Publication Date
1-1-1995
DOI
10.17848/9780585183466
Abstract
Using models developed for this study which incorporate an array of behaviors generally omitted from conventional models relating backloading to turnover, Gustman and Steinmeier find that backloading plays only a slight role in explaining mobility differences associated with pension coverage. They propose that higher wages often paid at pension-covered jobs play a greater role in reducing mobility than do pensions.
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Note
Relevant reports submitted to the U.S. Dept. of Labor are entitled 'Job Mobility, Older Workers and the Role of Pensions,' September 1987; 'Evaluating Pension Policies in a Model with Endogenous Contributions,' June 1988; and 'Pension Portability and Labor Mobility,' October 1990
Sponsorship
Research supported by three grants from the U.S. Dept. of Labor and by a Martin Segal Fellowship through the Rockefeller Fund in Economics at Dartmouth College
ISBN
9780880991513 (pbk.) ; 9780585183466 (ebook)
Subject Areas
LABOR MARKET ISSUES; Retirement and pensions; Wages, health insurance and other benefits
Citation
Gustman, Alan L., and Thomas L. Steinmeier. 1995. Pension Incentives and Job Mobility. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. https://doi.org/10.17848/9780585183466
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-Share Alike 4.0 International License.
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