Just Cause Protection Under Manager Discrimination

Authors

Joseph Pickens, U.S. Naval Academy
Aaron Sojourner, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment ResearchFollow

Upjohn Author ORCID Identifier

https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6839-2512

Series

Upjohn Institute working paper ; 25-422

DOI

10.17848/wp25-422

Issue Date

October 2025

Abstract

“Just cause” policies aim to discourage the arbitrary firing of employees. Recent efforts at passing such laws in the U.S. have been motivated by deterring discrimination. This paper presents a framework to study the effects of just cause when managers engage in taste-based discrimination. The framework generates predictions on whether just cause will ease achievement and retention of stable employment by exploiting the timing of separations around a probationary period. Since probationary periods are a typical feature of protections, the approach is generalizable. We test predictions using New York City’s 2021 just cause law for fast-food employees. Using a synthetic difference-in-differences design on publicly available data, we do not find results consistent with taste-based discrimination against black, Hispanic, female, or older workers, though lack of enforcement or data issues could be driving the nulls. Further analysis suggests another mechanism: screening discrimination against younger workers.

Subject Areas

LABOR MARKET ISSUES; Job security and unemployment dynamics; Turnover; Wages, health insurance and other benefits