Upjohn Institute working paper ; 15-219
We model the labor market impact of the key provisions of the national and Massachusetts "mandate-based" health reforms: individual mandates, employer mandates, and subsidies. We characterize the compensating differential for employer-sponsored health insurance (ESHI) and the welfare impact of reform in terms of "sufficient statistics." We compare welfare under mandate-based reform to welfare in a counterfactual world where individuals do not value ESHI. Relying on the Massachusetts reform, we find that jobs with ESHI pay $2,812 less annually, somewhat less than the cost of ESHI to employers. Accordingly, the deadweight loss of mandate-based health reform was approximately 8 percent of its potential size.
July 28, 2014
W.E. Upjohn Institute Early Career Research Award 12-137-07
LABOR MARKET ISSUES; Wages, health insurance and other benefits; Health insurance
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Kolstad, Jonathan T. and Amanda E. Kowalski. 2014. "Mandate-Based Health Reform and the Labor Market: Evidence from the Massachusetts Reform." Upjohn Institute Working Paper 15-219. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. https://doi.org/10.17848/wp15-219