An Incentives Approach to Improving the Unemployment Compensation System

Authors

Paul L. Burgess, Arizona State University
Jerry L. Kingston, Arizona State UniversityFollow

Publication Date

1-1-1987

Series

National Chamber Foundation report

DOI

10.17848/9780880995740

Abstract

Overpayments may account for up to 15 percent of all payments made under the unemployment compensation system. Burgess and Kingston propose that this overpayment serves as a clue to the more serious problems residing in the system. The authors focus on the lack of incentives (or the existence of disincentives) for improvement within the UC program structure for all participants - claimants, employers, and state UC agencies. Other issues they explore include the excessive complexity of the system and the difficulty of effectively monitoring claimant compliance with eligibility criteria.

Files

Contents

1. Introduction
2. Evidence on Overpayments in the UC System
3. UC System Complexity: Adverse Effects and Responses
4. Adverse Impacts of Federal Administrative Funding Procedures
5. Federal Criteria for State Agency Performance
6. Adverse Incentives in State UC Programs
7. Administering Weekly UC Eligibility Criteria
8. Summary and Conclusions

Sponsorship

Grant from the National Chamber Foundation of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce

ISBN

9780880990486 (pbk.) ; 9780880995740 (ebook)

Subject Areas

UNEMPLOYMENT, DISABILITY, and INCOME SUPPORT PROGRAMS; Unemployment insurance; Benefits and duration; Benefit financing