Advance Notice Provisions in Plant Closing Legislation

Authors

Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Cornell University
George Jakubson, Cornell University

Publication Date

1-1-1988

DOI

10.17848/9780880995344

Abstract

After summarizing the theoretical arguments for and against plant closing legislation, the authors present results of empirical analyses, based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics Survey of Displaced Workers and other data sources, that show that having advance notice appears to reduce the probability that a displaced worker will suffer any spell of unemployment.

Files

Contents

1. Introduction
2. Do Advance Notice Provisions Matter?
3. Data Used in Our Analyses
4. The Determinants of Advance Notice—Do Workers Pay For It?
5. Advance Notice and Nonemployment Duration
6. Advance Notice and Survey Date Employment and Earnings
7. Implications of Findings

Appendices

Note

Findings discussed in seminars at Cornell University, the National Bureau of Economic Research, the Upjohn Institute, and in a paper presented at the American Economic Association meeting, December 1987.

Sponsorship

Grants from the National Science Foundation Economics Program and the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.

ISBN

9780880990707 (pbk.) ; 9780880995344 (ebook)

Subject Areas

LABOR MARKET ISSUES; Job security and unemployment dynamics; Dislocated workers