Disability Insurance Screening and Worker Outcomes

Authors

Alexander Ahammer, Johannes Kepler University LinzFollow
Analisa Packham, Vanderbilt University and National Bureau of Economic ResearchFollow

Series

Upjohn Institute working paper ; 22-375

**Published Version**

In Employment Research 29(4): 4-7

DOI

10.17848/wp22-375

Issue Date

October 2022

Abstract

We estimate the returns to more targeted disability insurance (DI) programs in terms of labor force participation and worker health. To do so, we analyze male workers after an acute workplace injury that experience differential levels of application screening. We find that when workers face tighter screening requirements, they are less likely to claim disability and are more likely to remain in the labor force. We observe no differences in any physical or mental health outcomes, including reinjury. Our findings imply that imposing stricter DI screening requirements has large fiscal benefits but does not yield any detectable health costs, on the margin.

Sponsorship

W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research Early Career Research Award No. 21-58160-09 and Graf Hardegg’sche Stiftung

Subject Areas

LABOR MARKET ISSUES; UNEMPLOYMENT, DISABILITY, and INCOME SUPPORT PROGRAMS; Workers compensation and disability; Disability; Occupational health and safety