San Francisco
The Politics of Race and Sex
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San Francisco has to be counted among the most capable prime sponsors in the nation. But competence in the CETA system must be assessed by the sponsors' ability to respond to local circumstances, rather than by a set of national standards.

This summary first sketches the economic and political environment within which CETA functions in San Francisco. It then describes the planning and decisionmaking processes that govern the city's CETA activities, including the nature of the staff and the roles of federal and state governments. That leads to a description of the program that has emerged from those decisions. Finally, it appraises the quality of training in San Francisco's CETA programs and offers insights for understanding the national system.

The Political Economy of San Francisco

Race and sex politics is the key to understanding CETA in San Francisco, a fact that has its origins more in the area's geography than in its economy.

Geography and Population

Bounded on the north and east by San Francisco Bay, on the west by the Pacific Ocean, and boxed in on the south by another political jurisdiction, San Francisco encompasses only 49 square miles. With this limited area and only 650,000 residents, it is relatively small in numbers as cities go, but it is one of the most densely populated areas in the United States.
Widely renowned for the beauty of its physical setting and its cosmopolitan atmosphere, and serving as the major U.S. door to the Pacific, the area has experienced pressures on its housing market that have tended to prevent the deterioration of private and public buildings seen in many other cities. Slums develop and are rehabilitated through private financing in relatively short cycles.

The white non-Hispanics, who dominate the U.S. population are a minority (49 percent) in San Francisco. Because the city is the U.S. door from, as well as to, the Pacific, Asians and Pacific islanders comprise the second largest population category (about 20 percent of the total). Within that group are people from at least a dozen nations, the largest groups being Chinese and Filipinos. The inflow of Orientals waxes and wanes with the fortunes of war and the economies in the Far East, with Indochina the major source in recent years. In third place is the substantial black population (16 percent of the total), which had its origin during the shipbuilding boom during the Second World War and has experienced little influx since. Finally, the majority of San Francisco’s Hispanics (14 percent of the total) have their roots in Central and South America, with relatively few Mexican-Americans and fewer Mexican nationals.

The proportions of the population who are CETA eligibles—that is, the long term unemployed living in poverty, and those receiving benefits under the program of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)—are all remarkably consistent with the ethnic ratios, except that blacks are overrepresented and Chinese underrepresented among the unemployed poor. By age, young adults are overrepresented in comparison with national norms, indicating San Francisco’s role as a youth mecca during the 1960s, and its continued attractiveness to young singles.
The strong social and ethnic consciousness among San Francisco's population is perhaps not remarkable, but the degree of political organization and potency is. The city has at least a dozen strongly organized political associations based on ethnicity. Homosexuals, both gays and lesbians, constitute another well-organized and aggressive political entity. The rights of women, the handicapped, and the aging are the foci of other politically potent groups. Each of these has its role in CETA politics.

**Government**

Despite its apparent unification, the consolidated city/county government in San Francisco is almost as divided as its political constituencies. City government scandals in the 1930s led to a deliberate weakening of government. A mayor is chosen at large in nonpartisan elections. A board of supervisors, each elected from a different section of the city, plays the legislative role. A chief executive officer—appointed by the mayor, confirmed by the board and removable only by impeachment—is responsible for administering the major departments of government such as health and sanitation. Another batch of professionally oriented services (such as police and fire) report to commissions also appointed by present and past mayors but removable only by impeachment. A group of relatively independent agencies, such as the airport, have the power to generate and spend their own funds, yet every expenditure must be approved by the finance committee of the board of supervisors. Several other agencies, such as the housing authority and the Bay Area Rapid Transit district, known as BART, are city/state organizations that operate outside the city civil service.

The mayor gains substantial independent power through federal programs such as CETA. Appeal to the various race and sex organizations is the key to electoral success. Organiz-
ed labor traditionally has been a power in San Francisco politics, but its influence has withered as blue-collar employment drifted out of the city.

Perhaps because of the lack of other elective entities, the school districts in San Francisco are a focus of political activism, despite a relatively small school-age population. The San Francisco unified school district is responsible for elementary and secondary schools, the community college district for San Francisco City College and nine community college centers, which include adult education. The city also has an extensive parochial school system, an extraordinary number of private elementary and secondary schools, small colleges, and private proprietary training institutions. There is also in the city the state-supported San Francisco State University and the University of San Francisco, affiliated with the Catholic Church.

**The Economy**

In the past 30 years, San Francisco has shifted from a blue-collar labor market based in shipping, shipbuilding, warehousing, and manufacturing to a predominantly white-collar market based in company headquarters and governmental agencies. Shipping activity and traditional manufacturing have tended to move across the bay to Oakland, and other East Bay locations, while newer manufacturing enterprises have settled in the "silicon valleys" of the peninsula, some 30 miles away. Meanwhile, the selection of San Francisco as a regional headquarters for federal and state government activities has added to public employment. The westward movement of the U.S. center of economic gravity and the country's growing trans-Pacific ties have changed San Francisco's skyline (much to the chagrin of many local residents) by the growth of downtown corporate headquarters.
The outflow of manufacturing and the inflow of government reduced the city’s tax base, as did the 1978 Proposition 13 limitation on local property tax rates. As a result, public services have deteriorated somewhat and the city has become more anxious to grasp every source of state and federal funds available.

San Francisco’s unemployment rate—5.4 percent in April 1980 and 5.9 percent in May 1980—is not high for a central city. In fact, even construction activity was being maintained halfway through 1980. More notable is the abundance of white-collar and the dearth of manual jobs. All 41 occupations listed as demand categories for CETA purposes in the spring of 1980 were in the professional, clerical, sales, and service categories. Among San Francisco’s job openings, only automotive repair, building maintenance, and truckdriving, along with a few jobs for welders and machine operators, could be described as blue-collar. Almost all of the recent employment expansion has been concentrated in services; finance, insurance, and real estate; and retail trades. That industry and occupation structure is clearly apparent in the choice of CETA clientele and activities in San Francisco.

Planning and Decisionmaking

Planning is, of course, a staff function but decisionmaking involves not only the prime sponsor’s staff, but also the mayor and her staff, the board of supervisors, the employment and training council, and the influential community-based organizations (CBOs). Federal and state officials have a pro forma role, but not much more.

Staff Qualifications

The outstanding capability of the San Francisco prime sponsor is attributable primarily to the quality and influence
of its staff. Their combination of longevity, experience, influence, and technical competence is unlikely to be exceeded anywhere in the CETA system.

The staff director, Eunice Elton, has been called the "mother of manpower" in San Francisco. She is a 43-year veteran of the California State Employment Service who has managed local offices, regional field offices, and antipoverty specialty programs, and directed the San Francisco Concentrated Employment Program (CEP), and its Community Manpower Program, which was CETA's predecessor. She has directed the Mayor's Office of Employment and Training (MOET) from the beginning of CETA (under three successive mayors) and her technical judgments are considered beyond challenge in the city. Her position is even more invulnerable than her credentials, because she has remained on the Employment Service payroll throughout her CETA service and is beyond retirement age.

Ray Holland—director of the planning, evaluation, and management information system from CETA's initiation—is a veteran of the Peace Corps and the community action program.

Elton and Holland are the only "Anglos" among the top staff. The two program directors, one for employability development (training) and youth programs and the other for public service employment programs, also have MDTA and Economic Development Act program experience and have held their positions from the beginning of CETA. One is of Puerto Rican-Filipino origin, the other of Chinese descent. The heads of the various housekeeping departments have been with MOET from the beginning though they have been promoted from lower level positions. Currently, the three top staff members heading these departments are a Chinese, a black, and a Mexican-American. There is considerable turnover in subordinate positions but almost none in top management.
Staff stability has been maintained despite the absence of formal job protection. All MOET employees are temporary city employees who, along with most of the mayor's staff, cannot achieve tenure. They receive health benefits and vacations but no retirement benefits. They are paid according to the entrance rate for the city's regular civil service grades but receive no in-grade step increases, so they earn less than their peers, although they face as many, if not more, job pressures. The explanation for MOET's staff stability must be adrenalin intoxication.

MOET has done an unusual job of structuring its lower ranks so that CETA enrollees can join the staff as paraprofessionals and then, by substituting experiences for academic credentials and perhaps taking further training, rise to technical and even professional roles. The Labor Department's regional training center is given high marks by the staff and community college and time off can be negotiated for university courses. Although staff development has included training workshops, it has consisted primarily of guided on-the-job experience.

**Prime Sponsor As Decisionmaker**

MOET is a paradoxical decisionmaker. Probably no CETA prime sponsor is more data-oriented and planning-minded, yet few others are more politically responsive in their decisions. The MOET staff is personally well shielded from political influence, yet recognizes the necessity of responding to political pressures on the employment and training council, the mayor, and the board of supervisors.

MOET's staff of qualified planners accumulates the available labor market information and adds a good bit of its own. It has a highly sophisticated management information system and knows almost constantly what is going on amongst a vast array of contractors. Although its decisions
are, for the most part, promptly, smoothly, and objectively made, ultimately they must be recognized as political.

To a large extent, the nature of the labor market and the unusual competence of politically potent institutions make possible this combination of objectivity and politics. The San Francisco labor market has no mysteries on the demand side. It is diversified, homogeneous, and stable.

It is diversified because no one industry or set of firms dominates it, nor does its activity rise or fall appreciably with any one set of economic forces. As an export-import center, its international markets are so diversified that no one country's economic colds can become its pneumonia.

It is homogeneous because it is a white-collar and service market. San Francisco houses corporate headquarters and financial institutions, not producing or materials-handling facilities. Its jobs are white-collar managerial, not technical or scientific. Surrounding those managerially oriented jobs are service jobs (in and out of the firms) that support the executive workforce. Its use as a regional headquarters for both federal and state governments intensifies the central focus on management.

Because these activities tend to emphasize overhead personnel, San Francisco's labor market does fluctuate as much as would a more production-oriented economy. Its set of clerical and data processing occupations seem always to be in demand, and employers' demand and employees' turnover can guarantee relatively continuous employment opportunity in a number of service occupations. If demand is quite stable, a satisfactory set of institutions and programs can be developed and continued.

On the supply side, San Francisco has a remarkably diverse but unusually sophisticated population. The stream of immigrants from both domestic and foreign sources tends
to be those who departed by choice and selected their destination. The most successful from along the rim of the Pacific basin—Asian, Latin-American, and Pacific Islanders—choose San Francisco as their new home. They tend to combine relatively low incomes with education and other characteristics not generally associated with poverty. The domestic youth movement makes San Francisco a target for a new life style. The typical indigenous underclass is less notable than in many central cities.

Thus, San Francisco’s population includes many who are eligible for CETA by economic criteria, yet who possess an organizational and political capability unusual in a poverty community. Most of these community-based organizations (CBOs) are indigenous to San Francisco; the national organization play little or no role in CETA decisionmaking or the delivery of services. What other prime sponsor in the system states explicitly in its request for proposals (RFP) that priority will be given to programs providing services to gays and lesbians? San Francisco’s indigenous CBOs can obtain access to resources and then deliver services with a level of competence that is generally beyond challenge.

The area’s economic stability has made it possible to predict a continuing need for a familiar set of services. Therefore, MOET has been able to set criteria which, when met, qualify the contractor for guaranteed 3-year funding—not for a stipulated amount of money, because federal funds cannot be known in advance, but for a proportionate share of the action. Of nearly 200 MOET contractors, 14 are in that secure status currently.

As decisionmaker, therefore, MOET has been able to respond to political realities but defend its actions by standard, objective economic criteria. The use of labor market information to determine service needs and of management information to evaluate performance need not lead to markedly
different decisions than those which politics would have dictated.

For related reasons, MOET has been able to spread the base of decisionmaking without losing control of the decisionmaking process. Its advisory employment and training council, though too large for optimal effectiveness, is very active in its decisionmaking, but generally sides with the staff on most issues. The council is made up of roughly one-third *ex officio* members from public agencies, one-third mayoral appointees representing various interest groups, and one-third appointees of the board of supervisors drawn from geographical areas of the city.

The council's two most potent committees are the planning committee and the evaluation committee. The first decides annually how the budget will be distributed by enrollee characteristics and service functions. The evaluation committee is supplied twice a year with a mass of data on contractors' performance. Then each contractor must publicly defend its stewardship. The careful preparation, volume, and sophistication of the data supplied by MOET staff make it highly unlikely that the council will refute it. A former MOET staff member, now in the mayor's office, also sits in on all of these sessions so that the mayor's preferences get into the decision stream early, while the staff has a strong advocate with the mayor.

If the staff gets overruled, as it does occasionally, it is generally by the board of supervisors, which is much more difficult to reach and influence as a body, although any board member can be more easily subjected to political pressure from outside.

Monthly meetings of all MOET contractors provide information, communication, and an opportunity to vent feelings and frustrations.
Despite MOET's adroit decisionmaking process and its favorable economic setting, the presence of the competent but political CBOs has costs as well as advantages. Some CETA activities which staff members consider to be of high potential, notably individual referral and high-support on-the-job training discussed below, are difficult to defend for lack of a political constituency. Politics need not and generally do not force acceptance of a less than adequate program but it may block an outstanding one that lacks political support.

**Federal, State, Local Relations**

MOET has the advantage of history in its relations with both the DOL regional office and the state CETA system. In effect, MOET, in the person of Eunice Elton, was there first and the others are newcomers. The state CETA system has no supervisory role over any prime sponsor. However, San Francisco has done reasonably well in garnering governor's discretionary funds. The State Employment Development Department spends considerable state CETA money in the city. In addition, a variety of state-funded programs contribute significantly to the resources available to the city.

Probably the most significant fact of MOET's relationship with other government bodies is that federal regional staff rarely hassles anyone from MOET. Residence in the regional office city helps, because misunderstandings sometimes grow with distance. MOET staff reports favorable experience with the regional training center run by a local consulting firm of strong reputation in the employment and training field. Beyond that, the regional staff is most helpful by not second-guessing MOET's decisions or intervening in its activities.
Training Policies and Practices

San Francisco’s CETA program—its funding, enrollments, and performance—demonstrate a clear and longstanding preference for training over all other CETA services if training is defined broadly as employability development. In fact, that is the name of the MOET administrative unit responsible for all services except public service employment. What do CETA-eligible residents need to make them acceptable to employers in the stable San Francisco economy? Given the diversity of the population, it is not surprising that the most frequent answer is "enough command of English to be able to function in a white-collar or service job."

Table 1 summarizes the total CETA budget and enrollments for fiscal 1979. Of the Title II B-C funding total over which the prime sponsor had considerable discretion, 56 percent was spent on classroom training and 16 percent for on-the-job training. The 10 percent spent on work experience was, in effect, mandated.

Table 1. Total San Francisco CETA Funding and Enrollments, 1979

<table>
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<th>Title</th>
<th>Total funds</th>
<th>Enrollments</th>
<th>As of Sept. 30, 1979</th>
<th>Cumulative fiscal 1979</th>
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<td>8,980,528</td>
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Maintenance of effort requirements imposed by the Youth Employment Demonstration Projects Act of 1977 dictate that MOET reserve 48 percent of its Title II-B CETA slots for youth. A substantial amount of these services take the form of work experience, because many youth are not prepared to settle down to a training program or to work in its intended occupations afterward. Work experience is an acceptable "aging vat," but the MOET director objects to the way that theory works out in practice. School counselors too often refer students who are not CETA-eligible to any jobs they hear about, usually with private employers, because they know publicly subsidized jobs are available for disadvantaged youth. Thus, youth with the best out-of-school contacts leading to the regular labor market get further reinforcement and those without any such contacts are diverted to a semi-income maintenance situation.

MOET has little or no control over that situation but has an explicit policy forbidding work experience programs for adults. Nine percent of Title II B-C funds were spent on supportive services for the disadvantaged clientele. For public service employment under Title II-D, MOET is inaugurating an approach for 1981 in which PSE enrollees will spend half the day in classroom training and the other half on the job applying those skills. Title VI will remain standard PSE.

San Francisco CETA also has one other important non-training service—advocacy programs. Seven contractors have an explicit affirmative action role on behalf of age, race, sex, or handicap groups. They provide no significant training or employment. These agencies have been effective in the comfortable demand situation in working with employers to meet affirmative action goals by hiring CETA eligibles of various characteristics. The advocacy programs and miscellaneous services absorb the 9 percent of Title II B-C funds not accounted for above.
In fiscal 1979, 192 contractors had assignments to deliver CETA services in San Francisco. Of these, 146 were hosts for public service employment. Seventeen supplied classroom training and seven promoted on-the-job training, in addition to the seven advocacy contractors. The largest investment is in English as a second language (ESL). For several contracting institutions, ESL is the primary reason for being. Each concentrates on a specific language group: Spanish, Chinese, Korean, Filipino and so forth. Each teaches English in a skill training context, primarily clerical skills, and therefore most of their pupils are women. For smaller numbers of men, each also provides some training in service occupations as a vehicle for language training.

A larger group of contractors emphasize skill training and treat language training as an adjunct skill. For instance, the Jewish Vocational Service has an outstanding program for Russian Jewish emigres. Because most of the emigres have university degrees, knowledge of U.S. weights and measures and similar material is taught to refurbish chemists, engineers, and so forth, with English instruction as an add-on. With help from the Jewish Vocational Service, a similar program is being designed for Vietnamese.

Nonlanguage training institutions in San Francisco also tend to concentrate on a single skill or a narrow range of skills. Thus, the choice of an institution at which to enroll is equivalent to a choice of training type. Intake is centralized only for youth. For those with language problems that is no handicap, because enrollees must be referred to the institution specializing in their native language. For others, however, it means that the accident of contact determines the nature of the training opportunity. The sophisticated may learn of all of the alternative institutions and their offerings and select from among them. Those who go to a Job Service office and are fortunate enough to find an interviewer who
recognizes their CETA eligibility may be referred to whatever the interviewer knows to be available. A Youth Service Office, funded by MOET and operated by Job Service, provides central referral services for the young. But what is available for them is primarily work experience. A Job Service office located in the MOET building has a contract to make individual referrals to ongoing programs in regular public and private schools.

San Francisco has no actual skill center, even though one institution bears that name. Under the Manpower Development and Training Act, it approached but never achieved the qualification requirements for a skill center; the provision of training in a broad range of occupations, onsite counseling, job development and placement, and supportive services, and a concentration on the disadvantaged. In the interim, it has become one of nine nondegree community college centers serving a broader audience. It now serves CETA primarily by accepting individual referrals who can function on a par with its other students. Its one class-size CETA project—for health care professionals—has an excellent placement record but is somewhat selective in its enrollment.

The skill center is an example of a simultaneous boon and bane built into the California education system. When a CETA client enrolls in a tax supported school, that school is rewarded with the same average daily attendance education funds it would receive for any other student. Hence, the school usually absorbs the training costs; only the training stipend comes from CETA sources. That allows an attractive leverage of the CETA training dollar, but it may also bias training decisions. Better training in some fields may be available from private institutions, but the trade-off between the higher cost of these institutions and the pressure to spread available funds to serve more enrollees may tip the balance in favor of public institutions.
Some of the MOET staff would prefer a centralized intake system for assessing all enrollees and referring them to the institution offering the most appropriate mix of services. Institutions that specialize in services for particular age-race-national origin-sex groups, however, would resent such intervention between them and their client groups and have the clout to prevent it, so the MOET staff has never actually proposed to centralize intake.

The staff also harbors two related preferences that are not politically viable. Neither has a constituency of its own, and both are opposed by powerful community groups.

One is an expansion of the individual referral program. The majority of San Francisco CETA eligibles have high school diplomas and many have some college credits. By selecting trainees carefully and working with the schools, the staff members feel they could overcome the need for supportive services and purchase a higher level of training. The staff desire to move to training in higher level skills, even at higher per enrollee costs, reflects a nostalgic pride in the MOET Skill Training Improvement program experiences, all of which had been completed before this study began. This approach, too, would face opposition from those with vested interest in CBO based programs. The staff hopes to expand upgrading programs and does not expect as much opposition, because that emphasis probably can be accommodated within the current mix of contractors.

Similar political problems exist for the second staff preference: more and better on-the-job training. As noted above, the national CBOs have no political clout in the city. Only the local Urban League advocates OJT but the power lies with the indigenous organizations, which tend to look at OJT as a diversion from the resources available to them.

The staff also has no preference for standard low support OJT, which is seen as merely a wage subsidy for small
employers. However, they are enthusiastic about high-support OJT, of which there have been some outstanding examples. Primarily in response to affirmative action pressures, public utilities and other large employers have occasionally approached MOET or a contractor, and CETA-eligible persons have been selected to meet these employers' needs. A MOET contractor has provided vestibule training in simulated work settings. Grooming, deportment, and basic education, as well as entry level skills, have been stressed. Then the enrollees have moved into an OJT phase but still have been coached by the contractor until secure in their jobs.

High level clerical, substantial technical, and low level management positions have been obtained in this way. A consortium of engineering and architectural firms is currently inducting young blacks into technician positions by the high support OJT approach. But such opportunities are sporadic. Employers that can provide them cannot be persuaded by a modest wage subsidy. They respond to their own needs, and their affirmative action emphasis is shifting from the entry level to the upgrading stage. Employers will not participate in the competitive RFP process, so someone has to act as surrogate for them. Without strong direct advocacy, it is difficult for MOET staff to retain an uncommitted pool of OJT funds to respond quickly to employer invitation. Any uncommitted funds are well known to the CBOs, which bring pressure on the employment and training council, board of supervisors, and mayor for their allocation.

High-support OJT seems unattainable as a regular program, but it has been accomplished often enough to remain a tantalizing dream to the MOET staff.
The Quality and Results of Training

One could summarize training in San Francisco CETA by saying that:

1. Employability development in a broad sense is the first priority of nearly all actors in the system.
2. The language problems of new immigrants are so overwhelming as to swamp other needs.
3. The skills, qualifications, and commitments of the immigrants are sufficient, combined with a favorable labor market and competent trainers, to guarantee high placement rates and even higher retention.
4. The mix of services and service deliverers is probably not optimum, but it certainly is defensible.

The correlation between program quality and program outcomes is distorted by the nature of the population and the labor market. The ESL programs are the most successful, even though not necessarily of the highest quality. The facilities are generally crowded and uninspiring. The instructors must meet community college certification requirements and are generally competent and committed. Over time, the instructors in the various ESL programs in San Francisco have developed their own approach and denominated it as vocational English as a Second Language. They all tend to take pride in and use the same approach, regardless of language. There is no way to separate the competence of the instructor and the quality of the curriculum from the commitment of the student body in assessing results. What is clear is that the participants do learn English—at least enough to get by and get a job. The job skills components of ESL are generally not well-equipped and often seem to be an afterthought. Nevertheless, placement and retention rates in the high 80s are standard across the ESL range and are bought at very low per enrollee costs.
The quality of individual referral is dependent upon the quality of the institutions involved. The private proprietary schools are designed to meet the market and generally have impressive facilities and excellent equipment. Their major handicaps from a CETA standpoint is that many CETA eligibles have not been able to survive in those competitive environments. Most of the community colleges also offer good facilities and instruction and adequate equipment. However, the skill center is housed in an abandoned elementary school and carries the marks of a second class institution. Nevertheless its health programs are taught by professionals who maintain high quality.

Most impressive in the San Francisco setting are the high support OJT projects. The initial pre-entry training is adequate but the employer involvement and commitment to hire is what makes all the difference. But these are sporadic and difficult to mount.

All in all, San Francisco can be described as a CETA system with a successful training emphasis, more because of the nature of the population and the economy than because of the training quality. In fact, San Francisco’s native black and white poor would debate its effectiveness for them.

Capacity to Develop and Manage Training Programs

All of these factors are reflected in the development and management of CETA training programs. Stability of need and offering reduces the challenge to develop new programs and new approaches. That which works well can be continued without need for continuous modifications and new beginnings. A combination of ESL and clerical training is relatively easy to put together. Decentralized delivery lets the prime sponsor hold the contractors’ feet to the fire without
having to take full and direct responsibility for managing the training program.

Still there are always prices to pay. A decision to decentralize to service units sponsored by politically potent groups means that almost every group has a right to a funded institution of its own. They cannot all be equally competent. Only in dire circumstances can one national origin group be denied any funding and its constituents required to seek service from another group’s entity. The California system of state-supported educational institutions offering free tuition is a boon to the leveraging of CETA funds, but it may lock MOET into continuation with a mediocre institution because of the low per enrollee cost. More selective individual referrals and more high support OJT are the staff’s own non-political preferences. The price of survival in a political atmosphere is compromise. But MOET has been able to mount an impressive service delivery mechanism in a political setting which could have been chaotic.

The diversified employability development system also has the advantage of being readily expandable. MOET received, in 1980, proposals for over twice as much training as it was able to fund. The capacity for individual referral is almost infinite, given the number of private as well as public training institutions in the city. None of the San Francisco CETA training programs is capital-intensive and expansion of language training requires only instructors, which are plentiful. Every program has a substantial waiting list of eligible applicants. MOET staff believes classroom training could be expanded by one-half in a few months if given the funding. Expanded classroom funding would also take the opposing political pressures off high support OJT, freeing resources to develop more of those programs.
Conclusion

CETA in San Francisco is well managed by any set of standards. Its decisionmaking has a broad base and responds to both politics and economics. Its staff is not plagued by turnover and has extraordinary competence. The federal agency is neither a help nor a service hindrance. A major training need—the Americanization of a new generation of immigrants—has been identified and is being met within the limits of available resources. All of these achievements are being accomplished in a highly politicized atmosphere, and the response to those pressures is adroit. One might argue for a different response—one that would centralize intake and assign clients to training institutions by need and capability. But politics is as real as economics, and there is no obvious way to choose between them.