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Evaluation of the Air Force's Determination of the Military Value of the W.K. Kellogg Air Guard Station and the Potential Cost Savings Generated by its Closing

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This final report has been updated and revised based on new information. Please disregard all previously dated reports. In addition, I wish to acknowledge and thank the staff of the W.K. Kellogg Air Guard Station for their excellence assistance and patience. This report could not have been completed without their assistance. Of course I take full responsibility for any remaining errors and omissions contained in the report.

Executive Summary

This is an evaluation of the methodology used by the Air Force in determining the military value of the W.K. Kellogg Air Guard Station and in estimating the potential costs savings generated by its proposed closing.

Loss of Future Mission Capability

Our findings show that if the Air Force closes the W.K. Kellogg Air Guard Station, it would lose a highly effective mission ready fighter wing, which could take up to five years to rebuild. The 110th fighter wing earned the best average Fully Mission Capable (FMC) rate of the six A-10 bases during the past 10 years. Its crews have logged more flight hours than any other A-10 unit in the last eight years (Appendix B, Slides 25 - 26).

The proposed closure of the 110th Fighter Wing and movement of the A-10 aircraft to Selfridge will cause the new A-10 squadron to “drop to the lowest combat ready status and be a non-deployable unit for at least 3 to 5 years, depending on the availability of
training school assets" according to the sworn testimony of Retired Major General E. Gordon Stump (June 20, 2005). Selfridge’s F-16 pilots will be given first priority on placement and assignment for the A-10s, making it very likely that only a few of the current A-10 pilots will make the move.

**Military Value**

The methodology used by the Air Force in determining the military value of the W.K. Kellogg Air Guard Station is highly subjective, undocumented, and, at the same time, partially based on incorrect and irrelevant data.

The final military value rankings of bases are only partially derived from the bases’ Mission Capabilities Index (MCI). A regression analysis using data from 80 Air Forces bases shows that the MCIs for the eight separate missions account for only 61 percent of the variation in assigned military values of the bases. Of the eight MCIs, only the bomber and space operation’s MCIs were found to be statistically significant in explaining a base’s military value.

In addition, the information collected in the WIDGET data gathering process contains errors that negatively impact the calculated MCIs for the W.K. Kellogg AGS. More disturbingly, much of data gathered in the WIDGET process in not relevant in determining the mission capability of the W.K. Kellogg AGS. For example,

- The Prevailing Installation Weather Conditions (formula 1271) score for the W.K. Kellogg AGS was inappropriate. The criteria, a 3000 feet ceiling and 3 miles visibility, is not relevant when the standard conditions for flight is 300 feet and 1 mile.
- The Proximity to Airspace Supporting Mission (formula 1245) was erroneously based on distance and not on the number of mission airspaces available and useful for effective training. Pilots flying out of W.K. Kellogg AGS can and do use up to nine airspaces which offer a variety of surface environments and, due its northern location, seasonally variation as well including three Air-to-Surface ranges, two of which allow Live Munitions and Laser Guided Bombs (LGB) (Appendix B, Slides 37-38).
- The Proximity to Low Level Routes Supporting Missions (formula 1246) is not required for low altitude tactical training fighter aircraft, particularly in the A-10.
- The MCI for SOF/CSAR including A-10s is based, in part, on base capabilities that do not relate to the operation of A-10s including landing zones for helicopters and drop zones for parachutists, which are available to W.K. Kellogg at the adjacent Fort Custer military complex, but were not scored.

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1This analysis is limited by our inability to obtain, after repeated tries, the complete listing of the Air Force’s military value scores for all of its bases.
The question on Ramp Area and Serviceability (Formula 8) is unnecessarily biased toward large bases (configured on an Active Duty model), for it does not allow for joint ramp area agreements between the base and neighboring uses. In fact, joint ramp agreements can be a cost-effective means for the Air Force to control costs while maintaining necessary surge potential.

In short, the methodology used in determining the military value of W.K. Kellogg AGS was highly subjective and based on incorrect and inappropriate data. Of course, it is well beyond the scope of this analysis to come up with an alternative methodology to determine the military value of the W.K. Kellogg AGS. However, these results do support the recommendation that the BRAC Commission broadens its scope of review to include the base’s past record of performance (including recruitment), age and condition of the base’s physical infrastructure, and its cost effectiveness.

Potential Cost-Savings Estimates

The Air Force seriously overestimated the potential cost savings generated by closing the W.K. Kellogg Air Guard Station in Battle Creek Michigan. The Air Force estimates that the Net Present Value (NPV) of cost savings over the next 20 years from closing the base will reach $167 million. Moreover, its analysis shows that the annual recurring savings after the closing are $12.7 million with an immediate payback expected. It is our estimate that it will cost the Air Force $6.144 million (NPV) to close the W.K. Kellogg Air Guard Station.

The Air Force’s calculations are incorrect for four major reasons:

1. It failed to account for the substantial retraining costs that will occur if the 110th Fighter Wing is moved to Selfridge. Based on the assumption that the wing would lose 50 percent of its current pilots during the move, it would cost more than $72 million and up to five years to retrain 18 F-16 fighter pilots to the same level as now maintained by today’s 110th Fighter Wing (Appendix B, Slides 72 - 73).

2. Its calculated cost saving for military personnel reduction – the elimination of 50 positions – is voided by the fact that its overall end-strength remains unchanged. An issue recently addressed by a recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report entitled Analysis of DOD’s 2005 Selection Process and Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments (GAO)-05-785).

3. It inflated the potential cost savings that will be generated by eliminating the overhead costs of the W.K. Kellogg airbase. Current expenditure for base operation and maintenance is $4.2 million annually, not $5.7 million as reported in the COBRA model.
4. It ignored the cost of renovating Selfridge’s hangars which were constructed in 1932. We estimates this cost to reach $14.5 million (Appendix B, Slides 43-44).
Introduction

The U.S. Air Force recommends that the W.K. Kellogg Air Guard Station be closed, the 110th Fighter Wing deactivated and the A-10 aircraft be relocated to Selfridge. This report examines and evaluates the methodology used by the Air Force in determining the military value of the Kellogg base and in estimating the expected cost savings of closing the base. In addition, this report examines the potential loss of the Air Force’s future mission capability if the Kellogg base is closed.

It is the conclusion of this report that closing the W.K. Kellogg Air Guard Station is not in the best interest to our national defense. We find that closing the base will lead to a loss of future mission capability. Furthermore, the military value determination of the installation was based on a highly subjective and flawed methodology. Finally, we estimated that closing the base will not generate any cost savings to the Air Force. In fact, closing the base will cost the Air Force $6.144 million (NPV) during the next 20 years.

Loss of Future Mission Capability

The closure of the Kellogg Air Guard and the resulting relocation of it’s A-10 aircraft to Selfridge would likely cause the unit to drop “to the lowest combat ready status and be a non-deployable unit for at least three to five years, depending on the availability of training school assets” according to the sworn testimony of Retired Major General E. Gordon Stump (June 20, 2005). It is very likely that most of the unit’s current pilots would not be relocated with the planes to Selfridge because of both voluntary resignations and Selfridge’s current F-16 pilots enacting their right to pilot the relocated A-10s.

The performance of the 110th Fighter Wing based at the W.K. Kellogg Air Guard has been highly honored. It is the only ANG A-10 unit to receive an “outstanding” rating on an Air Combat Command (ACC) operational readiness inspection in the last nine years. Moreover, it is the only ANG A-10 unit with zero Class A or B mishaps since 1995. In addition, it holds the top average “Fully Mission Capable” (FMC) rate for A-10 aircraft out of all ANG A-10 units for last ten years and its pilots have flown more hours, regular and combat, than any other ANG A-10 unit over the last eight years (Appendix B, Slides 23-26).

The unit’s maintenance personnel have more than 1,000 years of combined A-10 experience with the average maintainers holding 11 years of experience with the plane (Appendix B, Slide 25).

Table 2 lists the unit’s most recent combat missions. In 2003, the 110th Fighter Wing served in Operation Iraqi Freedom after returning from being deployed in Operation Southern Watch only three weeks earlier. It was the only ANG unit to achieve such a feat. In Operation Iraqi Freedom the unit flew 455 combat sorties, logging in more than 1,164 combat hours.
### Table 1 - FMC and Hours Flown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>FMC Rate</th>
<th>Hours Flown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kellogg 110th</td>
<td>72.8%</td>
<td>34,773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltimore 175th</td>
<td>68.2%</td>
<td>31,546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willow Grove 111th</td>
<td>67.3%</td>
<td>31,772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bradley 103rd</td>
<td>59.9%</td>
<td>31,355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boise 124th</td>
<td>69.8%</td>
<td>33,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barnes 104th</td>
<td>63.9%</td>
<td>34,643</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### Table 2 - 110th Fighter Wing Combat Missions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Combat Mission</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Operation Deny Flight</td>
<td>Bosnia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Operation Joint Endeavor</td>
<td>Bosnia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Operation Noble Anvil</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Operation Southern Watch</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Operation Southern Watch</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Operation Iraqi Freedom</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the 2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Wing personnel earned 14 Distinguished Flying Crosses and 10 Bronze Stars (Appendix B, Slide 24).

Overall, Battle Creek’s overall MCI was better than 4 out of the 5 other ANG A-10 units (Table 3). It scored better than four of the five other ANG A-10 bases on 5 of 8 missions. According to these measures, Battle Creek is better suited to meet the Air Force’s future capability needs than four of the other five other ANG A-10 bases.

### Table 3 - MCI Comparison of Existing A-10 Installations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Base</th>
<th>SOF/CSAR</th>
<th>Fighter</th>
<th>Bomber</th>
<th>Airlift</th>
<th>Tanker</th>
<th>C2ISR</th>
<th>UAV</th>
<th>Space</th>
<th>AVERAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boise</td>
<td>41.35</td>
<td>50.86</td>
<td>39.70</td>
<td>47.32</td>
<td>70.84</td>
<td>72.76</td>
<td>73.07</td>
<td>43.37</td>
<td>54.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle Creek</td>
<td>30.52</td>
<td>37.60</td>
<td>27.47</td>
<td>39.22</td>
<td>50.93</td>
<td>62.74</td>
<td>63.36</td>
<td>53.29</td>
<td>45.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willow Grove</td>
<td>37.71</td>
<td>49.69</td>
<td>35.58</td>
<td>35.85</td>
<td>40.94</td>
<td>47.95</td>
<td>60.56</td>
<td>11.62</td>
<td>39.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barnes</td>
<td>35.50</td>
<td>42.02</td>
<td>29.69</td>
<td>37.75</td>
<td>39.35</td>
<td>46.06</td>
<td>61.49</td>
<td>23.61</td>
<td>39.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltimore</td>
<td>39.45</td>
<td>51.42</td>
<td>43.55</td>
<td>30.37</td>
<td>32.26</td>
<td>36.39</td>
<td>55.54</td>
<td>19.75</td>
<td>38.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bradley</td>
<td>35.40</td>
<td>40.10</td>
<td>27.43</td>
<td>37.83</td>
<td>40.49</td>
<td>51.78</td>
<td>54.51</td>
<td>12.77</td>
<td>37.54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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In short, the Air Force will throw away years of experience and know-how if it closes the 110th Fighter Wing and relocates the A-10 aircraft to Selfridge. Not only will it take three or five years to rebuild the A-10 squadron to an acceptable level of combat readiness, but will cost millions of dollars as well as will be shown below.

**Determination of Military Value**

To assist in determining the military value of its installations, the Air Force used a Web-based Installation Data Gathering and Entry Tool (WIDGET). WIDGET provided the means to acquire a consistent data base for 154 installations, which was then used to calculate the Mission Capability Indexes (MCIs) for eight separate missions for each base. The eight missions are fighter; bomber; tanker; airlift; Special Operations/Combat search and rescue (including A-10s); Command, Control, Intelligence/Surveillance/Reconnaissance (C2ISR), Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and space operations. The MCI tool measures the specific military value for each base for all eight of the missions. It is important to note that each of installations was given a MCI score for each of these missions even if it never performed one or more of them.

Armed with the calculated MCIs, the Air Force Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG) determined the military value of each base. How these military values were derived is unclear, however. After reviewing its 20 year force structure projections and overall principles, the BCEG went through several iterations of different base structures until “a set of potential forces structure deployments was reached that conformed to the Air Force principles, did not violate any Air Force imperatives, improved military capability and efficiency and was consistent with sound military judgment.” Based on this “potential force structure deployment” the BCEG adopted a set of recommended base closures and realignments. This step also went through several iterations. “Lastly, the BCEG approved Air Force candidate recommendations were time-phased to balance maximized payback and minimized disruption to operational training units.”

During this decision making process, the final military value assigned to each of the 154 installations became removed from the installations’ MCIs scores. In other words, the determination of military value became more subjective.

To estimate the importance of the data-intensive MCI process in determining the final military value assigned to each base, we conducted a regression analysis which statistically estimates the linear relationship between a base’s eight MCI scores and its final military value. Unfortunately, the analysis is based on only the 80 bases for which the military values were provided in the Department of the Air Force *Analysis and Recommendations BRAC 2005* (Volume, Part 1 of 2). We were not successful in obtaining the assigned military value for all bases. The data used in this analysis is presented in Appendix A.

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3 Ibid, page 52.
As shown by the Adjusted R-squared Statistic on Table 4, the eight MCIs combined explain 61 percent of the variation in the military values of the 80 bases in the sample. Had the military value been calculated as some type of weighted average of the eight MCIs, then the Adjusted R-squared statistic would have been 1. In other words, approximately 40 percent of the bases’ military value cannot be explained by its eight MCI scores. Regarding the individual MCIs, the Bomber and Space Operations MCIs are statistically significant and have the correct sign. For example, a one unit change in a base’s Bomber MCI would, on average lower its military value (improve its ranking) by nearly 1.8 units. Surprisingly, a higher score in a base’s UAV MCI would have, on average, a negative impact on its military value – pushing it higher. Statistically speaking, changes in a base’s Fighter, SOF/CSAR, Tanker or CS2ISR MCIs would have an impact on its military value that could not be distinguished from zero.

The Beta statistics indicate the relative importance of each of the MCI values to explaining a change in the military value rating. For example, a one standard deviation change in a base’s Bombers MCI will lead to a 0.58 standard deviation decline in the base’s military value rating.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MCI Value</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>t-statistics</th>
<th>Beta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fighter</td>
<td>-0.99</td>
<td>-1.33</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bomber</td>
<td>-1.79</td>
<td>-2.76*</td>
<td>-0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanker</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airlift</td>
<td>-0.86</td>
<td>-1.52</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS2ISR</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>2.66*</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Space Operations</td>
<td>-0.53</td>
<td>-3.79*</td>
<td>-0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>145.39</td>
<td>9.20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Statistically significant at the 5 % level.

Errors in Calculating Mission Capability Indexes

Although, the above analysis shows that a base’s final military value is only partially determined by its Mission Capability Indexes (MCIs), it is still important to evaluate the accuracy of the MCI methodology in capturing a base’s mission capability.

In the following analyses, the MCI scores for the W.K. Kellogg AGS are compared to those of Selfridge and the five other ANG A-10 bases. Table 5 shows the MCI scores for
the six comparison bases and the W.K Kellogg AGS, ranked in terms of the overall average MCI for all eight mission areas. W.K. Kellogg ranks third behind Boise and Selfridge. W.K. Kellogg’s average MCI score is only 3 percent below that of Selfridge, or 1.44 points. This is in sharp contrast to the major difference in the two bases’ final military values – 62 for Selfridge compared to 122 for Kellogg. Clearly, unarticulated subjective factors were added to Selfridge’s score to push its military value ranking so low.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BASE</th>
<th>SOF/CSAR</th>
<th>FIGHTER</th>
<th>BOMBER</th>
<th>AIRLIFT</th>
<th>TANKER</th>
<th>C2ISR</th>
<th>UAV</th>
<th>SPACE</th>
<th>AVERAGE MCI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boise</td>
<td>41.35</td>
<td>50.86</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>47.32</td>
<td>70.84</td>
<td>72.76</td>
<td>73.07</td>
<td>43.37</td>
<td>54.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selfridge</td>
<td>42.06</td>
<td>48.07</td>
<td>33.86</td>
<td>47.27</td>
<td>58.24</td>
<td>63.74</td>
<td>62.07</td>
<td>21.35</td>
<td>47.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kellogg</td>
<td>30.52</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>27.47</td>
<td>39.22</td>
<td>50.93</td>
<td>62.74</td>
<td>63.36</td>
<td>53.29</td>
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<td>Willow</td>
<td>37.71</td>
<td>49.69</td>
<td>35.58</td>
<td>35.85</td>
<td>40.94</td>
<td>47.95</td>
<td>60.56</td>
<td>11.62</td>
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<td>Grove</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>42.02</td>
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<td>61.49</td>
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<td>Barnes</td>
<td>39.45</td>
<td>51.42</td>
<td>43.55</td>
<td>30.37</td>
<td>32.26</td>
<td>36.39</td>
<td>55.54</td>
<td>19.75</td>
<td>38.59</td>
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<tr>
<td>Martin</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>27.43</td>
<td>37.83</td>
<td>40.49</td>
<td>51.78</td>
<td>54.51</td>
<td>12.77</td>
<td>37.54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5  Overall MCI by Mission Area

In addition, several of the questions used in WIDGET to assess the military capability of W.K. Kellogg to conduct SOF/CSAR and Fighter missions are irrelevant to the operation of A-10s or do not adequately address the issue they are intended to measure.

First, 22.7 percent of the total SOF/CSAR score rests on the base’s proximity to Landing Zones (necessary for helicopters) and Drop Zones (parachutes) – formulas 1248 and 1249. These do not apply to A-10 operations and should not be factored into MCI for A-10 operations, further, these facilities are available through the adjacent Fort Custer military complex, but were not included in the score.

In regards to methodology used to determine a base’s Fighters MCI, 22.08 percent of the total potential score depends on “The Proximity to Airspace Supporting Mission” – formula 1245. For the SOF/CSAR MCI a slightly modified question – distance is slightly reduced – accounts for 14.72 percent of the total potential score. These questions are ineffective in obtaining the information required for they only address distance to the airspace; they do not address the more important questions of how many airspace options does the base have and what is the variety of surface environments they offer. Fighters cover 5 miles per minute so to set the maximum distance at 150 miles is far too restrictive. The W.K. Kellogg Air Base offers nine different airspaces with a variety of environments within one hour fly time. In addition, the Kellogg Air Base was not allowed to list the Grayling Range as an asset as it was assigned to Selfridge even though pilots from both bases have equal access and it is supported by the W.K. Kellogg ANGB.

Regarding Ramp Area and Serviceability, the WIDGET question was heavily biased toward larger bases by not allowing for readily available shared ramp space to be counted. For smaller bases like W.K. Kellogg, that have successfully executed surge...
activities, this is an unfair requirement and is not cost effective. W.K. Kellogg controls 66,000 square yards of ramp area; however, it has ready access to other 90,000 square yards if required. One of the clear advantages of shared ramp space, which can be secured by signed agreement in times of surge activity, is that the Air Force avoids maintenance and service costs.

Finally, the WIDGET questions do not adequately address the growing concern of mission encroachment. Noise migration procedures and congested air travel control environments can harm a base’s ability to perform surge operations. This is a strong advantage of the W.K. Kellogg base compared to other bases in urban setting (Appendix B, Slides 50 - 65).

The questions in WIDGET never established the fact that the average age of the facilities at Kellogg is only 16 years old with 80 percent being built after 1991. The base is on a 10,000 foot runway, which is an alternate shuttle landing site and is utilized by Air Force One. The base has the largest most modern munitions storage facility in southwest Michigan. Finally, the base has room to grow with over 41,000 square foot available in authorized square footage for new facilities and over 45 acres available for building (Appendix B, Slides 35-37).

In summary, the methodology used by the Air Force to determine the military value of the W.K. Kellogg AGS is unclear, subjective, and based, in part, on erroneous data.

**Evaluation of the Air Force’s Cost-Savings Estimates**

The Air Force used the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) model to estimate the cost savings associated with curtailing operations at the W.K. Kellogg AGS. The COBRA model is a standard cost-benefit model which simply compares the cost associated with closing or realigning a military facility (e.g. moving costs and environment cost) with its potential savings (e.g. reduction in personnel costs and overhead). The model estimates the Net Present Value for a 20-year planning period. In short, the COBRA model is an accounting tool and its results are only as good as its inputs. We have independently tested the model’s calculations and found them to be without error.

Table 6 presents the Air Force COBRA model’s derived cost saving estimates. The COBRA model estimates that the Air Force will incur a one-time cost of $8.3 million to close W.K. Kellogg AGS and will save $12.7 million annually during the implementation period – 2006 to 2011. Moreover, the Net Present Value (NPV) of the cost savings derived from closing the base reaches $166.8 million during the 20-year planning period.

The Air Force analysis carefully calculated the one-time costs of moving 182 employees from W.K. Kellogg to Selfridge, $4,945,000. The assumptions and methodology used in these calculations appear sound.
Nearly 55 percent of the estimated annual savings of the closing the W.K. Kellogg is derived from the elimination of 92 personnel positions. Of the 274 positions currently at the W.K. Kellogg Base only 182 are scheduled to be moved to Selfridge.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6 - Air Force Cost Savings Estimates</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(in thousands of $)</td>
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<td>Costs</td>
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<td>Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost - Savings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Retraining Costs of Pilots and Maintenance Personnel

As discussed above, the proposed relocation of the A-10 aircraft (the 110th Fighter Wing will be closed) to Selfridge will cause the A-10 squadron to drop to a non-combat ready status and become a non-deployable unit for as long as five years. Selfridge’s F-16 pilots will be given first priority on placement and assignment for the A-10s, making it very likely that only a few of the current A-10 pilots will make the move. In addition, since the move is greater than 50 miles, the 110th Fighter Wing pilots have the right to refuse to move. This will require the Air Force to spend million of dollars in extra training costs, as well as paying for the hundreds of hours of necessary flying time that it will take for the retrained pilots to achieve mission readiness.

The Air Force cost-savings estimates simply ignored these substantial retraining costs. In our calculations we make the conservative assumption that one-half of W.K. Kellogg’s
pilots will not make the move. As shown in Table 7, the first year of training costs would total more than $27 million as 14 pilots take the TX (Transition) course at either Davis-Monthan or Barksdale Air Force base, and that other four take the even more intensive B (Basic) courses. After this training, the new pilots will still have to log in the required five years of flying time to gain a combat readiness level equaling approximately 50 percent of the current unit’s training and combat experience level for the A-10 mission.

Moreover, our estimates do not account for the retraining costs that will be necessary for ground personnel at Selfridge, including aircraft mechanics and munitions specialists.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7 - Retraining Costs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assumption: 18 pilots will have to be retrained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retraining Expenditures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 TX courses @ $990,000 each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 B courses @ $3,400,000 each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of necessary flying to achieve combat readiness:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 years of required A-10 flying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 years of required A-10 flying to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (in millions)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In total, the military will be burdened with more than $72 million in retraining costs (not discounted) before for A-10 squadron returns to approximately 50 percent of the combat readiness it currently holds at the W.K. Kellogg AGS.

Military Personnel Costs

The Air Force erroneously claims that the elimination of 50 military positions at the Kellogg AGS would generate a cost savings of $4.8 million annually. However, these should not be taken as cost savings, but instead, personnel cost transfers as the Air Force’s end military personnel strength does not change during the BRAC restructuring. As summarizes by the General Accountability Office (GAO):

The Air Force was unable to provide us documentation showing at the present time to what extent each of these [eliminated] positions will be required to support future missions. According to Air Force officials, they envision that most active slots will be needed for formal training and all the Air Reserve and Air National Guard personnel will be assigned to stressed career fields and emerging missions. Furthermore, Air Force officials said that positions will also be revised during the Quadrennial Defense Review, which could decrease end strength. Either way, claiming such personnel as BRAC savings with reducing end strength does not provide dollar savings that can be reapplied outside personnel accounts and could result in the Air Force having to find other sources of funding.
for up-front investment costs needed to implement its BRAC recommendations.\(^4\)

In short, the $4.8 millions generated by the elimination of the 50 military personnel positions will be used by the Air Force to fund necessary personnel slots required to retain military readiness in the face of its planned base closures and realignments. These funds will not be “saved” nor invested in other future Air Force activities.

We do accept the Air Force’s estimated annual cost savings of $2.8 million associated with the elimination of the 42 civilian positions at Kellogg if it is closed.

**Cost of Overhead – Operations and Maintenance**

The Air Force over estimated the cost savings that will be derived from the elimination of W.K. Kellogg AGS. As shown in Table 8, we estimate that annual cost savings that would be gained by closing Kellogg would be $4.2 million, not the $5.7 million as promised by the Air Force.\(^5\) The largest cost savings will be the elimination of the fire protection service agreement at the base, a savings of $2.2 million annually.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Eliminated Activities</th>
<th>Annual Cost Savings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supply &amp; Equipment</td>
<td>$401,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract Services</td>
<td>$91,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT Support</td>
<td>$240,759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental</td>
<td>$14,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOMA/RPS</td>
<td>$803,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Agreement</td>
<td>$406,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FireFighter Agreement</td>
<td>$2,260,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Annual Savings:</strong></td>
<td><strong>$4,217,411</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 8**

Operation and Maintenance Savings of Closings the W.K. Kellogg Base

Additional military construction expenditures will be incurred to bed-down the 110FW at Selfridge. These added costs are on top of the Air Force’s plans to construct a new Fire and Rescue Station at Selfridge. First, a new structure will be required to house the A-10


\(^5\)In an earlier version of our analysis (released on June 27), we seriously underestimated the potential cost savings associated with closing the base, $707,000 annually. We regret and apologize for this error.
flight simulators. In addition, there will be the added construction costs associated with building new fences for force protection due to the closing of the U.S. Army Garrison at Selfridge (Appendix B, Slide 45).

Furthermore, as shown in Table 9, four of the current structures at Selfridge were constructed in 1932, while another seven were built in the 1950s and 1960s. Such old structures require added maintenance and operating costs and several may require to be replaced in the near future. Many of the newer structures on the base are located on its West Ramp and are in excess of the base missions.

We estimate that the Air Force will be required to make renovations to its 1932 and 1955 Hangar space (structures 3 and 36) which will total $14.2 million. Additional required renovation costs on the base’s structures including its Fuel System Maintenance Dock, which is incompatible to A-10 aircraft, could reach up to $15 million; however, these were not included in our analysis. In addition, a new A-10 Simulator Facility will have to be constructed, which was also not included in the cost calculations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure Number</th>
<th>Use</th>
<th>Year Built</th>
<th>Size (SF)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Hangar</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td>26,880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Weapons Release</td>
<td>1932</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Aircraft Maintenance</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td>32,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Deployment Processing</td>
<td>1932</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Hangar</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>62,983</td>
</tr>
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<td>154</td>
<td>Fuel System Maintenance</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>17,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Fuel System Maintenance</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>30,171</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Existing aircraft related facilities would be in excess to the new mission. The lost square footage is 244,017 square feet.

In comparison, the average age of the facilities at Kellogg is 16 years, with 80 percent of the structures constructed after 1991.

Revised Cost-Saving Estimate

Table 10 presents our revised cost saving estimates. The re-estimation includes 1) the necessary retraining costs that can be expected in moving the A-10 aircraft to Selfridge, 2) the elimination of the erroneous military personnel savings, 3) the correction in the expected overhead cost saving and 4) the cost of renovating required hanger space at Selfridge. We find that the NPV of the costs to the Air Force of closing the W.K. Kellogg ANG is $6,144 million.

---

6 Renovation construction costs are estimate to be $158.35 per square foot with 89,863 square feet of hangar space being renovated.
### Table 10  Upjohn Institute’s Benefit Cost Analysis of Closing W.K. Kellogg Air Guard Base

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Costs at Selfridge</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>Beyond</th>
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<td>$8,950</td>
<td>$8,950</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Mil. Housing All.</td>
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<th>Costs at Kellogg</th>
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<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
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<th>2012</th>
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<th>Savings at Kellogg</th>
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<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
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<th>2010</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Construction</td>
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<td>$0</td>
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<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Savings Kellogg</strong></td>
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<td>$2,707</td>
<td>$7,010</td>
<td>$7,010</td>
<td>$7,010</td>
<td>$7,010</td>
<td>$7,010</td>
<td>$7,010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total Cost Savings                                      | -$102 | $47,285 | $3,348 | $3,040 | $3,040 | $3,040 | $3,040 | -$5,870|

Net Present Value: $6,144

Other Factors to be Considered

First, the U.S. Army estimates that they will save $260 million over 20 years by closing the Army Garrison at Selfridge. In order to avoid encroachment issues that would
endanger operations, the Air Force will have to assume responsibility for the property at Selfridge garrison, and thus they will assume some of its overhead costs. The Air Force analysis does not account for these potential costs. Moreover, the costs will likely run much higher than the need to construct a new fence, as mentioned above. Demolition costs may be required as well.

Second, in preparing its cost analysis the Air Force used a very low discount rate schedule, which slowly increases from 1.4 percent in 2005 to 2.7 percent in 2025. Using such a low discount rate places greater value on expected long-term cost savings than most analysts are willing to accept. Twenty years is a very long time period in the rapidly changing environment of national defense. It would have been prudent to introduce a risk factor during the later years of the forecast period. Table 11 shows the impact of the project’s Net Present Value under different discount rates and risk scenarios. In all scenarios, the expected NPV is reduced.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 11 Alternative Discount Rates and Risk Factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Current Discount</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force NPV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upjohn Institute NPV</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Conclusion**

The Air Force justifies the closing of W.K. Kellogg Air Guard State solely on its military value.

The Air Force placed one squadron at Selfridge (62 – *military value*) because it is significantly higher in military value than Kellogg (122 – *military value*). The Air Force retired the older F-16 from Selfridge and combined the two fighter units into one squadron at retain trained and skilled ANG Airmen from both locations. (Italics added)

It is the finding of this report that the large difference in military value between Selfridge and Kellogg cannot be supported by the data gathered in the WIDGET process.

Second, it is very likely that the Air Force’s expectation of retaining trained and skilled ANG Airmen, especially its current A-10 pilots based at Kellogg, will not hold true. It is likely that more than 50 percent of the A-10 pilots will not following the aircraft to Selfridge. This will require million of dollars in retraining dollars to be spent to ready Selfridge’s F-16 pilots for the relocated A-10 positions. This will eliminate a mission ready squadron and activate a new squadron that will not be mission ready until its new
pilots receive the necessary retraining and log-in the required flying hours. It could take up to five years before the A-10 squadron would reach 50 percent of level of mission readiness it has today, at a cost of more than $72 million to the Air Force.

Finally, the Air Force seriously erred in its estimation that the closing of the W.K. Kellogg ANG would result in a cost savings of $166.8 million. We estimate that closing W.K. Kellogg will cost the Air Force more than $6 million (NPV) over the next 20 years.

In summary, the methodology used by the Air Force did not provide an accurate evaluation of the military value of the W.K. Kellogg Air Base nor did it adequately measure the cost of closing the facility. In short, the Air Force’s recommendation to close the W.K. Kellogg Air Guard Station cannot be supported by this analysis.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Base Name</th>
<th>Military Value</th>
<th>Appendix A - Data Used in Regression Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Andrews</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>MCI Scores: Fighter: 64.83, 55.23, 57.19, 52.05, 74.6, 75.8, 53.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlantic city</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>SOF: 50.22, 41.94, 39.38, 23.51, 45.55, 41.04, 67.55, 55.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangor</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>CSAR Bomber tanker airlift CS2ISR UAV Space: 34.47, 31.77, 31.45, 42.68, 43.83, 52.05, 52.64, 40.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barksdale</td>
<td>33</td>
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<tr>
<td>Barnes</td>
<td>97</td>
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<tr>
<td>Birmingham</td>
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Analysis of DoD BRAC Process:
110th Fighter Wing & W.K. Kellogg

Compiled and Edited By:
Brigadier General Tom Edmonds (ret)
For: Battle Creek Unlimited
Overview

- Understanding the BRAC Plan
- The BRAC Process
- BRAC Implementation
- The DATA – Terms Defined
- Comparative Analysis
- Concerns
- Conclusions
The BRAC Plan

- BRAC Report Anatomy
- Purpose and Goals
- Basic Process
- Criteria
- Implementation
Plan Anatomy

• Volume I:
  – Describes overall BRAC selection process
  – Unclassified version of Force Structure Plan
  – Details DoD’s closure and realignment recommendations and justifications

• Volume II:
  – Classified Force Structure Plan

• Volumes III – XII:
  – Detailed description of analytical processes and recommendations of each DoD proponent Organization
  – Includes 3 Military Depts (USAF – Vol V) and 7 Joint Cross Service Organizations (JCSGs)
Purpose and Goals

• Secretary of Defense – Align Base structure with expected force structure over the next 20 years (By Law – PL101-510 – required to base recommendations on a 20 year Force Structure Plan)

• Goals
  – Transformation
  – Eliminate excess physical capacity
  – Rationalizing the base infrastructure with new Defense Strategy
  – Maximize both war fighting capability and efficiency
  – Examine opportunities for Joint Activities

Source for Stated BRAC Goals:
(Vol V para3.3.5 pg 52) This iterative process continued until a set of candidate recommendations was reached that best promoted transformation, provided military value, and was fiscally sound.
Basic Process

I. Capacity Analysis
II. Military Value Analysis
III. Scenario Development
IV. Scenario Analysis
V. Results Analysis
  ➢ Determining Payback
  ➢ Determining Economic Impact
  ➢ Assessing Community Infrastructure
  ➢ Environmental Impact
Basic Process

- Capacity Analysis
  - Determine Physical and Operational capacity of an installation
  - Determine if “Surge” capabilities meet contingency needs (Note: neither “surge” nor “contingency needs” are defined)

*Capacity Analysis as described by DoD BRAC report:*

Vol 1 Part 1 DoD BRAC Report (pg17, 3rd Para under Analytical Framework) – Surge Capability Assessment:

As part of the assessment of probable threats to national security, the National Defense Authorization Act for 2004 requires the Department to “determine the potential, prudent, [sic] surge requirements to meet those threats.” The Military Departments and JCSGs incorporated surge assessments in multiple steps of their analyses. Each determined the surge capacities needed to support the Department’s force structure plan, evaluated the capability of assigned installations and facilities to surge, and incorporated these capabilities in their capacity assessments. During the military value analysis, analytical proponents evaluated infrastructure supporting their functions within the framework provided by the BRAC selection criteria. **Criteria 1, “current and future” mission capabilities, and criteria 3, “ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements,” capture the concept of surge.** By appropriately weighting criteria attributes and metrics, Military Departments and JCSGs ensured that surge was appropriately reflected in military value analyses.
Basic Process

• Military Value
  − Primary Area utilized for determining reapportionment
  − Criteria 1 – 4
    • Current and Future Missions
    • Condition of Infrastructure
    • Contingency, Mobilization, Future Forces
    • Cost of Ops / Manpower
  − Quantitative and Qualitative Components

Source: Vol I Part 1 DoD BRAC Report

As required by statute, the military value of an installation or activity was the primary consideration in developing the Department's recommendations for base realignments and closures. (Pg 21, Military Value Analysis, para 1)

Quantitative: The quantitative component, explained in greater detail below, assigns attributes, metrics, and weights to the selection criteria to arrive at a relative scoring of facilities within assigned functions. (WIDGET) (Pg 21, Military Value Analysis, para 1)

Qualitative: The exercise of military judgment and experience to ensure rational application of the criteria. This component is discussed further in the context of scenario analysis. (Pg 21, Military Value Analysis, para 1)

Comparative Analysis – Focus Areas:
  1. Coast Savings
  2. Joint Basing
  3. Surge Capabilities
  4. Contingency Support
Basic Process

• Scenario Development
  - Following completion of Capacity and Military Value analysis
  - Iterative process to identify potential closure/realignement scenarios
  - JCSG developed scenarios (created outside the numerical process, subjective?)

• Scenario Analysis
  - Evaluated against selection criteria 5 – 8 with a review of Military Value (Criteria 1 – 4)
  - Decision Makers applied military judgment and experience to Military value of a proposal

Source: Vol 1 Part 1 DoD BRAC Report (Pg 15, Joint Cross-Service Groups, para 1)

Important: note the ability of the JCSG and Decision Makers to work outside the “objective” process. To facilitate a robust joint analysis during BRAC 2005, the Secretary of Defense chartered seven joint cross-service groups (JCSGs) to make realignment and closure recommendations related to common business-oriented support functions. The JCSGs, each of which had representatives from the Military Services, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Staff, were chartered as analytical proponents with exclusive authority to make recommendations related to assigned support functions. Each performed a broad, comprehensive review of these functions. The final BRAC 2005 package illustrates that these JCSGs generated a significant portion of the overall recommendations.

Source: Vol V para 3.3.5 (pg 52)

The initial force structure deployment was refined by the BCEG in subsequent iterations to remove unrealistic or impracticable actions that the Cueing Tool was unable to recognize, actions that did not improve military value in the aggregate, or that were not supported by compelling military rationale. These subsequent iterations, termed second look, third look, and so on, were refined until a set of potential force structure deployments was reached that conformed to the Air Force principles, did not violate any Air Force imperatives, improved military capability and efficiency and was consistent with sound military judgment.

Source: DoD Vol I Ch3 (pg 22)

“Scenario Analysis” - Decision makers also applied their military judgment and experience to assess the overall military value of the proposal. Once the decision makers determined that the scenario was consistent with or enhanced military value, they proceeded to evaluate the scenario against the remaining selection criteria DoD Vol I Ch3 (pg 21) Qualitative Aspect of Military Value: The qualitative component is the exercise of military judgment and experience to ensure rational application of the criteria.
Basic Process

• Results Analysis
  - Determine Payback (Criterion 5)
    • COBRA applied
  - Determine Economic Impact (Criterion 6)
    • Economic Impact Tool (EIT): measures total potential job change (direct and indirect) in the economic region or Region of Influence
  - Assessing Community Infrastructure (Criterion 7)
    • Ability to support incoming personnel
    • Evaluation of 10 Attributes

Note: no definitions offered for “economic region” or “Region of Influence”

Source: Vol I Part 1 DoD BRAC Report (pg 24)

10 Attributes:

  1. Demographics
  2. Childcare Costs
  3. Cost of Living
  4. Education
  5. Employment (rates?)
  6. Housing (availability? Cost?)
  7. Medical Care (“ “, “ “)
  8. Safety / Crime
  9. Transportation (?)
  10. Utilities
Basic Process

• Results Analysis (con’t)
  – Environmental Impact (Criterion 8)
    • Cost relative to potential environmental restoration, waste management and environmental compliance activities
    • Environmental Resource Impact
      – 10 Areas
      – Note: Costs associated with Environmental Restoration are not included in payback calculations

• Overall Criteria for Comparisons
  – Military Value
  – Cost Savings
  – Economic Impact
    • Local Communities
    • Community Support Infrastructure
    • Environmental Impact

Source: Vol I Part 1 DoD BRAC Report (pg 24)

10 Areas of Environmental Impact

• Air Quality
• Cultural/archeological/tribal resources
• Dredging
• Land use constraints/sensitive resource areas
• Marine mammals/marine resources/marine sanctuaries
• Noise
• Threatened and Endangered species / critical habitat
• Waste Management
• Water resources
• Wetland
BRAC Implementation

- **Guiding Principles for Facilities and Land**
  - Act Expediately
  - Fully utilize all appropriate means to transfer property
  - Rely on leverage market forces
  - Collaborate effectively (with local community)
  - Speak with One Voice (local community speaks singly on desires)

Source: Vol 1 Part 1 DoD BRAC Report Ch 4 (Pg 27, Implementation and Reuse, para 3+)

**Guiding Principles**

Out of its experience assisting communities during the implementation of previous BRAC rounds, the Department believes that the following principles will be particularly useful in the transition in communities supporting the Department’s mission:

- **Act expeditiously whether closing or realigning.** Relocating activities from installations designated for closure will, when feasible, be accelerated to facilitate the transfer of real property for community reuse. In the case of realignments, the Department will pursue aggressive planning and scheduling of related facility improvements at the receiving location.

- **Fully utilize all appropriate means to transfer property.** Federal law provides the Department with an array of legal authorities, including public benefit transfers, economic development conveyances at cost and no cost, negotiated sale to state or local government, conservation conveyances, and public sale, by which to transfer on closed or realigned installations. Recognizing that the variety of types of facilities available for civilian reuse and the unique circumstances of the surrounding communities do not lend itself to a "one-size-fits-all-solution," the Department will use this array of authorities in a way that considers individual circumstances.

- **Rely on and leverage market forces.** After four rounds of BRAC, both the public and private sectors are aware of the range of opportunities available for property reuse. A broad spectrum of practitioners has gained experience in all phases of base closure and redevelopment. This expertise should allow market forces to work effectively. Community redevelopment plans and military conveyance plans should be integrated to the extent practical and should take account of any anticipated demand for surplus military land and facilities. If installation growth is substantial, the Department will work with the surrounding community so that the public and private sectors can provide the services and facilities needed to accommodate new personnel and their families.

- **Collaborate effectively.** Experience suggests that collaboration is the linchpin to successful installation redevelopment. Only by collaborating with the local community can the Department close and transfer property in a timely manner and provide a foundation for solid economic redevelopment. While BRAC sometimes challenges the existing supportive partnership between the installation and the community, both parties can benefit from the change if they continue to recognize themselves as partners whose individual interests in carrying out BRAC decisions are interrelated. Existing partnerships may need to expand to include state officials because of their environmental, historic preservation, and economic development responsibilities. Military-community partnerships need to be flexible enough to adapt to the specific market forces and other circumstances at each location.

- **Speak with one voice.** The Department, executing disposal and reuse activities through the Military Departments and Defense Agencies, will provide clear and timely information through single focal points and will encourage affected communities to do the same. Timely information regarding facility and environmental conditions and closure and realignment schedules are critically important. In the past, when communities spoke with one voice about their reuse goals and activities, the Department was better positioned to consider local redevelopment plans. This was also true when installations and communities experienced substantial personnel increases. The Department recognizes that installation base commanders and local officials need to integrate elements of their growth planning so that appropriate off-base facilities and services are available for arriving personnel and their families.
BRAC Implementation

- Personnel Assistance
  - Priority Placement Program (PPP)
  - Voluntary Early Retirement Authority (VERA)
  - Voluntary Separation Incentive Program (VSI)
  - Homeowners Assistance Program
  - US Dept of Labor Funding
  - JFTR Authorizations – Dislocation Allowance

Source: DoD Vol I Part 1 BRAC Report (pg 29)

Assistance for Personnel

One of the Department’s challenges at installations subject to BRAC decisions is the fair and effective management of human resources. The closure of installations with the potential for separating a large number of civilian employees presents major challenges to commanders and human resource personnel. While these installations will still have missions to accomplish, the employees will be stressed about their careers and employment security. In this atmosphere, productivity will suffer and the employees’ overall quality of life may diminish. The Department has a number of mitigating placement, transition, and worker assistance programs to draw from, including the following:

- The Priority Placement Program provides for the referral and mandatory placement of displaced employees who are qualified for other vacancies within the Department. Other programs provide various types of referral and priority considerations for Defense and other Federal agencies’ job vacancies.
- The Department’s permanent Voluntary Early Retirement Authority allows eligible employees to retire early and receive a reduced annuity.
- The Voluntary Separation Incentive Program (with a cash payment) authorizes the Department to encourage displaced employees to separate voluntarily by resignation or retirement to avoid an involuntary separation of another employee.
- The Department’s Homeowners Assistance Program provides financial assistance to relocating military and DoD civilians when they must sell their homes in a market that has been adversely impacted by a BRAC action.
- The U.S. Department of Labor provides funding for assistance to displaced Federal employees. Under the Workforce Investment Act, assistance may include counseling, testing, placement assistance, retraining, and other related services. This assistance is available through the appropriate state employment security agencies.
The DATA – Terms Defined

- **Military Value**
  - Criteria 1 – 4 (WIDGET): Generate Bulk of Military Value Score
    - Current and Future Missions (46%)
    - Infrastructure Availability and Condition (41.5%)
    - Contingency, Mobilization, Surge and Future Force Requirements (10%)
    - Cost of Operations and Manpower (2.5%)

- **Missions 1 – 8**
  - CSAR/SOF
  - Fighter
  - Bomber
  - Airlift
  - Tanker
  - C2ISR
  - UAV
  - Space

Source: Vol 1 Part 1 DoD BRAC Report (Pg 18, BRAC 2005 Selection Criteria, para 2 / Pg D-35, Section 2913 Selection Criteria for 2005 Round, para b)

**(b) MILITARY VALUE CRITERIA**— The military value criteria are as follows:

1. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations.
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training.
4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications.

Source: Vol 1 Part 1 DoD BRAC Report (Pg 21, Military Value Analysis, para 1)

**Military Value Analysis (Criteria 1-4)**

As required by statute, the **military value of an installation or activity was the primary consideration in developing the Department’s recommendations for base realignments and closures.** The Department determined that **military value had two components: a quantitative component and a qualitative component.** The qualitative component is the exercise of military judgment and experience to ensure rational application of the criteria. This component is discussed further in the context of scenario analysis. The quantitative component, explained in greater detail below, assigns attributes, metrics, and weights to the selection criteria to arrive at a relative scoring of facilities within assigned functions.

To arrive at a quantitative military value score, the proponents began by identifying attributes, or characteristics, for each criterion. The proponents then weighted attributes to reflect their relative importance based upon things such as their military judgment or experience, the Secretary of Defense’s transformational guidance, and BRAC principles. A set of metrics was subsequently developed to measure these attributes (WIDGET). These were also weighted to reflect relative importance, again using, for example, military judgment, transformational guidance, and BRAC principles. Once attributes had been identified and weighted, the proponent developed questions for use in military value data calls. If more than one question was required to assess a given metric, these were also weighted. Each analytical proponent prepared a scoring plan, and data call questions were forwarded to the field. These plans established how answers to data call questions were to be evaluated and scored. With the scoring plans in place, the Military Departments and JCSGs completed their military value data calls. These were then forwarded to the field by the Military Departments and Defense Agencies. The analytical proponents input the certified data responses into the scoring plans to arrive at a numerical score and a relative quantitative military value ranking of facilities/installations against their peers (COBRA).
The DATA – Terms Defined

• Mission Capabilities Indices (MCI):
  − Transmogrified Data for each Criteria 1 – 4
  − Overall MCI rating for all bases
  − “Objective” installation comparison for military value
  − “BIG” is good

• Data Collection through WIDGET
  − Weighted averages throughout

• Final Score for Military Value
  − “Small” is good
  − ??? To get from MCI score to MV score
  − No table of comparison values between installations

Source: Vol I Part 2 DoD BRAC Report (Pg AF2, Military Value Analysis, para 1) & Vol V Part 1 DoD BRAC Report AF (Pg 43, para 3.1.2)

Military Value Analysis
The Service assessed the military value of its operational bases using certified data derived from individual installations. Rather than focus on fungible attributes like assigned personnel or relocatable equipment and forces, the military value assessment stressed installation characteristics that were either immutable or outside the control of the Air Force or were difficult to replicate elsewhere due to expense or complexity. Immutable characteristics include geographic location and proximity to other physical features or defense activities, terrain, and prevailing weather. Difficult-to-reconstitute characteristics include the installation’s transportation infrastructure, missile silos, or basic airfield infrastructure.

Applying operational capability data collected through a web-based installation data gathering and entry tool to BRAC Selection Criteria 1-4 and the weighing guidance assigned by the BCEG, each of the Air Force’s 154 installations was given a Mission Capability Index (MCI). For a given installation, there was a separate MCI for each of the eight mission areas (fighter, bomber, tanker, airlift, special operation / combat search and rescue, intelligence / surveillance / reconnaissance, unmanned aerial vehicles, and space control).

Ultimately, using these data to assess all Active and Reserve Component installations on an equal basis, all installations were rank ordered on their relative ability to support the eight Air Force missions. The objective was to find an optimal long-term basing plan that, within physical and operational constraints, located the Air Force’s long-term force structure at installations with the highest military value.

*tr.v.* trans·mog·ri·fied, trans·mog·ri·fy·ing, trans·mog·ri·fies

To change into a different shape or form, especially one that is fantastic or bizarre
Comparative Analysis

• BRAC stated Purpose
  – Transformation
  – Military Value
  – Cost Savings

DoD Vol I, Cover Letter, bottom of 1st to 2nd page.
Comparative Analysis: Transformation

- Definition: a process by which the Air Force achieves and maintains advantage through changes in Operational Concepts, Organizations and/or Technologies that significantly improve its war fighting capabilities or ability to meet the demands of a changing security environment.

- Take-Away
  - Ability to accept new missions is important.
  - Rating “HI” in more missions should be better than just one.

Source: AF Transformation WEB
Comparative Analysis: Transformation

- Battle Creek scored better than the 4 of 5 other ANG A-10 bases on 5 of 8 missions
- Battle Creek’s overall MCI was better than 4 out of the 5 other ANG A-10 bases
- Bottom Line: Looking at Future Capability, BC better suited for more missions than 4 of the other 5 ANG A-10 bases.

Note: The comparative analysis was done utilizing the AF data which is flawed (see BRAC process concerns later in brief)

Comparative Analysis: Transformation
## Comparative Analysis: Transformation

- **Raw Data**

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<td>62.74</td>
<td>63.36</td>
<td>53.29</td>
<td>45.64</td>
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<tr>
<td>Willow Grove</td>
<td>37.71</td>
<td>49.69</td>
<td>35.58</td>
<td>35.85</td>
<td>40.94</td>
<td>47.95</td>
<td>60.56</td>
<td>11.62</td>
<td>39.99</td>
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<tr>
<td>Selfridge</td>
<td>42.06</td>
<td>48.07</td>
<td>33.86</td>
<td>47.27</td>
<td>58.24</td>
<td>63.74</td>
<td>62.07</td>
<td>21.35</td>
<td>47.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Comparative Analysis: Transformation

![Bar chart showing the average MCI scores across different installations](image)
Comparative Analysis: Transformation

- **Raw Data**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BASE</th>
<th>Current and Future Miss</th>
<th>Condition of Infrastructure</th>
<th>Costing/Mob/Future Forces</th>
<th>Cost of Manpower</th>
<th>Overall MCI Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barnes</td>
<td>44.93</td>
<td>35.57</td>
<td>28.18</td>
<td>47.17</td>
<td>39.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boise</td>
<td>60.70</td>
<td>50.45</td>
<td>16.08</td>
<td>78.40</td>
<td>54.91</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bradley</td>
<td>41.41</td>
<td>38.07</td>
<td>16.08</td>
<td>43.06</td>
<td>37.54</td>
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<td>Baltimore</td>
<td>52.30</td>
<td>27.64</td>
<td>16.30</td>
<td>58.71</td>
<td>38.59</td>
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<tr>
<td>Battle Creek</td>
<td>47.73</td>
<td>42.24</td>
<td>41.40</td>
<td>58.81</td>
<td>46.64</td>
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<td>Willow Grove</td>
<td>46.43</td>
<td>39.20</td>
<td>13.71</td>
<td>39.74</td>
<td>39.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selfridge</td>
<td>44.78</td>
<td>52.83</td>
<td>35.00</td>
<td>42.91</td>
<td>47.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 1 – Current and Future Missions

• Current Mission: Combat Proven Superior Performing A-10 Fighter Wing
  − Only ANG A-10 unit to Receive an “OUTSTANDING” rating on an Air Combat Command (ACC) Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI) in the last 9 years.
  − 1 of 3 ANG Fighter Units to Support 3 Combat Operations in the Last 8 Years
  − Only ANG unit to Deploy to Operation Southern Watch – return home – within 3 weeks return to Southwest Asia for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) – Deployed twice the personnel and equipment
  − 466 Combat Sorties and over 1164 Combat hrs flown in support of OIF by 110th A-10s
  − Unit Volunteered and was Selected to Deploy into Iraq (Tallil Airfield) within 1 week of initiation hostilities in OIF
  − 110 FW has supported 39 Deployments with over 3,000 personnel and nearly 1000 short tons of cargo in the last 10 yrs

*OIF – ANG/AFRC A-10s comprised the bulk of the deployed A-10s. Of 6 deployed A-10 units, 5 were ARC aircraft.

**If OEF is included, 6 of 7 deployed A-10 units were ANG/AFRC during the time of “major combat operations” in OIF (Mar-Apr 2003)

Combat Operations – Last 10 Years
1995 – Operation Deny Flight (Bosnia)
1997 – Operation Joint Endeavor (Bosnia)
1999 – Operation Noble Anvil (Kosovo)
2000 – Operation Southern Watch (Iraq)
2002 – Operation Southern Watch (Iraq)
2002 – Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan)
2003 – Operation Iraqi Freedom (Iraq)

A number of folks (mostly transportation, chaplains and security) have been activated to support on-going operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, since “major” combat ended.
Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 1 – Current and Future Missions

• Current Readiness = Future Mission Capability

• COMBAT Experienced Force
  – From OIF: 14 Distinguished Flying Crosses and 10 Bronze Stars
  – Avg A-10 Time per Pilot (Full Time) = 2340hrs
  – Avg Combat Time per Pilot (Full Time) = 191hrs
  – Avg Pilot has served a minimum of 2 Combat Tours

• Highly Qualified Pilot Force
  – Special Qualifications: Flight Leads – 93%; Instructors 55%;
    Forward Air Controllers – 86%; Night Vision Goggle – 100%;
    Joint Air Attack Team – 69%; Targeting POD – 80%; Combat
    Search and Rescue – 79% Combat Experience – 80%

Source: 110 FW Flight records & 110 OG Stan/Eval (Letter of “X”)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total A-10 Hrs</th>
<th>Total Time</th>
<th>Combat Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total hrs all pilots</td>
<td>52381.4</td>
<td>78606.5</td>
<td>5054.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Averages Hours All Pilots</td>
<td>1689.72</td>
<td>2535.69</td>
<td>163.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Part-Time Hours</td>
<td>25795.6</td>
<td>44975.9</td>
<td>2950.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Part-Time Hours</td>
<td>1289.78</td>
<td>2248.80</td>
<td>147.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Full Time Hours</td>
<td>25735.5</td>
<td>33630.6</td>
<td>2104.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Full-Time Hours</td>
<td>2339.59</td>
<td>3057.33</td>
<td>191.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Special Qual</th>
<th>Number with Qual</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-Ship Flt Lead</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>93.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-Ship Flt Lead</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>72.41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IP</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>55.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAC</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>86.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVG</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAAT</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>68.97%</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSAR</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>82.76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCC</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>48.28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LASDT 300'</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>93.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACM ATTKR</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>89.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BARON</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>68.97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT POD</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>79.31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVG T/O + LND</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>44.83%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Combat Experience 23  79.31%
Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 1 – Current and Future Missions

- Only ANG A-10 Unit with 0 Class A or B Mishaps since 1995
- Current Readiness = Future Mission Capability
  - Top Average “Fully Mission Capable” (FMC) Rate for A-10 aircraft out of all ANG A-10 Units for last 10 yrs
  - 110th A-10 Fleet has flown more hours than any other ANG A-10 unit over the last 8 yrs
  - Most Combat Hours for any ANG A-10 unit during OIF
  - Maintenance Personnel 1,039 yrs combined A-10 experience - 11yrs Avg for each Maintainer
  - Full Partner in Total Force: 110 FW has fulfilled ALL Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) and Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS) Taskings levied – 0 Shortfalls

Source: AF Safety Center Mishap Records
Safety: 10 Class A or B mishap in ANG A-10 units since 1995, Cost = approx $31.9 million

Source: 103 FW/MXOA/MXQ, 104 FW/MXOA/MXQ, 110 FW/MXOA/MXQ, 111 FW/MXOA/MXQ, 124 FW/MXOA/MXQ, 175 FW/MXOA/MXQ, ANG
A10 Guard Fleet Mission Capable Rate Average (Last 10 years).
110th 72.8%
175th 68.2%
111th 67.3%
103rd 59.9%
124th 69.8%
104th 63.9%

A10 Reserve Fleet Mission Capable Rate Average (Last 5 years).
926 62.4%
917 75.3%
442 74.3%

Mission Capable Rate Average (Last 5 years)
110th 75.7%

A10 Guard Fleet Hours Flown (Last 8 years).
110th 34,772.9
175th 31,546.2
111th 31,772.6
103rd 31,355.1
124th 33,900.2
104th 34,643

Reserves fly comparable hours to the A10 Guard Fleet.
Active Duty A10 Units do not send us their stats but from Air Force Periodicals their MC rates are generally in the 50% range, as printed in these AF publications.
As far as Combat Sorties/Hours March 2003 the 110th flew 466 sorties and 1,164.2 hours
Source: 110 FW Personnel and Training Records
Our A-10 Technicians/Specialists average over 11 years of experience on the A-10, some have 20 years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapons</th>
<th>11.6 years average</th>
<th>209 total years</th>
<th>18 workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crew Chiefs</td>
<td>12 years</td>
<td>218 years</td>
<td>18 workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avionics</td>
<td>10.7 years</td>
<td>204 years</td>
<td>19 workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propulsion</td>
<td>12 years</td>
<td>170 years</td>
<td>14 workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accessories</td>
<td>10.1 years</td>
<td>172 years</td>
<td>17 workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheet metal</td>
<td>11 years</td>
<td>66 years</td>
<td>6 workers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1039 years experience by 92 Specialists
Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 1 – Current and Future Missions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Hours Flown Last 10 yrs</th>
<th>Avg FMC Rate last 10 yrs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Battle Creek</td>
<td>34772.9</td>
<td>72.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltimore</td>
<td>31546.2</td>
<td>68.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willow Grove</td>
<td>31772.6</td>
<td>67.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bradley</td>
<td>31355.1</td>
<td>59.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boise</td>
<td>33900.2</td>
<td>69.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barnes</td>
<td>34643</td>
<td>63.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ANG A-10 Flying Hour / FMC Rate Comparison
Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 1 – Current and Future Missions

- Unfailing Support for Combat Ops from Smallest Recruiting Base

![Bar Graph Showing Recruiting Base](image)

Source: ANG/DP

110 FW Manning: Assigned 1096, Full Time Federal (GS or AGR) 206 AGR / 66 AGR, 824 Traditional

Manning Levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Base</th>
<th>Recruiting Base (K)</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barnes</td>
<td>374.117</td>
<td>85.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boise</td>
<td>314.811</td>
<td>93.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bradley</td>
<td>760.935</td>
<td>87.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltimore</td>
<td>1568.14</td>
<td>95.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle Creek</td>
<td>74.652</td>
<td>101.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willow Grove</td>
<td>2273.372</td>
<td>100.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selfridge</td>
<td>1505.252</td>
<td>97.80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 1 – Current and Future Missions

- Highest Manning Levels of ALL ANG A-10 Units since 2001
ANG End Strength
As of 31 March 2005

Green: Less than or equal to 2% of annual target =>
96.7%  22
Yellow: 94.7-96.6%  8
Red: Greater than or equal to 2% of annual target
<=94.6%  24

Source: ANG/DP
Manning Levels

<table>
<thead>
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<tr>
<td>Selfridge</td>
<td>1505.252</td>
<td>97.80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 1 – Current and Future Missions

• Joint Operations
  – SEAL Deployment
  – Ft Campbell
  – Israel – Civil Engineers
  – Honduras - Medical

• Homeland Defense / Homeland Security
  – Operation Vigilant State
  – On-Going support of MI State Police
  – Alternate Command Facility for Federal Center

Source:  110 FW/XP Deployment records
Source:  MI NG/HQ Operation Vigilant State AAR

Operation Vigilant State:
1. An Exercise conducted in combination with MI Dept of HMS, FBI, BATFE, Dept of Military and Veterans Affairs (Air & Army Guard), Coast Guard, Federal Air Marshals, FAA, Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Transportation and Security Administration, MI State Police, Wayne County Airport Authority, Local Law Enforcement
2. Reaction to and Suppression of a potential MANPAD threat targeted against the Detroit Metropolitan Airport.
4. After action report available upon request.
Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 1 – Current and Future Missions
Battle Creek – Ft Custer Joint Facility

7500 Acres of Federal Land Available for Growth
DoD Joint Integration Board

Why a Southwest Michigan Joint Complex?

JOINT TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES
CROSS-SUPPORT
POSSIBLE CONSOLIDATION
IMPACT AWARENESS/VISIBILITY
A COMMUNICATIONS CONDUIT

Number of Units within 30 miles: Approximately 40
Number of Personnel: Over 4000
Number of Congressional Districts: 2
Total Economic Impact: Est. Over $200,000,000
DoD Joint Integration Board

Highlighted Units Indicate those units Battle Creek ANGB directly supports or operates Jointly with on a regular basis.
Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure

• 16yr Average Age of Facilities
  – 80% Built after 1991 – focused on A-10 mission
• No Encroachment Challenges
• 10,000’ Runway – Alternate Shuttle Landing Site, Utilized by Air Force One
• Largest Most Modern Munitions Storage Facility in Southwest MI
• Room for Growth
  – Over 41,000 sq ft available in authorized square footage for new facilities
  – Over 45 acres available for building
• New Control Tower
• Planned Parallel Runway to Facilitate Larger Fighter Presence
• Facility can support 36 A-10’s TODAY, without modification

Source: 110 FW Real Property Records, W.K. Kellogg Airfield Management
Auth Space = 373,680 sq ft
Actual Space = 332,377
Space Shortage = 41,303 (89%)
Source: W.K. Kellogg Planning Commission (Airfield Management)
Proposed New parallel RWY and supporting taxiways
Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure

Source: 110 FW Real Property Records, 110 FW Land Use Plan
Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure

- Prime Training Location
  - Access to 3 Air-to-Surface Ranges – 2 Allow LIVE weapons within 200nm (Including Laser Guided Munitions – very rare due to munition footprint)
  - Access to 6 Military Operating Areas (MOA) within 200nm
  - 2 Army Maneuver Areas within 200nm
- Allows for large numbers of aircraft training simultaneously
- Ideal Location for Increased Operations

DoD FLIP Publications, Applicable Range Regulations

Air-to-Surface Ranges:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Sq Miles</th>
<th>Airspace</th>
<th>Live Drop</th>
<th>Dist From BC (NM)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R-4201 Grayling Range</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>Surf – 23,000</td>
<td>Yes (LGB)</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-3401 Atterbury Range</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>Surf – 25,000</td>
<td>No (Inert Only)</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-3403 Jefferson Range</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>Surf – 24,000</td>
<td>Yes (LGB)</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Military Operating Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Sq Miles</th>
<th>Low Altitude</th>
<th>High Altitude</th>
<th>Dist From BC (NM)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hersey</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>5,000 – 23,000</td>
<td>Dry Only</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Mile</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>500’ – 10,000</td>
<td>Dry Only</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hilltop</td>
<td>1120</td>
<td>10,000 – 34,000</td>
<td>Dry Only</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steelhead</td>
<td>3240</td>
<td>6,000 – 18,000 (ATCAA 50,000)</td>
<td>110</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pike(E/W)</td>
<td>10144</td>
<td>6,000 – 18,000 (ATCAA 50,000)</td>
<td>137</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buckeye</td>
<td>2040</td>
<td>5,000 – 18,000</td>
<td>191</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR-107 Air Refueling Track</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>14,000 – 23,000</td>
<td>86</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Comprehensive Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure
Battle Creek Ranges & Airspace

200nm Range from BC – Range chosen based on normal sortie duration (1.5 – 2.0hrs) with 45 – 60 minutes of range time available for training.
Compared to BC

1. Loss of 2 Air-to-Ground Ranges, including 1 with Live Munition and LGB capability

2. Place 2 MOAs at Max training range, limiting low altitude training – navigation of Detroit Airspace, to/from MOAs
Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure - Willow Grove Ranges & Airspace (Significant Reduction in Availability)

Notes:
1. Ft Drum complex – primary range – greater than 200nm from WG
2. MOA airspace extremely limited – only MOA within 200nm limited to 8,000 – 17,999
3. Whiskey areas available off coast – extremely limited use to A-10 aircraft

Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure – Barnes/Bradley Ranges & Airspace (Significant Reduction in Availability)

Note:
1. Congested East Coast Airspace
2. Long Distance to Air-to-Surface ranges through congested airspace

Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure
Battle Creek Ranges & Airspace HUB+SPOKE!

Stark comparison to other airfields.
Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure

• Selfridge Facilities
  − MCI scores based on facilities not available post BRAC
  − Average age of remaining facilities: 51yrs (BC = 16yrs)
  − Lost Square Footage: 244,017 sq.ft.
  − Primary Hangar Space Built in 1932 and 1955 (1960 and 2005 @ Battle Creek)
  − MCI score difference:
    • Selfridge: Max Points = 3.88
    • Battle Creek = 1.94

Note: Hangar Space is referenced in formula 1221 (Fighter MCI)

Source: 110 FW & 127 WG Real Property Records, BRAC CE assessment (Facilities to be lost), Dept of the AF BRAC Analysis and Recommendations Vol V Parts 1 & 2.

Available Hangar Space Comparison (sq ft):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battle Creek</th>
<th>Selfridge</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Building</td>
<td>Size</td>
<td>Year Built</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6900</td>
<td>26,118</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6901</td>
<td>12,551</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6917</td>
<td>17,096</td>
<td>1988</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Bld 154 square footage not included as the facility cannot support A-10 aircraft (too short) and will require significant modification to accommodate new mission.
Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure

• Selfridge Facilities
  • Required Renovations:
    • Fuel Cell: Not Large enough for A-10, Cost?
    • Hangars: 89,863 sqft of 1932/55 vintage Hangar space
    • Cost to Renovate: $14,229,806
  • Other Possible Renovations:
    • Facilities Built in 1932 = 100,668 sqft total
    • Cost to renovate = $15,940,777

• Closure of the Army Garrison
  • Additional Security costs?
  • Additional Encroachment Challenges

Source: Recent remodel of W.K. Kellogg Hanger completed in March of 2005 (20,208 sq ft) $3.2 million. $158.35 per sqft for renovation of hangars

Seldridge Facilities (Real property records):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bld</th>
<th>Year Built</th>
<th>Size (sq ft)</th>
<th>Cost to Renovate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>154</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>? (Not Large enough for A-10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td>33,535</td>
<td>$5,310,267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td>32,890</td>
<td>$5,208,131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td>34,243</td>
<td>$5,422,379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>100,668</td>
<td>$15,940,777 (Bld 154 not included)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Army Garrison Closure, Vol I Part 2 DoD BRAC Report (pg Army-106)
Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure

Source: AF BRAC IVT
CODE 1 (Usable – Class A, Adequate)
- A facility which can be used to house the function for which currently designated through and position use with reasonable maintenance and minimal major alteration or reconstruction.

CODE 2 (Usable – Class B, Substandard)
- Upgrading Required and Practical: A facility which is structurally sound, and which is inherently capable of being raised to Usable–Class A standards for housing function for which currently designated by reasonable and practical expenditure of funds.

CODE 3 (Force Use – Substandard)
- A facility that cannot practically be raised to Usable–Class A standards for housing function for which it is currently designated. The facility, because of necessity must be continued in use for a short duration or until a suitable facility can be obtained.

CODE 4 (Sterile)
- A facility which (a) does not meet the condition classification codes 1, 2, 3, or 5; (b) is excess to mission requirement in designated, changed, or controlled use and is not due to economic considerations—considered appropriate for disposal.

CODE 5 (Facilities Committed to Congress)
- Identifies all facilities committed to Congress for disposal. This code will not be changed unless HQ USAF approves permanent retention. Programmed for demolition.

CODE 6 (Disposal Approved by All Levels of the Air Force)
- Identifies all facilities approved for disposal within the AF other than those in condition 5. Approved for Demolition.

Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – ANG A-10 Facility Comparison

Source: ANG A-10 Base Real Property Records
Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – ANG A-10 Facility Comparison

Source: ANG A-10 Base Real Property Records
### Comparative Analysis: Military Value

#### Criterion 2 – ANG A-10 Facility Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BASE</th>
<th>CAT 1</th>
<th>CAT 2</th>
<th>CAT 3</th>
<th>CAT 4/6</th>
<th>% Built/Renovated before 1994</th>
<th>% Built/Renovated After 1994</th>
<th>% Built/Renovated After 2000</th>
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<tr>
<td>W.K. Kellogg</td>
<td>85.71%</td>
<td>11.90%</td>
<td>2.38%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>23.81%</td>
<td>76.19%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Selfridge</td>
<td>42.86%</td>
<td>43.30%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>16.25%</td>
<td>51.25%</td>
<td>32.50%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>83.75%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Willow Grove</td>
<td>59.70%</td>
<td>32.84%</td>
<td>7.46%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>71.64%</td>
<td>28.36%</td>
<td>2.99%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: ANG A-10 Base Real Property Records
Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure
Encroachment Challenges – Martin State

Note:
1. Congested Airspace
2. Dense Population

AF Study to see where accidents occur in relation to airport
   Conducted in 1973 and updated in 1995

Results found:
   61% of accidents related to landing operations
   30% of accidents related to takeoff operations
   80% were fighter or training aircraft

CLEAR ZONE
   Adjacent to end of runway
   3000’ X 3000’
   27.4 % of all Air Force Accidents

ACCIDENT POTENTIAL ZONE I (APZ I)
   Adjacent to Clear Zone
   3000’ X 5000’
   10.1 % of all Air Force Accidents

ACCIDENT POTENTIAL ZONE II
   Adjacent to APZ I
   3000’ x 7000’
   5.6 % of all Air Force Accidents

CLEAR ZONE USE PROHIBITED
   For anything that produces light emissions
   For anything that unnecessarily attracts birds or waterfowl
   Generally acquires the land through purchase or easement to prevent development

ACCIDENT POTENTIAL ZONE I (APZ I)
   Less critical but still possesses significant hazards
   Allows industrial/manufacturing, transportation, communications/utilities, whole sale trade, open space, recreation and agriculture

ACCIDENT POTENTIAL ZONE II
   Less critical but still possesses significant hazards
   Same uses as APZ I
   as well as low density single family residential
   personal and business services
   commercial/retail trade uses of low intensity or scale of operations.
   High people density should be limited to the maximum extent possible
   Optimum density recommended for residential usage is one dwelling per acre
Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure
Encroachment Challenges – Martin State

Note:
1. Short Runway
2. Dense Population
Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure
Encroachment Challenges – Martin State

Housing in clear zones
Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure
Encroachment Challenges – Martin State

Housing in clear zones – increased since photo taken
Congested location – proximity to large metropolitan area
Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure
Encroachment Challenges – Willow Grove

Heavily populated in close proximity to Airfield
Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure
Encroachment Challenges – Willow Grove

Dense population in clear zones
Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure
Encroachment Challenges – Willow Grove
Congested location – proximity to large metropolitan area and Canada
AF was forced to purchase 2,562 acres off the southern end of RWY 01/19 ($720,563) to limit current encroachment problems.
Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure
Encroachment Challenges – Selfridge

Dense population
Housing continues to be built in clear zones, additional land purchase by AF may be required to avoid further encroachment
"Middle of nowhere" but convenient to metropolitan areas for HMD/HMS missions.
Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure
No Encroachment Challenges – Battle Creek
Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure
No Encroachment Challenges – Battle Creek

0 housing in clear zone
Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure
No Encroachment Challenges – Battle Creek

O housing in clear zones and majority of airfield is surrounded by farm land and Ft Custer
Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 3 – Contingency, Mobilization & Future Forces

• Supporting 39 AF Deployments with over 3,000 personnel, nearly 1000 short tons of cargo in the last 10 yrs

• OIF – ANG/AFRC A-10s comprised the bulk of the deployed A-10s. Of 6 deployed A-10 units, 5 were ARC aircraft.

• Combat Operations – Last 10 Years
  − 1995 – Operation Deny Flight (Bosnia)
  − 1997 – Operation Joint Endeavor (Bosnia)
  − 1999 – Operation Noble Anvil (Kosovo)
  − 2000 – Operation Southern Watch (Iraq)
  − 2002 – Operation Southern Watch (Iraq)
  − 2002 – Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan)
  − 2003 – Operation Iraqi Freedom (Iraq)

Source: 110 FW/XP, AF/XP
Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 3 – Contingency, Mobilization & Future Forces

- Joint Operations & Capabilities
  - Since 2002, 110 FW provided deployment support for multiple Non-AF Units – 10 deployments, 1076 PAX & 245 short tons cargo
  - Primary Deployment center for 51st Civil Support Team – Regional Disaster Response Team

- Joint Training Facility for ARNG, ANG, Marine and Navy Reserve utilizing Ft Custer – W.K. Kellogg Facilities

- Ideal Location for “Aeroport” Operations - Deploying Aircraft, Personnel & Equipment throughout the Globe

Source: 110 FW/XP
Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 3 – Contingency, Mobilization & Future Forces

- Raw Deployment Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<td>3</td>
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</table>
Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 4 – Cost of Operations & Manpower

• BRAC Report States
  - $8.3 Million one time cost to Close W.K. Kellogg
  - Save $14.4 million annually during implementation period
  - $167 million in savings over 20 years”

• The REAL Numbers – Over $16.9 million -
  $77.5 million in COSTS not savings
  - What’s Included
  - Assumptions
  - “Hidden” Costs

Areas Included to determine actual cost savings when closing BC:
1. Infrastructure Maintenance and Support
2. All other costs are transferred (see assumptions)

Areas included to determine cost to move unit:
1. Personnel retraining costs based on 50% new unit – current costs do not include MX (still researching)
2. Additional Annual Training and Drill Costs
3. Cost to move the “required” personnel (PCS)
4. Did not include costs to repair/upgrade facilities at new location (difficult to accurately quantify)

Assumptions:
1. ARC End Strength remains unchanged through FY11

DoD BRAC Report Vol I (pg11) End-strength (k) & (GAO)-05-785

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY05</th>
<th>FY07</th>
<th>FY09</th>
<th>FY11</th>
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<td>USAF AC</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>350</td>
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<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
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</table>

2. 50% of the “Combined” unit will require complete retraining
3. Number of personnel commuting would not change, used actual numbers based on BC personnel
4. AFIs were utilized to the max extent possible to define “combat capable”, i.e. AFI 11-202 Vol I for pilots on training/hours required for upgrades
5. Based on Current BRAC plan, there will be overlap between 110 FW and 127 FW personnel.
6. A-10 TX and B Course costs provided by ANG Training
7. ACC/DD provided flying hour costs = $3433 per hour for the A-10 (AF/FMC)
8. Retraining costs include cost of additional sorties to return squadron to previous quals, but does not include the extra IP sorties expended on the training (difficult to quantify as most will count towards IP training, but some will not)
9. Overall personnel operating costs do not change as the ARC end strength is unchanged
10. No savings on equipment as the new unit will require all the same equipment
11. No savings from closing the F-16 and C-130 unit at Selfridge should be attributable to the closure of BC
12. All training course can be accomplished when desired (i.e. no waiting for class dates)

Hidden Costs
• Loss of Readiness – Fighter Squadron, CST Support, Marine Support, HMD Support
• Removal of the Citizenry from the Military
• Family Costs
Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 4 – Cost of Operations & Manpower

• ACTUAL Cost to Operate W.K. Kellogg
  – $650,000 Annually in facility operating and maintenance
  – $0 property lease
  – $0 personnel cost – TRANSFERRED
  – $0 equipment cost – TRANSFERRED
  – $57,000 Airfield support costs (snow removal, etc.)
  – $4,217,411 Operations Maintenance Budget Savings
    (Note: some of these costs may transfer with personnel and equipment)

• Savings over 20 years = $84.35 million (no discount applied)

Source: 110 FW/FM Budget Records

Potentially Non-Transferred Operations and Maintenance Costs

<p>| | |</p>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supply &amp; Equipment</td>
<td>$401,760</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contract Services</td>
<td>$91,192</td>
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<td>IT Support</td>
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<td>Environmental</td>
<td>$14,400</td>
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<td>FOMA/RPS</td>
<td>$803,000</td>
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<td>Security Agreement</td>
<td>$406,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Firefighter Agreement</td>
<td>$2,260,300</td>
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Potential (Maximum) Savings

Over 20 years $84,348,220

Note: No discount rates applied to savings numbers – actual savings would be significantly less.
Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 4 – Cost of Operations & Manpower

- The REAL cost of the closure and move
  - FACILITIES – construction of new buildings, modification of existing facilities at new location as they do not accommodate the A-10 Operations = $Unknown
    - Selfridge Remaining Facilities Average Age > 51yrs
    - Most Selfridge Maintenance Facilities built in 1932
    - Note: Many facilities included in BRAC analysis will be “moth balled” or demolished – inaccurate collection
  - New Simulator Building / Fire Station Upgrade / Fuel Cell Modifications
- PERSONNEL
  - PCS Moves
    - 206 GS Employees = $7,821,138
    - 66 AGR Employees = $846,994
- TRAINING
  - Increase in Annual Training (AT) and Drill Costs
    - $1,023,276/yr ($20,465,520/20yr)
  - Retraining Costs

Source: Cost analysis basis derived from JFTR (Joint Federal Travel Regulation)

New Commuters Annual

Training

Additional Per Diem Expense/day $21

600 @15 days/ year $189,000 additional per diem for 15 AT days for 600 traditional guardsmen

Additional Mileage Expense

600 @ .37 @ 150 miles $33,300 per AT day

600 @ 15 AT days $499,500 for 15 AT days for 600 guardsmen

UTA

377 people Fri & Sat Nights $27,898 *additional cost to cover new commuters outside 50 mile radius

12 UTA's $334,776 Total cost for contract quarters

$1,023,276
Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 4 – Cost of Operations & Manpower

- TRAINING
  - PILOT TX/B COURSES
    - B Course $3.4 Million per pilot
    - TX Course $990,000 per pilot
    - 50% Unit Retraining: Cost for 14 TX and 4 B Courses = $27,460,000
    - 100% Unit Retraining: 32 TX and 4 B Courses = $45,280,000
  - 5 Years A-10 Flying (IOC)
    - 18 Pilots = $40,227,894
    - 36 Pilots = $80,455,788
  - Additional Sorties over 5 Years to regain Qualifications (Based on Current Qual Levels)
    - Flying Cost to regain Quals (18 pilots) = $4,322,137
    - Flying Cost to regain Quals (36 pilots) = $6,962,982
  - TOTAL Pilot Retraining (Over 5 Years)
    - $72,010,031 to $132,698,770

Source: AFI 11-2A/OA-10 Vol 1 (Cost per flying Hour AF/FMC)
All sortie counts are minimums:
18 Pilots
1 year to get experienced = 84 sorties/pilot
4 years training to regain all quals = 288 sorties/pilot
Avg sortie duration 1.75 hrs
372 sorties/pilot X 1.75 hrs = 651 hrs Avg time per pilot (**Compared to now – 1700hrs)
651hrs X 18 pilots X $3,433 per flight hour = $40,227,894

 Experienced Aircrew (EXP)—For pilots: hours are FP/IP/MP and fighter time is defined as FP/IP/MP hours logged in aircraft with an assigned an AFSC of 11FX. OA-10 is considered fighter time. An experienced pilot has: 500 hrs PAI, or 1,000 hrs (FP/IP/MP), of which 300 are PAI, or 600 fighter hrs, of which 200 hrs are PAI, or previously fighter EXPERIENCED and 100 hrs PAI.

Sorties to regain quals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th># Pilots</th>
<th>Retrain 18 pilots to Qual percentages</th>
<th>Retrain 36 Pilots</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sorties</td>
<td>Hours</td>
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<td>16.8</td>
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<td>65.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
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</table>

1259 hours X $3,433/hr = $4,322,137

$6,962,982
Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 4 – Cost of Operations & Manpower

• How Long Will the Retraining Take?
  – TX Course – 4 Months
  – B Course – 7 Months (PCS)
  – Davis Monthan AFB can support 2 classes per year
    with 15 students Max
  – Barksdale AFB can support 1 class per year (B
    Course) with 4 Students Max, TX course – 5 per year
    with 6 – 8 students Max

• How many slots will be available for ANG
  retraining?

Source: Det 3 TRSS/OTD Davis Monthan AFB & 442 FW Barskdale AFB
Training
Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 4 – Cost of Operations & Manpower

• Training – MX personnel
  – Although an unlikely scenario – 100% full retraining of MX personnel would cost over $6.6 Million
  – This cost is not included in the overall retraining totals; however, the cost is more than $0 as currently defined in COBRA

Supporting Data located in MX DATA Collection file.
Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 4 – Cost of Operations & Manpower

- **Bottom Line Cost Analysis**
  - Savings Over 20 years = $84.35 million
  - Costs over 20 Years
    - Personnel Movement = $8.7 million
    - Retraining Costs = $72 million - $132.6 million
    - Increased AT/Drill Cost = $20.5 million
  - **NET:**
    - Savings $84.35 Million
    - Costs $101.2 Million - $161.8 Million
    - **Bottom Line $16.85 - $77.45 MILLION in Costs**

Note: Costs not included –

1. Infrastructure
   a. Fire Station
   b. Sim Bld
2. Retirements and other early out incentive programs (double bill)
3. MX personnel retraining costs
BRAC Process – Concerns

• Data Gathering – Consistency
  − Installations being credited with facilities not owned or slated for removal (Army Garrison)
  − IVT (Installation Visualization Tool) – not utilized for all installations, yet “provided” tool for comparison?

• Data Gathering – Criteria (re: Fighter / SOF-CSAR Missions)
  − Favoring Large Active Duty Locations
    • Formulas 8, 1232, 1241, 1214 and 1233
  − Logical Concerns
    • Formulas 8, 1245, 1246, 1266, 1270, 1271, 1241

Source: Dept of the AF BRAC Recommendations and Analysis Vol V Part 1 (Pg 61-103) Vol V Part 2 (MCI Formulas)
Favoring AD Bases:
  8 – Joint Civil-Military fields utilize shared ramp space (ANG units not authorized large ramps, i.e. BC is authorized 30,000 sq yds)
  1232 – Sufficient Explosive sited parking
  1241 – Ability to Support Large scale mobility deployment
  1214 – Fuel dispensing rate to support mobility and Surge
  1233 – Sufficient Munitions storage
  • All of these areas are going to favor a large AD facility and put small Joint Civil-Military facilities at a disadvantage.
  • Because of QD (safety) criteria – munitions storage on a Joint Civil-Military facility is going to be limited regardless of facility capacity
  • The questions did not take into account MOUs with civil partners to increase capability
  • Further, they ignore the cost savings inherent by not maintaining these large facilities + equipment

Logical Concerns:
  8 – BC not authorized 241,000 sq yds (Max points) yet graded against that criteria? Not funded for 241,000 sq yds, BC has significant acreage available for increased ramp space if it was authorized
  1245 – Proximity to airspace supporting mission *Arbitrary distances assigned without regard for mission accomplishment, i.e. is 150 miles too much or no effect
    ** See Airspace Slides – BC has more in quantity and quality of all types of training airspace **
  1246 – Proximity to Low Level Routes Supporting Mission *Not required for most low altitude tactical training in Fighter Aircraft – dated requirement
  1266 – Range Complex Supports mission *Again distance and mission impact is the criteria, further units were assigned “ownership” which is irrelevant
  1270 – Suitable Aux Airfield within 50nm *Not relevant based on fighter fuel requirements and capabilities – not utilized in training
  1271 – Prevailing installation weather conditions *3000/3 is arbitrary, further the question should be based on weather effecting mission accomplishment. Given a standard of 300/1 for most fighter aircraft, range weather is of more significance than home station weather.
  1241 – Ability to support large scale mobility deployment *Question did not intimate a “surge” requirement. MOUs on Joint civil-military fields can drastically increase the capability of a small installation for the fraction of the cost of maintaining the facilities as DoD. This was not asked.

Installation Visualization Tool (IVT)
IVT provides the BRAC 2005 process a means of viewing imagery and geospatial data a consistent fashion for all installations meeting BRAC 2005 threshold criterion. BRAC policy memo number one (16 Apr 03, OSD/AT&L) identifies IVT as a tool to be used during the BRAC 2005 process that will enhance the Department’s overall ability to manage its infrastructure. The BRAC Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG) developed requirements for use IVT. ***Required for Use, yet NONE of the ANG A-10 bases were scored utilizing this tool, further the Selfridge IVT was incomplete***
### BRAC Process – Concerns

#### Fighter MCI Formula Discrepancy Analysis

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<th>Description</th>
<th>% Of Overall MCI Score</th>
<th>Selfridge Battle Creek</th>
<th>Adjusted Selfridge Score</th>
<th>Adjusted Battle Creek Score</th>
<th>Cumulative Selfridge</th>
<th>Cumulative Battle Creek</th>
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<td>5.52%</td>
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<td>37.6</td>
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<td>1205.2</td>
<td>Buildable Acres for Growth</td>
<td>1.86%</td>
<td>0.76 0.21</td>
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<td>1221</td>
<td>Hangar Capability – Small Aircraft</td>
<td>3.88%</td>
<td>3.98 1.94</td>
<td>44.19</td>
<td>35.68</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>31.37</td>
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</table>

Total % Effected: **36.81%**

#### SOF/CSAR MCI Formula Discrepancy Analysis

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Formula</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>% Of Overall MCI Score</th>
<th>Selfridge Battle Creek</th>
<th>Adjusted Selfridge Score</th>
<th>Adjusted Battle Creek Score</th>
<th>Cumulative Selfridge</th>
<th>Cumulative Battle Creek</th>
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<td>Proximity to DZ/LZ</td>
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<td>7.05 1.47</td>
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</table>

Total % Effected: **51.81%**
As scores are adjusted for Formula discrepancies and flaws – the difference in scores becomes statistically insignificant.
As scores are adjusted for Formula discrepancies and flaws the installations actually reverse position.
BRAC Process – Concerns

• DoD & AF Substantially Deviated from Stated BRAC Objectives and Goals

• Military Value
  – “Final Scores” do not reflect MCI analysis or real life
  – MCI process flawed in data gathering and analysis
  – “Hard Data” runs contrary to AF conclusions

• Transformation
  – Battle Creek better suited for more missions than 4 of the 5 other ANG A-10 bases
  – W.K. Kellogg & 110 FW have much to offer within the AF Transformation Plan – Readiness, Facilities, Location = Capability

• Cost Savings
  – NO SAVINGS for Air Force
  – Conservative Estimates Show $16.9 - $77.5 Million in Costs

Military Value
1. One of the Top A-10/Fighter Units in the ANG, by performance – scored very poorly – doesn’t make sense
2. Installation designed for the A-10, scores poorly in its primary mission – doesn’t make sense

Readiness
1. ANG A-10’s scheduled for AEF Cycle 6, AEFs 5 – 8 with 26 aircraft. Occurs during transfers, moves and closures. Volunteerism? These are not activations.

Citizen Soldier
1. What is the cost of keeping the public involved through the Citizen Soldier?
2. Over 800 positions will be terminated with the closure of the 110th
Bottom Line:
What Do I Lose? What do I Gain?

• Lost:
  - Top Combat Unit – Capability Does NOT Transfer
    • Over 800 Fully Trained Deployable Combat Experienced Member of the ANG
    • Pilots – One of the most Experienced and Decorated Units
    • Maintenance – Highest FMC Rate for A-10
    • Support – Unfailing World-Wide Expeditionary Combat Support
    • COMBAT Capability for Half a Decade!
  - Top Notch Facility – Designed for A-10 Operations
  - Optimum Training Location
  - Key Joint Deployment Location and Facility
  - Leading Recruiting Base of ALL ANG A-10 Units and SW MI
  - Military Connection to SW MI

• Gain:
  - NOTHING (No Increase in Capability, Does not support Transformation, No Cost savings)
WHAT’S LOST . . .
Questions
& Comments