in East Berlin. See Don Kirk, “Maestro Directs Lithuania,” *USA Today*, 27 March 1990, sec A, p 2 and Juan J. Walte, “Intellectuals Rise to Top in Eastern Europe,” *USA Today*, 27 March 1990, sec A, p 2.
10. In a brilliant study of modern Britain, Harold Perkin has argued that professionalization is a socially vertical phenomena, penetrating all strata of society. Thus, Perkin contends that the rise of what he terms “professional society” heralds the end of class society, as all tiers of the population sort between the qualified and the unqualified rather than between upper and lower classes. See Harold Perkin, *The Rise of Professional Society: England Since 1880* (London and New York: Routledge, 1989), especially pp. 2-9.

The argument made here, instead, is that professionalization has meant a transformation of class society. Although the establishment, formalization, and monitoring of entry standards is a characteristic of occupations up and down the job ladder, the upper class is comprised of professionals with advanced educational credentials. What separates the average lawyer from the average plumber is not occupation-specific knowledge nor occupation-specific expertise, but the former’s
passage through the key defining cultural center for the managerial class, the university. Non-elite occupational groups simply have learned the exclusionary advantages of setting "professional standards" in maintaining monopoly control over their respective job tiers. Also see the discussion in Larson, "Proletarianization and Educated Labor," 141-51.


Agnew, "A Touch of Class," p. 70 observes whether we are speaking of middle-level management, engineering, advertising, public relations, journalism, law, social sciences, and medicine, or the helping professions, the stories are all strikingly similar—indeed, almost formulaic: a narrative of academic entrepreneurship and institution building, a story of journals, associations, and foundations, of examinations and degrees, in short, a story of technical and cultural gatekeeping and awarding credentials. This may not be the stuff out of which epic sagas are made, but it is nonetheless a cultural history. If anything, it is a conspicuously cultural history: a history of a class whose work and play are almost entirely taken up with the manipulation and improvisation of social and technical symbols, a "speech community" whose culture can be described in Alvin Gouldner's words, as one of "critical and careful discourse."


13 Burnham, *The Managerial Revolution*.


16 Lebedoff, "Dangerous Arrogance," *passim*.


18 Brown and Erie, "Blacks and the Legacy of the Great Society."


32. As Perkin, *Rise of Professional Society*, p. 10, observes in the context of his characterization of the managerial estate as "professional society":

> The main struggle for society's resources, therefore, is between those who benefit directly from government expenditure and those who see themselves as the source of the expenditure. [B]y far the most important division between the interest groups is between the public sector professions, those funded directly and indirectly by the state, and the private sector professions, chiefly the managers of private corporations. As the struggle between lord and peasant was the master conflict in feudal society and the struggle between capitalist and wage earner the master conflict in industrial society, so the struggle between the public and private professions is the master conflict of professional society.

After all, corporate managers, who are not mere intellectual propagandists for the business regime, become the contemporary representatives of capital in an environment where ownership and management have not been fused in a single entrepreneur for many years. Thus Perkin's "struggle between the public and private professions" can be reconstituted as the struggle between the managerial class and capital.


Finally, the Reagan administration simply did not succeed in limiting the scope of government. Perhaps in part because of its own intransigence over maintenance of the size of the military establishment, it was driven to more limited accomplishments on fronts where it wanted to make deep cuts. Thus the managerial estate lives on into the Bush administration and, one expects, beyond. It promises some, like Richard Herrnstein, a meritocracy of those with measured mental capacity. A deeper look indicates that it carries the seeds of genocide for those deemed unwanted in this, our "brave new world."