Rent Control—Is the Cure Worse Than the Disease?

Brian J. Asquith

After a long period of neglect, a new generation of policymakers and activists has embraced rent control as a solution to the housing affordability crisis plaguing America’s booming coastal cities. The national median rent for a one-bedroom apartment is $1,209 a month, but for some metro areas it is considerably higher. Urban residents suffering from the highest rents are mostly in wealthy, coastal cities, such as San Francisco ($3,500), New York City ($2,860), San Jose ($2,480), Los Angeles ($2,360), Oakland ($2,100), and Washington, D.C. ($2,160). In addition to sharing astronomically high rents, these cities also share another feature: rent control.

Rent-control regimes have operated in these six cities for the better part of 30 years, and they exist also in a host of smaller cities, chiefly in California, Maryland, and New Jersey. Undergraduate Economics 101 would have you think that rent control is essentially a rent freeze, but the reality is that rent control as practiced today has evolved into a far more complex system. The vast majority of today’s rent controls were instituted in the 1970s and early 1980s in response to the stagflation crisis, and are often referred to as rent stabilization, tenancy rent control, or second-generation rent control to distinguish themselves from their much-maligned predecessor. Since these modern forms are really the only game in town, I refer to them herein as just rent control.

Rent-control regimes have operated in these six cities for the better part of 30 years, and they exist also in a host of smaller cities, chiefly in California, Maryland, and New Jersey. Undergraduate Economics 101 would have you think that rent control is essentially a rent freeze, but the reality is that rent control as practiced today has evolved into a far more complex system. The vast majority of today’s rent controls were instituted in the 1970s and early 1980s in response to the stagflation crisis, and are often referred to as rent stabilization, tenancy rent control, or second-generation rent control to distinguish themselves from their much-maligned predecessor. Since these modern forms are really the only game in town, I refer to them herein as just rent control.

These measures were largely intended to be temporary, but like many so-called temporary regimes, rent control is the answer to an emergency situation that never seems to end. One reason for rent control’s persistence is that it redistributes benefits from future tenants to present ones. One influential study found that, after rent control was
Rent Control—Is the Cure Worse Than the Disease?

expanded to a new set of apartments in 1994 in San Francisco, tenants in affected buildings were 10–20 percent more likely to remain at their 1994 address compared to tenants in the control group. Since rent increases are capped at less than the rate of inflation, these tenants were (and in some cases still are) effectively being subsidized to live in their controlled apartments for as long as they like. This creates a powerful pro-rent-control constituency that can be difficult for reform-minded policymakers to overcome.

This de facto subsidy to stay in place affects tenants’ labor market outcomes. One study shows that tenants absorb longer commutes instead of yielding their rent-controlled apartments, suggesting that keeping the subsidized housing is more valuable to them than moving closer to a new job or switching job markets altogether. Another study concluded that the stronger the local rent-control ordinance, the more likely a person was to limit their job search to local jobs. While rent control may allows workers to stay close to high-wage jobs in dense urban areas, it is not altogether clear that this is in the best interests of tenants or the economy in the long run.

Rent control’s distortional effects also extend into housing supply. The policies in Table 1 collectively dampen landlords’ profits in the controlled market. In the case of San Francisco, landlords actually lose money since rent increases are capped at 60 percent of the inflation rate. In growing markets, the gap between what a landlord receives from a controlled apartment and from one that allows increases at the market rate compounds over time. Because tenants in this situation have strong incentives to stay longer under rent control, landlords in turn try to avoid tenants they suspect will be “long-stayers.”

My own research asks: How do landlords of rent-controlled properties change their housing supply when prices rise? Do they bring more units to market? Or, in San Francisco, at least, have policymakers imposed such burdens on landlords that they actually remove properties from the market? To motivate this question, Figure 1 shows evictions by quarter in San Francisco. The left axis shows Ellis Act evictions, by which landlords evict all tenants and withdraw an entire building from the market. Ostensibly, this occurs when landlords no longer want to operate their buildings, and so one might expect these evictions to rise when the economy slumps and vice versa. Instead, Ellis Act evictions spike during booms and fall during recessions. The right axis shows “just-cause” at-fault evictions, mostly tenants being evicted for delinquent rent. Since tenants in the controlled market are insulated from price increases during booms, one might expect this type of eviction to rise during recessions as tenants’ ability to pay falls. Instead, Ellis Act evictions (albeit less sharply), at-fault evictions seem to rise in boom periods and level off in recessions.

These relationships suggest that landlords try to evade rent control restrictions when it would be especially profitable to do so, such as by converting rental units to condominiums. To test this hypothesis more definitively, I examine how two outcomes respond to market price increases that affected San Francisco neighborhoods differentially between

Table 1 Major City Rent Control and Evictions Policies, October 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Subject to controls if the building is...</th>
<th>Max annual allowable rent increase</th>
<th>Vacancy decontrol?</th>
<th>Just-cause evictions?</th>
<th>Rental stock coverage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles⁠</td>
<td>Built before 10/1/1978 and has 2 or more units</td>
<td>Regional CPI rate, bounded within 3–8%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oakland⁠</td>
<td>Built before 1/1/1983 and has 4 or more units</td>
<td>Regional CPI rate, max of 10%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York City⁠</td>
<td>Built before 1/1/1974 and has 6 or more units</td>
<td>Set by NYC rent guidelines board annually</td>
<td>No, rent increase for new base rent capped at 20%⁠</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San José⁠</td>
<td>All rental units built before 9/7/1979</td>
<td>Previously 8% 6/2016: 5%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No, city-mandated arbitration instead</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington, DC⁠</td>
<td>An apartment building built before 1/1/1976</td>
<td>CPI + 2%, max of 10%</td>
<td>No, rent increase for new base rent capped at 10%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco⁠</td>
<td>Built before 6/13/1979 and has 2 or more units</td>
<td>60% of CPI, max of 7%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d In both cities, landlords can appeal for a rent increase on new base rents of up to 30% if rents in comparable units are shown to be higher.
e San José Municipal Code, Apartment Ordinance, Chapter 17.23. Coverage figure is from San José Municipal Ordinance No. 29730, p. 1.
g Asquith (forthcoming).
2003 and 2013. The first outcome is whether landlords tactically evict individual tenants to try to lock in higher rents from new tenants. More specifically, do landlords use just-cause evictions to expel long-standing but lower-paying tenants? In spite of the pattern in the graph, I find no statistically significant evidence that landlords do this. Instead the evidence suggests that landlords of rent-controlled apartments are less likely to turn over their tenants when prices rise.

The other outcome is whether controlled landlords outright exit the market in response to a price increase. I find that landlords do in fact respond to rising prices by withdrawing from the rental market via Ellis Act evictions (or, in smaller buildings, by withdrawing one unit from the market by claiming a relative needs to move in). This is a serious response, because by law the landlords must pay relocation fees and leave these units vacant (or filled by a family member) for at least three years or be subject to sanctions.

The two results confirm that the controlled market is distorted compared to “normal” housing markets. Landlords apparently expect to make such little money on the controlled market that they conclude it’s better to exit the market entirely, at least for a few years. If these landlords are thus incentivized to reduce supply as prices rise, it is hard to see how rent control improves housing market dynamics in these cities.

So, if existing evidence is that rent control is distortionary, why not abolish it? We have some evidence on what happens when rent control is repealed, and the result is generally salutary (see, for example, Autor, Palmer, and Pathak 2017). In January 1995, a Massachusetts law banned rent controls, mostly affecting units in Boston, Cambridge, and Brookline. Property values in both decontrolled and never-controlled units rose, while property crime fell, especially in areas with the highest concentration of controlled units. Additionally, segregation may have decreased.

However, the evidence is not clear on whether low- and middle-income tenants in fact would have been better off without rent control. So, what are other remedies to help these groups with housing costs? Government programs have included Section 8 housing subsidies, low-income housing tax credits to finance new housing, and more recently, affordable housing mandates. These programs offer some help, particularly to poorer renters, but generally do little to address the housing needs of middle-income residents facing excessive rent burdens in expensive cities. Rent control’s lack of means testing is thus a political strength, because it can claim to be the rare policy that helps middle-income renters as well.

Despite popular demands for government intervention on rents, economists typically advocate for increasing the housing supply. Frustratingly, there is little empirical evidence on what happens to rent prices when the number of housing units in a neighborhood rises, with one study suggesting prices may not move much. Upjohn Institute economist Evan Mast, Philadelphia Fed economist Davin Reed, and I are currently studying this issue using data on unit-level migrations, rents, and building openings.

Irrespective of the ultimate answer, rent control is here to stay. The current beneficiaries are well-organized, numerous, and know what they stand to lose from its repeal. The return of rent control to the scholarly agenda is thus propitiously timed to caution policymakers and a frustrated public that while soaring rent burdens are indeed approaching crisis levels in some places, rent control is a policy that has yet to deliver on its promise: affordable rents for all, not just for the few lucky enough to score a controlled apartment.

Figure 1  Evictions in San Francisco, 1993Q1–2018Q1

SOURCE: Author’s calculations from data provided by the San Francisco Rent Board and Kate Pennington, University of California, Berkeley.
NOTE


REFERENCES


The article draws on research from the forthcoming working paper, “Do Rent Increases Reduce the Housing Supply under Rent Control? Evidence from Evictions in San Francisco,” published by the Upjohn Institute. https://doi.org/10.17848/wp19-296

Brian J. Asquith is an economist at the Upjohn Institute.

Labor Market Effects of U.S. Sick Pay Mandates

Nicolas R. Ziebarth and Stefan Pichler

Background

The United States, Canada, and Japan are the only industrialized countries that do not provide universal access to paid sick leave. In these countries, sick pay is largely provided as a fringe benefit by employers on a voluntary basis (Heymann et al. 2010). In the United States, coverage rates are around 65 percent among full-time workers; low-income, part-time, and service sector workers have coverage rates of less than 20 percent (Susser and Ziebarth 2016). In a given week of the year, Susser and Ziebarth (2016) estimate that the total demand for paid sick leave sums to 10 percent of the workforce in the United States.

To date, sick leave legislation has been passed in 11 states, the District of Columbia, and dozens of cities across the United States. They require that employees must have the right to earn, accumulate, and take sick days, typically up to seven days per year. Some critics are concerned that these mandates cause substantial wage reductions for employees, as well as job losses. Upjohn Early Career Research Awardee Nicolas R. Ziebarth of Cornell University and colleague Stefan Pichler of ETH Zurich published an examination of these sick pay mandates in the Journal of Human Resources (forthcoming).

Findings

The research team used employment and wage data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics from 2001 to 2016 to compare the labor market dynamics of the cities and states with mandates to “synthetic” control cities and states over time. The research assessed mandates in nine cities (including San Francisco, Washington, D.C., and New York City) and four states (Connecticut, California, Massachusetts, and Oregon).

The synthetic control group method (SCGM) is a relatively recent statistical method that allows researchers to draw causal inference. In this specific case, to benchmark the labor market dynamics of cities and states that implemented a mandate, the SCGM produces a very similar synthetic control group consisting of fractions of similar counties and states.

Figure 1 illustrates the SCGM and some select findings. The left column shows the findings for three areas—San Francisco, King County, and New York City. The right column shows the findings for three select states, California, Massachusetts, and Oregon. The x-axis represents the normalized timeline in months up to and since the mandates became effective, and the y-axis shows the...
Figure 1  Employment Dynamics in Regions with Sick Pay Mandates Relative to Synthetic Control Regions

San Francisco County, California

California

King County, Washington

Massachusetts

New York City, New York

Oregon

SOURCE: Pichler and Ziebarth (forthcoming).

NOTES: The solid vertical lines indicate the months when the mandates became effective, whereas the dashed vertical lines to the left indicate when the law was passed, and the dashed vertical lines to the right indicate when the “accrual period” was over. Originally published in the Journal of Human Resources (forthcoming). © 2018 by the Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System. Reprinted courtesy of the University of Wisconsin Press.
We do not find evidence that sick pay mandates kill jobs or systematically disrupt local labor markets.

The absence of major labor market disruptions may be a function of how the U.S. mandates are designed. In fact, they seem to be more incentive-compatible than their European counterparts and minimize shirking behavior, a main concern of opponents. The reason for this incentive-compatibility is that paid sick days are personalized, and employees “earn” them. For every 30–40 hours worked—that is, for every full-time week of work—employees earn one hour of paid sick leave. Unused sick days roll over to the next year. Because earned sick days represent a personalized insurance credit (similar to health savings accounts) for future health shocks that are likely to occur (e.g., flu or illness of a child), we expect shirking to play a minimal role for most employees.

However, wages and employment could still be significantly affected because of administrative burdens or psychological effects when employers overestimate the actual relevance for their businesses. The findings in Pichler and Ziebarth (forthcoming), however, show that this was very likely not the case. They are able to exclude employment losses of more than 2 percent and wage reductions of more than 3 percent at conventional statistical levels.

Together with research showing that influenza-like illness rates decrease as a result of the mandates (Pichler and Ziebarth 2017), this finding suggests that the mandates can be an effective tool to increase workers’ health and well-being.

NOTE

REFERENCES


W.E. Upjohn Institute Welcomes Michael Horrigan as Its New President

The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research has chosen Michael W. Horrigan to be its next president. Horrigan, an associate commissioner with the Bureau of Labor Statistics, begins his new job March 4. Horrigan succeeds Randall W. Eberts, who announced his retirement from the president's role last March after 25 years leading the Institute. Eberts remains with the Institute as a senior researcher.

Horrigan came to the BLS as a labor economist in 1986, after six years as an economics professor at Williams College in his native Massachusetts. He rose through the ranks as a division chief, the director of the National Longitudinal Surveys Program and assistant commissioner in two offices. He served as associate commissioner for the Offices of Prices and Living Conditions before taking his current role of associate commissioner in the Office of Unemployment and Unemployment Statistics in 2014.

In 1991, Horrigan was finishing a one-year term as a senior labor economist with the Council of Economic Advisers when he met Eberts. “I was replacing him as one of the senior staff economists,” Eberts said. “Now he is replacing me as president of the Institute, more than 25 years later. In the interim, Mike has established himself as one of the premier labor economists in the country.”

Horrigan’s oversight of programs to produce and distribute key national employment indicators positions him well to steward the Institute’s research initiatives on vibrant local economies and on alternative work arrangements, said Donald R. Parfet, chair of the Upjohn Institute Board of Trustees. “His background in labor economics and numerous leadership roles at the BLS make him particularly well suited to guide the Institute on an exciting strategic path,” Parfet said.

“He has a lot of experience in this space and a real eagerness to lead us,” Parfet said. “He has the energetic drive to continue the work that Randy has started.”

In addition to providing vision and strategic direction, Horrigan also plans to continue his own research, potentially collaborating with Institute researchers on topics such as workforce development, automation and labor force participation. “The researchers are doing exceptional work and I’m looking forward to building on that research in a way that has even greater impact,” he said.

The Institute has focused on various topics over the years but draws strength from its unique position as a nonpartisan labor market research nonprofit that is narrowly focused on employment issues. “We absolutely will want to go deeper,” Horrigan said. “We want to leverage the things we know how to do really well, in a way that’s intentional.

“We’ll also look at going broader, while at the same time be disciplined about which initiatives we undertake,” he said. “We will not go beyond our reach.”

Horrigan and his family will move to Kalamazoo after his assignment begins. Although Horrigan got a taste of the Midwest during graduate work at Purdue University and has relatives in Michigan, he is still learning about the area. “There’s a lot more than I realized,” he said. “I’m excited about the education and cultural opportunities Kalamazoo has to offer for me and my family.”

NEW BOOK: Investing in America’s Workforce

Improving Outcomes for Workers and Employers

How can well-structured and effective workforce programs and policies result in better economic outcomes for individuals, businesses, and communities? Explore contemporary research, best practices, and resources from more than 100 authors in the book Investing in America’s Workforce: Improving Outcomes for Workers and Employers. The book is divided into three volumes: 1) Investing in Workers, 2) Investing in Work, and 3) Investing in Systems for Employment Opportunity. Each volume contains discrete sections made up of chapters that identify specific workforce development programs and policies that provide positive returns to society, to employers, and to job seekers.

Download the three volumes and individual chapters for free at https://www.investinwork.org/book.

Investing in America’s Workforce is a Federal Reserve System initiative in collaboration with the John J. Heldrich Center for Workforce Development at Rutgers University, the Ray Marshall Center of the Lyndon B. Johnson School at the University of Texas, and the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.

Note: The policies and practices presented in the book are intended to spur innovative thinking that results in context-specific solutions. The perspectives are not intended as an endorsement from the Federal Reserve System or its partnering institutions.